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ABSTRACT 
The thesis conducts a specific to general investigation on petroleum product subsidies in 
oil exporting countries. Starting with a specific focus on Nigeria, I examine the benefit 
incidence and the economic effects of fuel subsidies using the 2009/10 Harmonized Nigeria 
Living Standard Survey and the 2011 input-output table respectively. I then proceed to conduct 
a general analysis by empirically estimating the effects of subsidies on fuel consumption, CO2 
emission and social welfare for OPEC and member countries. 
Results from the Benefit Incidence Analysis (BIA) show that the richest household 
quintile enjoys twice as much the benefit of fuel subsidies as the poorest household quintile on 
the aggregate. Both the gasoline and kerosene subsidies are found to be more regressive than 
the per capita expenditure suggesting the inefficiency of fuel subsidy as a mechanism for 
income redistribution. Using the Input-Output and SAM multiplier approach, I study the effect 
of reducing gasoline subsidy as implemented in January 2012 on sectoral outputs, household 
expenditure and government spending under two scenarios. When there is no reinjection from 
the reduced subsidy spending, the results show that the 49% increase in gasoline price would 
lead to a 0.01% and 0.18% reduction in GDP and government spending respectively. There is 
also a fall in labour and capital income by 0.29% and 0.34% respectively while household 
expenditure increased by 0.33%. When the savings from subsidy reduction is reinjected to the 
economy, the results show that labour and capital income increased by 0.24% and 0.17% 
respectively while both GDP and government expenditure increased by 1% and 0.12% 
respectively 
In the general analysis, I apply the Pesaran, (2007) cross-sectionally augmented Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin Panel unit root test to check for cross sectional dependence, the four panel 
cointegration tests developed by Westerlund, (2007) to inspect long-run relationship and the 
Common Correlated Effects (CCE) Mean Group estimation to obtain consumption elasticities 
for OPEC and member countries. The results confirm that subsidies on fuel prices in these 
countries are quite large while products are highly price inelastic suggesting that price reforms 
and fuel taxes can help improve revenue, reduce wasteful consumption and CO2 emission.
1 
1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Statement of Problem 
The amount of money governments all over the world spend on subsidizing energy 
particularly fossil fuels is astounding. This, in addition to the increasingly more subsidy made 
accessible to other alternative and renewable types of energy in the wake of global and nationa l 
economic recession definitely call for concern. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook (2014) 
asserts that 40 countries subsidise fossil fuel consumption globally with subsidies accounting 
for an average of 5% of aggregate GDP1. Globally, fossil fuel consumption subsidies grew 
from $412 billion in 2010 to $548 billion in 2013 with petroleum products subsidies accounting 
for more than 50%. Less than 10% of the total fossil fuel subsidies value reach the poorest 20% 
of the income group in these countries (WEO, 2014). 
Subsidies exist globally in a number of economic sectors, including agriculture, fisher ies 
and energy because they are one of many policy instruments used by governments to 
accomplish economic, social and environmental objectives. In fact, energy subsidies are 
specifically used in developing countries to ease energy poverty and promote economic 
development by facilitating access to affordable modern energy services. It is therefore 
conventional to find governments providing support for the production or consumption of 
energy in different ways either by maintaining lower prices with subsidies in the case of 
consumption or giving grants or concessionary loans, providing tax exemptions/holidays and 
lending supports for energy related research and development in the case of production. In most 
oil producing non-OECD countries, governments engaged in state financing of energy and in 
most cases subsidize energy products. This is a phenomenon prevalent in all OPEC2 member 
1 These 40 countries account for over 50% of global energy consumption in 2013. 
2 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries founded in September 1960 presently with twelve members 
2 
countries including Nigeria (see figure 1 below which shows the export and the average 
subsidisation rate (ASR) for the top 15 net oil exporting countries as at 2011)3. One of the 
arguments in the literature is that adequate provision of energy promotes economic growth and 
increase energy access. At the micro level, it increases the standard of living of individual in 
the long run. However, for many decades, and especially since the 1980s, there has been an 
increasing call on the governments by many international agencies like the World Bank, IMF 
and UNEP to eliminate fuel subsidies in order to remove economic distortions, improve 
countries’ fiscal health and or reduce air pollution. This is because fuel subsidy usually conflict 
with overall energy policy in many ways. 
Figure 1.1: Oil Export and Average Subsidisation Rate of the Top 15 net Oil Exporter 
Source: Author with data sourced from IEA, 2012 subsidy online database 
First, apart from diverting much needed public and private finances from other priority 
sectors, they are quite expensive and usually have serious fiscal implications4. Without doubt, 
in majority of the poorest countries of Africa and Asia, the government expend several folds 
3 In the figure, the Average Subsidisation Rate is defined as the share of fossil fuel subsidy to supply cost of fuel 
in percentages.   
4 For instance, subsidy payments by government to national oil company and other marketers of petroleum 
products in Nigeria between year 2006 and 2008 was about US$9.7 billion compared to the total capital 
allocation to priority sector such as security, the Niger Delta, critical infrastructure, Human capital development 
and Land reform & food security in the 2009 annual budget which was US$6.57 billion. Annually, this 
translates into about 1.5% and 2% of the GDP 
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extra on fuel subsidies than on health, education and other key public welfare disbursement 
(World Bank, 2009). Second, there is also an indirect harm that subsidy does to the 
environment. This is particularly so when the subsidies lead to disproportionate consumption 
of energy services, which proliferates the harmful effects of pollution and highlight the inherent 
energy insecurity in most energy systems (see Bacon and Kojima, 2006; World Bank, 2009; 
Guiyang, 2007; and IEA, 2008). Third and consequent on the belief that subsidies offer much 
superior advantage to those segments of the populations that can afford and already possess 
large quantities of high-energy intensive goods and services, there is an obvious challenge on 
the reason often cited as an incentive for subsidizing energy. Contrary to improving the quality 
of life for the poor masses, there is a widespread opinion that the vast majority of this populace 
naturally receive extremely little benefit.  
In addition, fuel subsidy can also encourage fuel smuggling particularly when the 
domestic prices are cheaper than that of other neighbouring countries. The issue of trans-border 
leakages of petroleum products due to wide price differentials arising from subsidy is a 
common phenomenon in Malaysia in South East Asia and Nigeria within the West African sub 
region5. There is also available evidence that energy subsidy caused stealing and excessive ly 
luxurious life style6. All these suggest that fuel subsidies evidently do not support the efficiency 
in energy use which is perhaps an important issue in the world today. However, government 
policies on fuel pricing usually attract a great opposition from many interest groups in the 
society who are of the opinion that reduction/removal of subsidies would have bad implica t ion 
                                                                 
5 Diversions of government subsidized petroleum products from Nigeria to neighbouring Togo and Benin 
republic appear to be an unending crisis despite serious sanctions and border tightening.   
6 In Nigerian for instance, each medium and high income households has on the average three (3) and six (6) 
cars respectively while the poor majorities rely on public transport systems. See Akpoghomeh and Badejo 
(2006)  
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on the poor and reduce economic growth7. A large number of agitations in this regard have 
resulted in worse socio economic condition.  
Despite considerable subsidy reform efforts made by countries, fossil-fuel subsidies 
being notoriously complex to remove remain widespread. The growing resistance to fuel 
subsidy reforms in many countries has lend credence to the political arguments that subsidies 
are invasive not much for the reason that the demand for subsidy is so enormous but because 
the subsidy supplies systems is in place and it is politically knotty for several regimes to defy 
using them. For most governments, there is no other willingly available apparatus for gratifying 
important interest groups. While most economic analysts detest subsidies on the ground that it 
can be a predominantly harmful form of public policy, customarily, subsidies exist because 
they are embedded in a political logic that is a lot complex to adjust (see Victor, 2009; 
Anderson, 1995; and Andresen, 2008).  
The mixed empirical outcome of studies investigating the effect of fuel subsidy is another 
critical factor. While some studies confirm that fuel price subsidies cause inefficient resource 
allocation and sometimes unreasonably benefits people beyond the targeted poor (IEA, 2011; 
World Bank, 2010; Coady et al, 2006; Baig et al, 2007; and Saboohi, 2001), others found 
reduction or removal of fuel subsidy to exert unintended consequences on the poor population 
(Koplow, 2009; World Bank 2010) and on the development of other sectors of the economy 
particularly in developing world. For instance, Bazilian and Onyeji (2012) observe that 
removal of subsidy in Nigeria and other similar economies put further pressure on the existing 
high cost of power supply thereby raising cost of doing business in general and slowing down 
industrial development while Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012) find that despite the associated 
                                                                 
7 Though, the distinction may not be firm, interest group in this case differ from advocacy and pressure groups 
normally set up for specific political aim. We refer to voluntary associations and the general public that seeks to 
publicly protests and challenge some unfavourable and ill-conceived government’s political and economic 
programmes or policies. The latter are often in the mid and high income group of the society and can lobby 
governments. 
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negative impacts, energy subsidies represent a significant safety net for the poor populace in 
several Arab countries, such that reducing and or eliminating these subsidies without 
compensatory social programmes would further reduce households’ welfare and grind down 
the competitiveness of some sectors. 
 
From this backdrop and given seemingly lack of general consensus from availab le 
empirical evidence, it is obvious that there is a gap between the dictates of economic theories 
and the practical issues surrounding energy pricing on the one hand and the understanding of 
how different countries actually operates in the context of subsidy reform policies on the other. 
Accordingly, the major problem informing this study is an attempt to fill this gap.  
Understanding the link between the prescriptions of economic theory and the practical issues 
pertaining to energy pricing in any economy depends on a detailed and robust empirica l 
analysis of the pattern of domestic demand. In typical oil exporting countries like OPEC where 
petroleum products’ prices are subsidised either for political, social and economic reasons, 
analysing domestic demand can provide clearer intuition to contentious issues about subsidies.  
 
1.2  Research Questions 
This research is therefore aimed at addressing the following three research questions. 
i. Who benefits from fuel subsidies in Nigeria and how well-targeted is each fuel’s 
subsidies to the intended poor groups in Nigeria? 
ii. What are the economic effects of fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria? 
iii. How large are the fuel subsidies and what are the associated effects on fuel 
consumption, carbon emission and social welfare in OPEC countries? 
Given that government spending on subsidy should in general promotes efficiency and 
equity (Cuenca, 2008; Rosario, 2007; and Akosile, 2012), the extents to which governments 
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spending on fuel subsidies benefits the poor remains germane in subsidy debate. The first 
question addresses this by examining whether expenditures on petroleum product subsidies had 
redistributive impact in Nigeria. This and the second question are of particular relevance 
because their resolution can assists immensely in guiding future subsidy (and other policy) 
reforms and also in identifying the segment of population or economic sectors that require 
assistance and those that can better shoulder higher fuel prices so that the unfavourable side 
effects and destructive opposition to subsidy removal can be avoided. The third question 
provides information about the extent of welfare and economic losses embedded in the existing 
fuel pricing structure which is of important policy interest to OPEC member countries who 
desire to reform their petroleum products’ pricing system in order to minimise distortion and 
welfare losses in the economy.  
  
1.3  Objectives 
The broad objective of the research is to analyse the socio-economic effects of petroleum 
products’ subsidies in OPEC member countries with specific in-depth analysis on Nigeria. 
Specifically, this research will 
i. Assess the incidence of petroleum product subsidies by different population 
income/expenditure groups to determine the extents to which government spending on 
fuel subsidies benefits the poor in Nigeria 
ii. Evaluate the economic effects of removing fuel subsidies and reinjecting the saving on 
the various sectors and agents of the economy in Nigeria. 
iii. Empirically analyse the domestic demand for petroleum products in OPEC member 
countries, estimates the size of fuel subsidies in OPEC countries and assess the effects 
on carbon emission and social welfare. 
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1.4  Justification of the Study 
 
A research of the type being proposed here is unique in several ways.  
First, available evidence from the literature review indicates that no study has used recent 
data to analyse multi fuels petroleum product subsidies for OPEC. Whereas, OPEC members 
account for 10 of the 15 top oil exporting countries in the world with an average subsidisa t ion 
rate of 64%. In fact, IMF (2008) fiscal affairs department study confirms that 19 of the 25 
countries that subsidized aggregate consumption of gasoline and diesel are net oil exporters . 
Given the prevailing difference in the socio economic condition of countries, multi fuels studies 
can offer great insight into the specifics of inefficient subsidy by fuel type. More so, as rich as 
the literature is on OPEC's behavioural response to international oil market dynamics, less 
effort has been given to the analysis of petroleum products pricing within the OPEC members' 
domestic markets. This is a major gap in the literature that I am motivated to fill.8  
Secondly, the measurement of subsidy and certain implicit approximations particula r ly 
on the use of one end-user prices of petroleum products as proxies for opportunity cost at end-
user level in virtually all regional and cross country studies can grossly affects the results and 
conclusions since the price paid by a country depends on the differences in purchasing 
arrangement, and the considerably variations in the handling and local transportation costs 
across countries9. Not only can the adoption of a single end-use level price across countries 
erroneously ignored countries’ differences, it may also renders the inferences based on these 
results inaccurate. Therefore, I am motivated to conduct country specific study for OPEC 
membership with the hope of estimating the actual price differentials and hence subsidies.  
                                                                 
8 Doug Koplow (2009), while highlighting the many inconsistencies in periodic subsidy es timates across 
different countries by different studies particularly by IEA and the World Bank concluded that studies on 
subsidies should be conducted at least once every five years for the top ten global fossil fuel producing and 
consuming nations and more importantly, increased attention should be accorded countries deriving a significant 
share of their national output from these industries.  
9 The much-cited paper by Larsen and Shah (1992) uses United States pre-tax end-user prices of petroleum 
products as proxies for opportunity cost at end-user level for all other countries. 
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Third, there is no doubt that considerable attempt have been made to examine the 
distribution of fuel subsidy benefits in several countries, none has applied the Benefit Incidence 
Analysis (BIA) approach. While the Benefit Incidence Analysis (BIA) approach has been used 
to examine the distribution, incidence and targeting of government subsidies on education, 
health, water and sanitation and even electricity subsidies10, this is the first attempt to apply the 
method to fuel subsidies in general and Nigerian in particular. 
Lastly, quite a number of highly subsidising countries have initiated fuel subsidy reforms 
in the last couple of years and the trend appear continuous11. However, studies have not kept 
pace with empirical assessment of the socio-economic impacts of these reforms. For instance, 
with particular reference to Nigeria where fuel subsidies has been adjusted 20 times between 
1978 and 201212. It is important to know that no study has researched into the effect of any of 
these reforms on the people, industries and the economy. Yet all the reforms have been met 
with protests and civil unrest with attendant loss of lives. This is the first attempt in this regard. 
Hence I apply the I-O and SAM multiplier – a typical static General Equilibrium Model 
approach to analyse both the effects of removing fuel subsidies and reinjecting the saving in 
Nigeria.  
 
1.5  Data Source and Methodology 
First, the distributional impacts of petroleum products subsidies is analysed using the 
benefit incidence (BIA) approach. A benefit incidence measure follows a three-stage process. 
The first process is to obtain estimates of the unit subsidy of providing a particular product. 
This is usually based on officially reported public spending on subsidising the product in 
                                                                 
10 The World Bank poverty assessment report (1994) also applied the method to analyse the benefit incidence of 
subsidies on electricity and other sources of power in Colombia 
11 IEA’s  World Energy Outlook provides a list of countries alongside recent developments in terms of fossil fuel 
subsidy reforms. See table 9.1, pages 330-331. 
12 Despite the promise by successive governments to reinvest the subsidy saving back into the economy, on ly in 
2012 has the government kept his words on reinjecting the saving back into the economy  
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question rather than budget allocations. The second stage is to identify the various households 
or individuals who are the users or consumers of the product. Individuals who consume a 
subsidized public product in effect gain an in-kind transfer. It is the distribution of this transfer 
across the population that benefit incidence analysis seek to measure. The last stage entails 
aggregating the households (or individuals) into sub-groups of the population so as to evaluate 
how the subsidy is distributed across different groups. The most widespread grouping is by 
income, or a similar measure of the welfare of the individual e.g. expenditure. The input-output 
and SAM multiplier general equilibrium methods is used to evaluate the impacts of subsidy 
removal on other sectors and agents in the economy. The input-output analysis is a highly 
flexible Leontief technique that analyses the inter-industry or inter-sectoral relationship in 
order to understand the interdependencies and complexities of the economy. It is essentia lly 
invaluable in measuring both the direct and indirect outcomes of planned changes in the 
demand for the product of one sector on output and employment of other sectors and other key 
macroeconomic variables. Afterwards, the SAM multiplier models are estimated to reveal the 
extent of inter-sectorial linkages and the impact of subsidy on an economic agent (say 
household) or any other sector (say manufacturing) in the economy. Analysing the 
consumption of petroleum products involve an econometric analysis. This study applied 
common correlated mean group panel data estimation techniques alongside stationarity and 
cointegration tests. Unlike direct financial transfers, evaluating the level of fossil fuel subsidies 
is a task challenged by poor quality, limited and in some cases complete lack of data. To this 
end, the price-gap method is used to quantify product subsidies for all the countries considered 
in this study. Despite its limitations, the price gap approach remains essentially useful in many 
regards13. By providing information on subsidies that alter end-user prices, price-gap method 
                                                                 
13 Though, the price-gap method is limited in its inability to account for subsidies which do not affect prices but 
impact on the structure of supply in the economy and the estimates are usually very sensitive to the assumptions 
made with regards to the reference price, the prime value of the price-gap method lies in its comparative ease 
compared with other subsidy evaluation methods. At least, by focussing on market  clearing prices with few 
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produce intuitive data on essential factors that will almost certainly affect short-term energy 
demand and supply decisions in a format that can be quite easily fed into global macroeconomic 
models which permits more extensive testing of how subsidy reforms might affect consume r 
welfare and energy markets. We complete the analysis by applying partial equilibrium analys is 
(PEM) to estimate the effects of subsidy on consumption, emission and social welfare. 
All secondary data for all the OPEC member countries were sourced primarily from 2014 
issue of the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin and the World Bank Development Indicators 
These data are complemented by Nigerian input-output data obtained from the Nigeria Institute 
of Socio Economic Research (NISER) Ibadan, Nigeria and the Harmonised Nigerian Living 
Standard Survey (NLSS, 2009/10) from the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
 
1.6  Scope of the Study 
While the general focus of this study is on OPEC member countries, Nigeria has been 
selected for a specific in-depth analysis due partly to the huge input-output, SAM and other 
survey data required and partly because of the recent crisis in the country following gasoline 
subsidy reduction.  
The choice of OPEC for the general investigation is informed by several factors. Aside 
the fact that member countries are leading fossil fuel producing countries whose significant 
share of national earnings comes from oil, the strategic influence of OPEC on the internationa l 
price of oil is striking. The level of economic development and major economic indices suggest 
that pro–poor distribution process deserves adequate recognition in major macroeconomic 
policies which entrenched subsidies in the political equation of member countries. Yet, inaction 
in reforming the fuel subsidies can be highly risky and costly.  
                                                                 
adjustments to enhance the comparability of the pricing data, researchers can avoid considering ample individual 
energy related policies in specific countries. More so, the ability to examine subsidies to some extent independent 
of government cooperation can be better appreciated in non OECD countries that cannot provide correct 
information on government’s energy-related activities (see Koplow, 2009) 
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In terms of product coverage, the study pays attention to four petroleum products namely 
Motor gasoline, Household kerosene, Diesel, and Fuel oil.  
 
1.7 Outline of the Study 
The thesis has been organised into six chapters. Chapter two covers the conceptual, 
theoretical and methodological review while chapter three investigate the benefit incidence of 
fuel subsidy in Nigeria. The economic effects of subsidy removal in Nigeria is addressed in 
chapter four while the estimation of fuel subsidy and the effects on consumption, CO2 and 
social welfare in OPEC occupied the fifth chapter. The study is concluded in chapter six.   
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2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Conceptual Issues 
 
2.1.1 Defining Subsidies 
There is a considerable harmony that in theory, subsidies indicate a transfer of economic 
resources to the agents in the market which in turn affects either the price or the cost of 
producing particular commodities. This definition of subsidy is limited to in kind transfers 
targeted to the energy sector directly via organization costs or through tax relief. In practice 
however, the concept of subsidy is much broader. For instance, most policies that shift private 
financial and/or market risks onto the general public, the tax payers or even the government 
such as subsidies on lending and guarantees on loans are all considered as subsidies despite the 
lack of direct monetary transfers. Some other programs which are not directly targeted but are 
of substantial benefit to the energy sector are also included in subsidy. Some category of energy 
related studies has widened the definition of subsidies further to include externalities. These 
include certain benefits or costs shifted onto third parties without compensation (externalit ie s) 
and complementary goods or services that encourage the increased use of fossil fuels, such as 
general transportation infrastructure. In order to accurately assess the impact of subsidy on the 
environment and economy, this class of subsidy requires appropriate offsets (deducting all 
forms of interventions which act as taxes on particular fuels) to arrive at a net subsidy value.   
Subsidy is sometimes defined to encompass all energy policy interventions. For instance, 
Greenpeace idea that subsidies represent government policies that benefit particular sectors of 
the economy14  could be used to describe any government intervention in energy markets. 
According to the Energy Information Administration (2000), subsidies are any government 
actions which had as their purpose alteration of energy markets by benefiting some group of 
                                                                 
14 See Koplow and Dernbach (2001) 
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consumers or producers. Specifically, the IEA (1999) defines energy subsidy as any form of 
government action mainly in the energy sector which pull down the cost of production, 
increases the price received by producers or reduces the price paid by consumers of energy15. 
The International Monetary Fund (2008) define subsidy as any form of government 
interference that brings about a deviation of the actual price facing consumers and producers 
from a specified reference price and affects consumption and production patterns along with 
the distribution of resources with significant consequences for the budget, expenditure 
structure, and growth in the long run. In general, a price subsidy ultimately reduces (increases) 
the consumer (producer) price of a good or service below (above) what it would be in the 
absence of the subsidy depending on whether it is a consumer or producer subsidy respectively. 
While the latter often come in form of producer support, the former are usually administered 
through price legislation and both will in practice result in shortages or excess supply of the 
commodity. 
In several third world countries, government and policy makers can control the price of 
petroleum product directly where there is monopoly in the production and distribution of 
petroleum products and indirectly with the use of pricing regulations, taxes and or subsidies 
(Hossain, 2003). Where this is the case, subsidy will comprise of both the implicit and the 
explicit components 16 . Implicit subsidies may not be an instantaneous transfer from the 
government to the producers and are therefore off budget. According to Saavalainen and Berge 
(2006), such off budget subsidies may translate into a quasi-fiscal activity and results in a quasi-
fiscal deficit as the subsidies are finance from the budget in the long-run. 
                                                                 
15 See World Energy Outlook (1999): ‘Looking at Energy Subsidies: Getting the Prices Right’ 
16 Though, implicit price subsidies cannot be easily pinpoint in a government budget, they often manifest in the 
form of losses by government owned enterprises resulting from prices being set below cost recovery lev els; 
diverse rates for various consumers or regulations that alter market prices or restrict market entry. In like 
manner, explicit subsidies may not always appear with the caption “subsidies” but they are usually provided for 
in the government budget as expenditures either by government directly or on its behalf by designated public 
agencies 
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The size of implicit subsidies is often not well known because they are much harder to 
measure and as large as it could be, they are often not reported. However, they include off 
budget costs borne by public agent such as national oil producing companies; tax expenditures 
in the form of tax exemptions for petroleum products; and the difference between import parity 
prices and applicable retail prices. Explicit subsidies on the other hand essentially reflect 
compensation to the national oil company for the difference between the international price of 
fuels and the wholesale domestic price. 
2.1.2 Measuring Subsidies 
Defining subsidies poses less conceptual difficulties than its measurement17. First, there 
is a Program Specific method which measure the value transferred from a particular program 
to all market partakers. This is a common approach employed by public sector analysts. The 
method tries to quantify the value of specific government programmes to a given industry. The 
major strength of this method is its ability to capture transfers whether or not they affect end 
user prices. The Program Specific method captures the value of government programs that 
benefits a particular sector, whether these benefits end up with consumers via reduction in 
prices, producers via higher revenues or resource owners via higher rents). Unless this 
information is integrated into a macroeconomic model, they do not tell us much about the issue 
of ultimate incidence of the subsidy or the distortions they have on product pricing.  
Second is the Producer/Consumer Subsidy Equivalent method which attempt to 
consolidate both the net market and net budgetary transfer into a single measure. This approach 
captures both the pricing distortion and transfers that do not affect end market prices and it can 
also separate the effects on producer and consumer markets. Though it has been employed to 
assess Producer Subsidy Equivalent for coal in a handful of countries, the method is widely use 
                                                                 
17 For an overview of subsidy measurement approaches as well as the relative strengths and weaknesses of each 
method, see Koplow and Dernbach (2001)  
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in the agricultural sector. The major limitation of the approach is that it is data intensive. In 
addition, there exist little empirical producer/consumer subsidy equivalent data for fossil fuel 
markets.  
Third and final is the Price Gap method which measures the variance between the 
observed and the “free-market” price for an energy commodity. By definition, the price gap 
method draw attention to observed price distortions but leaves out the considerable fiscal 
supports that may not affect consumer energy prices but do have significant influence on the 
structure of supply. The method is of great value in that it can be estimated with relatively little 
data and can be very useful in the area of cross country studies. In addition, the approach 
provides estimates which can serve as good indicators of pricing and trade distortions. 
Assuming the international market is devoid of any form of trading constraints, the efficient 
price in the case of a fully traded commodity such as petroleum products will be the 
international or import price duly adjusted for quality differentials, plus domestic transportation 
costs as well as the distribution margins. However, there is usually a difference between the 
price of a good with government intervention and the price of such good in the absence of such 
intervention. This is what Gupta et al, (2002) classified as implicit price subsidy i.e. the 
difference between the subsidised retail price and the free market price for petroleum products 18 
2.1.3 Effects of Subsidies  
In order to understand the effect of subsidies, it is imperative to know why they are 
provided in the first instance. As discussed in the statement of the research problems in section 
one, notable among the reasons for subsidizing petroleum products is to make such products 
reasonably priced for the poor and the low income rural populace. By correcting underlying 
market failures, subsidies are also considered the most optimal means of promoting access to 
                                                                 
18 The free market price is the price that will ordinarily prevail in the absence of government intervention in the 
market and should naturally b set equal to the cost of importing extra unit of the product in any net oil importing 
nation. Detailed explanations on the definition are provided in chapter 3 and 5 of the thesis.  
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commercial energies for the poor. In addition, subsidy scheme are administered to promote a 
more equitable distribution of income among the various income group of the population.  
Hence, subsidies are not problems in themselves but in trying to deliver them, their 
effects go beyond the main targets thereby affecting economic agents and sectors other than 
those intended. In this process, they generate either equity effects (by affecting the distribution 
of income and wealth within the society) or efficiency effects (by distorting the efficiency of 
primary economic activities) and sometimes both. The effects may be beneficial or harmful, 
slight or key, direct or indirect, anticipated or unintended. Whatever the case, both the equity 
and the efficiency effect are worth and should be considered autonomously. 
2.1.3.1 Efficiency Effects:  
This is one major and perhaps the most prevalent issue in the energy subsidy debate. The 
majority of condemnations of subsidy received today imply that public policy generate an 
inefficient energy use both in the aggregate level and the various composition. In a perfectly 
competitive environment, economic theory consents to the fact that allocation of goods and 
services based purely on the invisible hand of free private markets tend to provide far less or 
far more than the optimal quantities of some goods. If the free market forces undervalue an 
economic activity, then government subsidies may possibly enhance economic efficiency. 
Similarly, if the same markets overvalue an economic activity, then taxes possibly will enhance 
economic efficiency. On the other hand, if the free market forces perfectly allocate or value an 
economic activity, then government intervention (via subsidies or taxes) distorts resource use 
and generates inefficiency. This form of inefficiencies is what is referred to in the economic 
literature as non-market failures or more ingenuously, as government failures (see Wolf, 1991). 
The basic thrust of the above economic theory is that subsidies can be either market distorting 
(in which case, they cause a government failure) or market augmenting (where they reduce a 
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market failure). Dealing with the subject requires multifaceted policy analyses without which 
it will be practically impossible to determine the actual efficiency effects of subsidy. 
One principal argument often adduced for the inefficiency of petroleum subsidies is that 
they are poorly or ill targeted. Available evidence points in the direction that the higher the 
household income, the higher the accruable benefit from a given subsidy. This is because high 
income households consume more quantities of petroleum products and accordingly benefit 
comparatively more from subsidized prices. A World Bank (2006) study found that in the early 
1990s, the poorest third of the population received six times less than the richest 20% of the 
populace in fuel subsidy per person in Venezuela. In another perspective, since subsidies alter 
free market price signals, they end up distorting the efficient allocation of resources and may 
bring about wasteful consumption and investment preferences that hardly reflect relative 
scarcities 
2.1.3.2 Social and Equity Effects: 
Equity in this context refers to the ways and manner in which socio economic benefits 
and costs are distributed among economic agents or the population in a given society. 
Practically all government actions generate socio-equity effects because there are both the 
beneficiaries and losers from most government actions, programs and policies. When 
government policy (such as fuel price subsidies) benefits certain people or agents in the 
economy, there are several other categories of people who do not benefit or better put, who 
bears the burden (by paying the associated taxes or other regulatory costs) to shelter these 
benefits for the beneficiaries. UNDP (2006) observed that while the economies of many 
developing countries have been growing steadily, income inequalities continued to widen. As 
crucial as economic growth is among the important driver of economic development, higher 
growth rates, budget surpluses and accumulated foreign reserves can only be meaningful when 
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they are accompanied by a more socially equitable distribution of resources, improved access 
to socio economic goods and services among others. 
As far as subsidy issues are concerned, economists are concerned chiefly with the 
economic efficiency of any government intervention while politicians and policy makers are 
more apprehensive of the equity effects of governmental interventions in the economy.  
Besides, the general public appears to be more concerned about the fairness of government 
policies (i.e. the equity effect) than about its efficiency effects. A socially equitable distribution 
involves the systematic allocation of resources to ensure redistribution of income, goods and 
services from the well off in the society to the poor and the less privileged thereby reducing 
the income gap and promoting welfare and ‘social good’ in the economy. While those who 
generally do not oppose welfare in principle believe in subsidies on the ground that a society’s 
moral classification depends on how the less privileged are treated, they do, however, oppose 
subsidy where it increases the welfare for the already better off in the society.  
2.1.3.3 Initial and Ultimate Effects:  
While government may propose subsidies to achieve a set of effects on production and 
consumption, market agents often adjust to the prevalence of subsidies so as to alter the ultima te 
cost or benefit of the subsidy from the intended to unintended economic agents. In actual fact, 
subsidies on the whole have such complex effects on the economy that mere examination of 
outlays will only offer patchy and incomplete information. Therefore, the distinction that is 
often made between the incidence and the ultimate burden of a tax is particularly important 
when measuring energy subsidies. The difference between the initial incidence and the ultima te 
burden of a subsidy is particularly applicable to tax allowances for energy. Tax allowances (tax 
expenditures in economics) results in a reduced tax rate for certain goods and services relative 
to that paid by consumers of competing goods and services. Moreover, the benefits of subsidies 
are diminished by competition and captured partly by other consumers. If the initial subsidy 
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lowers costs to the producer, those lower costs may translate into reduced market prices that 
benefit consumers. Regrettably, most subsidy studies ignore the details of this allocation of 
subsidies between consumers and producers purely because accounting data can hardly make 
such distinction. 
2.1.3.4 Direct and Indirect Effects:  
When the domestic prices for petroleum products are reduced as a result of subsidy, the subsidy 
package will affect the real income of households through two channels. The first effect will 
be the resultant reduction in the prices paid by households for consumption of petroleum 
products such as kerosene for cooking and lighting or gasoline for private transport. This is 
referred to as the direct effect of subsidy. Since these fuels also serve as inputs in the production 
process, the indirect effect arises as producers pass on the lower costs of fuel input through 
reductions in prices of other goods and services (in the form of lower prices for food, electric ity 
and transportation) consumed by households. According to Coady et al (2006) in a study for 
the IMF’s Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) unit submitted that the indirect effect of 
subsidies is typically larger than the direct given that a substantial share of most fuel oils (e.g. 
diesel, gasoline etc) are used in the production and distribution of goods and services. This 
implied that most of the indirect effect arises from the pass through of lower fuel prices to food 
and transportation costs for households. 
 
2.2 Energy Subsidies: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly 
The case for government subsidies is well established in the theory of public expenditure. 
Governments spending in any economy are generally justified based on efficiency and equity 
considerations. According to Rosario, et al (2007), such spending will promote efficiency when 
it corrects market failures and/or generate positive externalities and uphold equity by 
improving the access of the poor to essential goods and services or allocation of economic 
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welfare. Much of public spending has redistributive drive and the general perception is that 
public provision or subsidisation of goods and services is welfare consistent and egalitarian in 
nature.  
Governments are often required to subsidize services that the market will not provide, or 
provides insufficiently. Pure public goods, where the marginal cost of additional consumption 
is zero, usually call for full state financing. Other private goods and services may be subject to 
significant external benefits or costs, and thus merit some form of government intervention. 
Subsidies might also be justified because of failures in related markets. Left to themselves, 
markets would under-provide certain goods and services, resulting in sub-optimal resource 
allocations. Governments are therefore called upon to subsidize some commodities for 
efficiency reasons.  
Equity is yet another fundamental rationale for government subsidies. The fact that the 
poor are disadvantaged in gaining access to important goods and services, which would help 
them escape from poverty, suggests that the state should seek to target the provision of these 
services to such groups. Governments subsidize certain goods and services because they want 
to improve certain critical outcomes among the population. Energy and energy services 
subsidies, for example, can be justified if they improve living standards, promote access and 
results in higher growth. Petroleum products’ subsidies might be part of a program to nurture 
infant industries19 or stimulated partly by attempt to protect the environment. 
Facilitating the poor escape from poverty is a traditional responsibility of the state. In 
fact, one of the functions that people routinely expect governments to perform is to reduce 
inequality and poverty. This goal sits somewhat uncomfortably beside the more traditiona l 
concerns among economists for economic efficiency, including the provision of public goods. 
                                                                 
19 According to IEA, (2008) the Persian Gulf states attempted this by offering hydrocarbon feed stocks at prices 
that are somewhat below the opportunity cost in a rather successful but costly effort to at tract petrochemical 
industries. 
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The provision and or subsidising of basic goods and services for the poor are one of the most 
effective instruments governments have to achieve these objectives.  
To this end, energy subsidies exist and are found in practically every single country and 
going by the World Bank (2010), the scope can be large within a country perspective. The 
motives for providing subsidies vary quite frequently from one country to another. 
Nonetheless, the common rationalizations for energy subsidies embrace the need to expand 
energy access, protect the poor, keep employment, promote industrial development, avoid 
inflationary pressure, and enhance energy security as well as other political considerations, 
(Doug Koplow, 2004; World Bank 2010; Fattouh and El-katiri, 2012; and Bazilian and Onyeji, 
2012). 
Figure 2.1: Primary Objectives of Energy Subsidies and Some Unintended Outcomes  
Source: Author Sketch 
 
In spite of the above rationale, there are some ‘bad’ about energy subsidies which mostly 
arise in the form of unpremeditated adverse consequences. These effects can be categorized 
into three main groups namely the Economic, Social and Environmental. Energy subsidies may 
result in certain economic inefficiencies in resource allocation that may prompt sub optimal 
use of reserves in producing countries. When subsidies provide incentive for excessive use of 
energy, they may also generate unusually high consumption. Generally, inappropriate pricing 
Petroleum Product 
Subsidy 
Desired Impacts:
Expands Energy Access
Protects the Poor
Promotes Industrial Development
Enhances Employment
Avoids Inflationary Pressures
Ensures Energy Security
Unintended Outcomes:
 Encourages Over-consumption
 Hastens the decline of exports
 Reduces the Global Demand’s 
Sensitivity to High Prices
 Increases CO2 Emissions 
 Discourages Investments and 
Obstructs Clean Energy Investment
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often acts as disincentives for productivity improvements and discourages not only investments 
in modern and efficient technology but also investments in alternative energies (See Coady et 
al, 2006; Fattouh and El-katiri, 2012; and IEA, 2011). 
Though, subsidies that lead to wide disparity in domestic fuel prices may encourage 
smuggling of fossil- fuel products to neighbouring countries but this has more to do with corrupt 
border officials in affected countries. Several studies including Gangopadhyay et al, 2005; 
Kpodar, 2006; and El Said and Leigh, 2006 have traced the social costs associated with 
subsidies to the regressive distributive nature which might further skew the prevailing income 
distribution in most countries. Yet, this does not remove the fact that energy subsidies establish 
important social safety net for the poor and can be very critical in addressing social equity and 
poverty reduction (See Lin & Jiang, 2011; Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012 and IEA 2011). 
In recent time, the bulk of the negative side of subsidies comes from the costs it imposes 
on the environment in form of fuel combustion related emission and greenhouse gases. This 
effect arises when subsidies result in excessive fuel demand and energy conservation goal 
becomes vulnerable. Another explanation is that, as fossil-fuels enjoy high subsidies, 
investment in and the development of cleaner fuels such as renewable, solar and wind become 
unattractive. However, as Park and Kwon (2011) studies have shown in the case of Korea, 
fossil-fuel subsidies can encourage fuel switching from coal or biomass to cleaner fuels.  
Experience abound that energy subsidies and their reform process can often turn out to 
be an ugly exercise. The ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ about energy subsidy above suggest that the need 
for subsidies may vary across countries based on pressing economic, social and developmenta l 
objectives and as such, reform process cannot be a one cap fits all. Mere adoption of pricing 
models or subsidy reforms by countries without comprehending the assumptions and the 
prevailing socio economic condition behind such models can exert greater negative impacts. A 
typical example of this policy adoption syndrome was attempt by Bolivia and Pakistan to 
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reduce subsidies by raising energy prices in line with the Iranian “Targeted Subsidies Reform” 
adjudged as the first successful attempt by major oil producing and net oil exporting country 
to significantly replace massive indirect fuel subsidies with far-reaching dividend transfers to 
the population. The two countries had to abandon the efforts in the wake of massive public 
resistance. Basically, public expenditure decisions particularly on subsidies should reflect a 
sound understanding of the needs and preferences of the population at large because spending 
money on the provision of goods and services, without attending to the efficiency with which 
the spending generates access to these goods and services, the impact on the anticipated 
beneficiaries and to the cost-benefit effect on the aggregate economy, is not economica lly 
prudent. 
The provision of public subsidies should be partnership between governments, on the 
one hand, and intended beneficiaries on the other. To make this collaboration effective, there 
must be a mutual flow of information, with the benefactor (i.e. governments) constantly 
‘listening’ to the intended beneficiaries (i.e. target populace) and the beneficiaries in turn, being 
informed of government goals and their privileges under explicit agreement or pledge. The 
issue therefore is about the dimension of the information flow: how informed are governments 
about the desires and conduct of the people, especially the poor? How will the short run effects 
be cushioned? Are these well communicated and accepted to the people? In most cases, any 
breach in such information flow usually results in ugly picture20.  
Therefore, the ugly picture of subsidies arises along the path of reforms. Sometimes, the 
subsidies to be reformed are hardly properly researched to ascertain the underlying objectives 
                                                                 
20 Properly aligned and coordinated information contributed to the relative success of the December 2010 
subsidy reforms in Iran compared to the poorly coordinated implementation of the gasoline rationing scheme in 
June 2007 where many officials made conflicting public statements about the timing and scope of the fuel 
rationing, which resulted in social tension and limited insurgences at some fuel stations. The importance of such 
information flow was recently demonstrated recently in the face off between the Nigerian government and the 
organised labour/civil society groups when the latter embarked on a week nationwide protests in reaction to the 
former’s announcement of a total withdrawal of subsidy on petroleum products in Jan uary, 2011. The 
demonstration send a signal back to the government on the position of the people and this led to government 
shifting its earlier ground of ‘total subsidy removal’ to that of ‘partial/gradual removal’ 
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and present role of such subsidies. Quite often, the economic, socio and political rationale for 
reforms are not well established and adequately publicised. In fact, successful implementa t ion 
may depend on appropriate timing, consistency and transparency. 
Fig 2.2: Protesting Fuel Pricing and Consumption Reforms 
 
Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16390183  and http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/06/28/MNGGIQN3RJ1.DTL  
 
2.3 Empirical issues 
The literature is replete with energy subsidy particularly, on petroleum product subsidy 
in developing and net oil-exporting countries. However, many of these studies are highly 
descriptive in nature while some have employed different econometric and statistica l 
techniques to evaluate the distributional impacts and effectiveness of subsidies and subsidy 
policies on the welfare and expenditures of the intended beneficiaries. 
The Department of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance in 2004 assessed the 
impact of Central Government subsidies in India and found that the Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
(LPG) subsidy benefits mostly the upper income groups in the urban areas with a regressive 
distribution while in the case of kerosene, the urban areas receive a generously proportioned 
subsidy on a per capita basis. The study observed that in the rural areas, subsidy on kerosene 
is regressive as higher spending groups receive more subsidized kerosene than lower 
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spending groups while the inadequate availability of subsidized kerosene accounted for its 
greater use in lighting as against cooking21. In the Indian case, it is the non-availability and 
not affordability that impeded the use of kerosene by the rural-poor. Hence creating a 
transparent and competitive market may in the long run, be sustainable in expanding access. 
Pitt (1983) paper examined the two arguments usually used to rationalize the subsidy 
provided on kerosene which is the major commercial fuel consumed by the Indonesian 
household22. The results from the econometric analysis of a large cross-sectional household’s 
data reveal that firewood-kerosene substitution is very restricted in regions with acute 
deforestation problem implying that subsidy is hardly effective in alleviating the problem of 
environmental externality. In addition, the results also established that the more affluent urban 
households (about 18.5% of all households) obtain a top-heavy share of total kerosene 
subsidy. While concluding that kerosene subsidy markedly benefits urban and richer 
households, the paper noted that poor families with little or no substitute for kerosene in 
lighting may bear a significant burden if all subsidies are totally faced out. The study suggests 
the use of other less costly technique to aid poor Indonesian households rather than 
subsidising goods consumed largely by richer household 
In an attempt to quantify the size and distributional impacts of an increase in oil prices 
on the real income of households and also evaluate the usefulness of subsidies in protecting 
poor households, Kpodar (2006) employed an input-output approach to evaluate the 
                                                                 
21 The report noted that Kerosene subsidy is prone to abuse since about 50% of the subsidized kerosene supplies 
are diverted from reaching the anticipated groups which suggest that both the LPG and kerosene subsidies are 
unproductive in achieving their intended objectives. It therefore recommends  a gradual but substantial removal 
of LPG subsidy but a more careful approach in the cutback of kerosene subsidies as over half of the rural 
households basically use kerosene in home lighting . 
22 One side of the argument is that the kerosene subsidy reduces  deforestation externalities arising from fire 
wood gathering and usage while the other is the social equity rationale which hinges on the necessity that 
commodities such as kerosene are ‘essential needs’ for the people and must be subsidised . Gangopadhyay et al 
(2005) contended the social externality arguments that fuel subsidies are effective device to shifting fuel 
consumption pattern away from biomass to fossil fuels as it reduces the pressures for deforestation and air 
pollution associated with the use of biomass. He said the argument depends on the extent to which rural 
households that use biomass as a result of its lower price benefit from the subsidies.  
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distributional effects of rise in a variety of petroleum product prices in Mali.23 The result 
shows that while escalating gasoline and diesel prices affect mostly non poor households, 
increasing kerosene prices are more detrimental to the poor households signifying that upper 
income households benefit exceptionally from price subsidies on any of the oil product 
considered. The implication of the outcome is that petroleum price subsidies are less effective 
instrument for shielding the income of poor households as against other well targeted subsidy 
Assessing the impact of subsidy reduction on the energy consumption pattern and 
welfare of the poor is important given that the bulk of the core poor globally rely primarily 
on biomass energy for cooking and the use of modern fossil fuels is limited in many 
developing countries where access to electricity is less (see Barnes and Halpern, 2000; Barnes 
et al., 1997). Kerosene and LPG are widely used for lighting and cooking by Indian 
households and are highly subsidized historically but the reality of the present reform in the 
energy sector will translate to imminent reduction in these subsidies by government.  
To this end, Gangopadhyay et al (2005) study examines the impact of reducing energy 
subsidies on the welfare of the Indian poor populace using data from nationally representative 
surveys of over a hundred thousand households and finds that LPG subsidy is regressive and 
can hardly exert much shifting effect on biomass use whereas kerosene is widely used and is 
not unlikely to displace the use of biomass. They conclude that subsidy is an ineffective means 
of the welfare of the poor but warned that any cutback in the subsidy must be supported by 
other poverty reduction policies that would limit the unfavourable impacts on the poor 
El Said and Leigh (2006) study uses the estimated implicit import parity prices to 
evaluate the overall fiscal cost of subsidy24  and also analyse the distributional impact of 
                                                                 
23 According to the author, Mali is typically poor and highly reliant on imported oil products. Th e paper noted 
that the main supplies of energy in the country are wood, charcoal and petroleum products and observed that 
implicit oil subsidy in Mali accounts for about 2% of GDP on the consumption of petroleum products whose 
share in the country’s total energy use is about 60% 
24 The author noted that fuel prices have remained mostly unaffected since 2002 in Gabon. Hence the full fiscal 
cost of the subsidies was estimated at over 3% of non-oil GDP in 2005. 
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implicit subsidies on fuel prices in Gabon using household survey data. The distributiona l 
impact of the subsidies was computed by simulating the effect of eliminating the subsidies on 
the real incomes of household across the income group using the 2005 EGEP household data 
set (Gabonese Survey for the Evaluation and Tracking of Poverty). The simulation entails 
raising the ex-refinery prices to import parity price levels with tax rates, fees, and margins 
remaining constant. The paper finds that it is the higher income households who actually 
benefits from fuel price subsidies in Gabon since the poorest 30% of the households receive 
about 13% of all the subsidies while about 35% of the subsidy accrues to the richest 10% of 
households. The paper concludes that fuel subsidies are not only ineffective but also a costly 
technique to shielding the real incomes of the poor. The authors suggest that the use of some 
of the existing programmes25 can provide a more directed and economical way of mitigat ing 
the effects of energy price increases on the incomes of poor households.  
The discovery that fuel subsidies are in favour of the rich in Gabon conforms 
remarkably with the results of the distributional impacts of fuel subsidies in many other 
countries. The cross country study by Baig et al. (2007) lend credence to this by observing a 
large dataset to explain the overall (direct and indirect) effect of various subsidy tradition on 
petroleum pricing around the globe. According to the paper, the all high international oil 
prices has made the domestic pricing issue a constant and major source of economic and 
general policy concerns for most countries. The analysis of the data shows that only half of 
the countries in the sample managed to execute a complete domestic pass-through of 
international price changes during the mid-2006. In all, the indirect effect is in general larger 
than the direct26. While the distribution of the total effect tends to be somewhat regressive, 
                                                                 
25 The authors belief that since the bulk of the fuel subsidies benefit the high income households, it is perhaps 
feasible to eradicate the subsidies and use part of the cost savings to fund better targeted programmes like 
augmenting spending on poverty alleviation projects; raising support for the country ’s existing welfare packages 
and reducing present social tariffs on water and electricity 
26 Since a significant share of most fuels are used in the making and distribution of commodities, the indirect 
effect results majorly from the pass-through of higher fuel prices to feeding and transport costs of households 
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that of the direct effect appears to be neutral. The authors recommend a practical approach to 
dealing with petroleum product pricing. For instance, during the period of rises in 
international oil prices, the prices of domestic petroleum products may be liberalised or 
introduce a healthy automatic adjustment procedure and merge each price increases with a 
transparent scheme and measures to lessen the impact of the price increase on the poor  
The analysis of the welfare implication of petroleum product subsidy was extended to 
Iran–a typical net oil exporting country which has pursued a policy of energy products’ 
subsidies for long in a bid to assist the poor and to exploit the relative oil advantages of the 
country. With the incessant call for the removal of energy subsidy on the ground of associated 
market distortion and loss of welfare, Saboohi (2001) carry out an assessment of the impact 
of energy subsidies reduction on households living expenses in Iran. He developed an analytic 
tool27 with which the direct and indirect effect of removing energy products’ subsidies on the 
household’s living expenses is evaluated. The findings show that subsidies do not improve 
the welfare of the poor and should be gradually eliminated and substituted by a more 
progressive resource distribution and other pro-poor policies like social security financed by 
resources resulting from elimination of subsidies 
Despite the fact that fuel price subsidies have unpleasant implications 28  for both 
government budgets and energy uses, they remain politically popular particularly in 
developing countries. Many governments in these countries are actually very reluctant to pass 
on to end users, any rise in energy price despite recent cases of constant volatility in world 
oil price. Coady et al. (2006) recognizes the critical issues that are germane when evaluat ing 
                                                                 
while the direct effect generally reflects the rise in the price of kerosene which often account for a large share of 
total consumption among the low income households  
27 To uncover the nature of resource distribution with subsidies, the paper estimated a Gini coefficient through 
the Lorenz curve for the whole households. Various Gini coefficients were calculated to capture the rich-poor, 
urban-rural dichotomy features in the population 
28 Huge volume of subsidies redirects public spending away from more priority sectors thus generating 
unsustainable fiscal deficits. Subsidised fuel prices will generally provide the households the incentives to be 
more inefficient in their consumption of energy which exacerbates the overall macroeconomic effect of higher 
world prices on the economy 
29 
 
the economic and social costs of fuel subsidies. Drawing relevant examples from recently 
undertaken analyses on some developing countries29 , they estimate the size of consumer 
subsidies and their budgetary implications. The result of the study shows that energy subsidies 
have significant socio economic costs and are quite often, poorly targeted in all of the 
countries. 
There is an increasing criticism by oil industry stakeholders and analyst on the impacts 
that subsidies exert on government finances, oil companies financial performance and energy 
use pattern. In this regard, IEA (2006)30 assesses the real magnitude of petroleum product 
subsidies in India and observed against common insight that India’s retail prices for petroleum 
products are relatively high despite subsidies. The paper maintained that the government 
sustains the present pricing system because the revenue from product’s taxes and surcharges 
surpasses subsidy spending. This is however at the detriment of oil companies’ finances and 
constitutes a disincentive for private investment in the industry. The result is inconclusive on 
whether subsidy allows the poor access to petroleum product but the study suggests that a 
more reliable, transparent and realistic pricing system should be execute by the government 
The study by Azis (2006) conducted a search on the relative merits of partial reduction 
as against the enormous cut in fuel subsidy due to the upsurge in the world price of oil which 
resulted in about 120% rise in average domestic fuel prices in Indonesia. Though the 
government action was necessitated by the need to reduce the mounting pressure on 
government budget due to rising expenditures related to all sorts of subsidies, the author 
believed that such a policy is misguided. Using a set of simulations on a financial general 
equilibrium model, it was found that cutting subsidies for the banking sector and using the 
                                                                 
29 These countries are Bolivia, Ghana, Jordan, Mali, and Sri Lanka 
30 This is a working paper by the International Energy Agency focusing on the Asia pacific. The paper 
contended that the sum of all government taxes and surcharges on petrol, kerosene and diesel products far 
exceed the annual budget subsidies for these products. Subsidy in the study is defined as the amounts listed 
officially as subsidies in the country’s annual budget and or the difference between the actual retail price and the 
retail price based on import-parity formula called under recovery by the oil companies  
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savings judiciously on agricultural investment could produce a positive outcome on poverty 
reduction and income distribution without worsening the macroeconomic conditions. The 
paper concluded that the substantial reduction in fuel subsidies is needless given the negative 
socio-economic and political aftermaths. 
Though the higher income segments of the population consume the bulk of petroleum 
products, it is however appealing to conclude in theory that these groups would bear the 
burden of further cutback in any subsidy. Truly, such conclusion would be hasty in view of 
the undulating effects of higher petroleum products prices on costs and output all over the 
whole economy. Hence, the paper by Clements et al. (2003) tries to investigate these linkages 
effectively and show that the effects of reduction in subsidy goes beyond the immediate short 
run effects on consumers using the computable general equilibrium (CGE)31 model to assess 
how increase in petroleum prices will affect prices and incomes in all the sectors of the 
economy. The results of the simulation forecast a minor increase in price level but a slight 
decline in output and more essentially that urban households will be the mostly and 
significantly affected by any subsidy reduction32.  
An analysis of the economic impacts of tax system and energy subsidies on Indonesian 
economy was conducted by Lewis (1993). This study reveals the small impacts of tax or 
subsidies abolition on energy consumption. They contended that taxes or subsidies abolition 
affects consumption through income effect and the results show that the abolition of the 
gasoline type of tax gives the largest impact to the expanding of fuel consumption while the 
abolition of kerosene subsidy yields the largest impact to the lessening of fuel consumption. 
                                                                 
31 They examine the impact of rising petroleum products prices on the aggregate inflation, real output and 
income distribution within a multi sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which was calibrated on 
data from the 1995 Indonesia Social Accounting Matrix 
32These findings suggest that in the immediate, a decrease in petroleum subsidies will lead to a rise in the price 
level and a fall in household consumption. Though the high income groups suffer the most from reduction in 
subsidy but the poor are equally affected. However, the poor households could be protected with more focused 
social security nets using part of the budgetary savings created by subsidy reform. Given the role of subsidy 
reduction in budgetary and financial sustainability, increase petroleum prices are not likely to have adverse 
effect on the poor in the long run 
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The simulation results point to the conclusion that prevailing tax system and energy subsidies 
create a considerable distortion on economy and the level of welfare in Indonesia.  
Negara (2000) employs a CGE model to study the impact of increasing energy price on 
macro-economic variables including economic growth, unemployment rate, saving rate, and 
income distribution in Indonesia. Negara argues that the policy to increase the fuel price is an 
effective tool to increase efficiency in energy consumption and strengthen the government 
budget. However this policy increases the level of unemployment. 
 Hartono and Resosudarmo (2006) analyse the impact of the fuel and electricity price 
appreciation on economic growth and income distribution with emphasis on the implicat ions 
of subsidies reduction policy on economic growth and income distribution, the implicat ions 
of energy utilization efficiency by households and industries and the appropriate policies on 
the Indonesia energy sector. Among the numerous conclusion of the dynamic CGE model33 
are that  reducing the subsidies which is not followed by escalation in efficient energy use 
caused  that GDP to increase by about 0.48-0.51% in 2010 compared to 2000 and income 
distribution will be spread evenly (Gini coefficient in 2010 will decrease 7.9% (compare to 
the base condition); Without income transfer to the poor, as a compensation to the decreasing 
of oil subsidy, most of the poor household incomes will be lower than the base scenario while 
reducing the fuel subsidy with compensatory income transfer will increase GDP and poor 
household incomes with the biggest percentages 0.06-1.33%.  
                                                                 
33 Three major scenarios experimented in the study include price changing scenario because of the decreasing of 
subsidies and implementation of compensation program which is not followed by escalation in efficient energy 
use; price changing scenario because of the decreasing of subsidies and implementation of compensation 
program which is followed by escalation in energy use efficiency by Industrial sector; and price changing 
scenario because of the decreasing of subsidies and implementation of compensation program which is  followed 
by escalation in energy use by both the industry sector and household sector. In all the scenarios, price changing 
and the reduction in subsidies are only implemented on seven types of energy namely, gasoline, ADO, IDO, 
kerosene, refinery gas, MFO and electricity. The cut of subsidies on those types of energy is implemented step 
by step such that there will be no subsidies on them except kerosene and electricity for poor households in ten 
years forward 
32 
 
Some studies have developed special CGE model to suit specific analyses of the impact 
of energy taxes and subsidies on choice socio economic and environmental variables. Naqvi 
(1998) develops Energy CGE model called GE-PAK to analyse the economic impacts of 
energy subsidies in Pakistan. The model which was constructed using the Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) data with complete Input-Output (I-O)34  table are based on a neo-classic 
assumption and has the potential to capture the relationships among the economy, energy and 
social equity.  
Bohringer (1998) develops a completely different format of CGE model in order to 
capture the bottom up features of energy sector activities as against the top down 
characteristics of production function35. The simulation results show that tax increase by the 
government increases the activities of simple-technology based industries and decrease the 
activities of energy-intensive industries. There is also evidence that ad valorem tax policy 
will decrease the demand of electricity and reduces output. 
PIE-DESDM (2001) develops the INDOCEM 36  CGE model for the Indonesian 
economy and uses Indonesian I-O table in 2000. The results show that the rise in fuel price 
causes 1.3/0.77% inflation rate if the rise in fuel price is followed/not followed by wage 
compensation respectively. In addition, this policy has a slight implication of about 0.27 to 
0.026% for economic growth with the biggest effect falling on the communication and 
transportation sector. Oktaviani et al (2005) develop a recursive dynamic CGE by using both 
the Indonesian Input-Output and Social Accounting Matrix data in year 2000 to analyse the 
impacts of fuel price policy on the macro-economy, poverty, and the agricultural sector. The 
                                                                 
34This Input-Output table use by Naqvi consists of income and expenditure data from 4 institutions with 131 
commodities from 128 industries. These institutions are households, companies, government and the external 
institution 
35This approach helps to improve credibility of energy CGE model and enhances the strength of policy 
recommendations. The study conducts simulations to analyse the impacts of ad valorem tax implementation 
which increase the price of energy as a primary input in electricity production by roughly 25, 50, 100 and 200 % 
36INDOCEM is an acronym for Indonesian Comprehensive Energy-Economy Model. The uniqueness of the 
model lies in its flexibility to separate the negative effects of increase in fuel price and the positive impacts of 
the higher fuel price on the efficiency of energy use 
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results show that by increasing fuel price, output price of energy-intensive industries such as 
transportation and fishery are raised while peoples’ real income and people welfare reduced. 
The study concludes that this policy in general, increases poverty level but does not affect the 
price of rice.  
Bacon and Kojima (2006) in a review of existing experiences on fuel subsidies’ phase 
out in developing countries argue that while the rise in global oil prices since January 2004 
has had very high economic and financial costs for these countries through increase in public 
debt and limiting other government spending alongside other unintended consequences such 
as fuel adulteration, smuggling, and regressive benefits, phasing out these subsidies can be 
politically perplexing. This authors review some fruitful strategies for eliminating or reducing 
fuel price subsidies while shielding the poorest consumers and conclude that fuel subsidies 
benefit the poor, but at a huge cost to the economy. They recommend that governments should 
hurriedly as possible, replace fuel price subsidies with efficiently designed and well-targeted 
assistance to identified poor beneficiaries 
Using the logic of survival, Victor (2009) demonstrates that the inability to understand 
the political economy of subsidy majorly accounts for the failure to reform subsidies. While 
subsidy can help to improve energy access to poor communities, redistribute income, alleviate 
poverty, nurture infant industries, and assist in addressing environmental degradation, when 
initiated and irrespective of its initial purpose, various interest groups37 coagulate around the 
continuation of the policy and make change hard. The study contends that it is vital to study 
both the demand for and supply of subsidies and recommends that the genuine reforms 
depends more on the latter.  
                                                                 
37 The interest groups that seek subsidies are generally well structured, and the creation of the subsidy frequently 
makes these groups even extra conscious of their concern in upholding the subsidy policy. In add ition, the body 
that deliver subsidies regularly find political gain in supplying this costly service. These are political 
corroboration that makes it mostly difficult to disconnect the purely interest induced political rationale of 
subsidy and the many genuine intentions for policy purpose 
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In reaction to recent agitations for countries to eradicate their subsidies on petroleum 
products, several countries have attempted to eliminate government support for the 
consumption and or production of fossil fuels with differing level of accomplishment. For 
instance, in late 2009, the policy makers from the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) member countries agreed to phase out unproductive fossil 
fuel subsidies. However, experiences have shown that subsidies are generally difficult to 
eradicate. Exact information38  of the intensity and category of subsidies is a good pre-
requisite for this task  
In September 2009 the G20 Leaders made commitment to streamline and elimina te 
wasteful fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption over the medium term 
based on the results of a joint study made by the OECD and the IEA using the OECD ENV-
Linkages general equilibrium model. The study indicates that abolishing fossil fuel subsidies 
in a number of non-OECD countries could reduce global Greenhouse Gas emissions by 10% 
in 2050. The magnitude of these subsidies are huge going by the IEA estimation which 
indicate that total fossil fuel consumption subsidies in 37 non OECD countries as of 2008 
amounted to USD 557 billion. Thus, Burniaux and Chateau (2011) deliberate the assumptions 
and data of the OECD-IEA analysis and examine both the environmental and economic 
implications of removing these subsidies and find that the full environmental benefit of this 
policy option can only be achieved with a comparable cap on emissions in OECD countries. 
The study concludes that while removing these subsidies is a global plus, the environmenta l 
and economic benefits are untrue for all countries and or regions 
The emerging dilemma in the basic energy demand and supply management in the wake 
of continuous surge in energy prices and growing environmental concern has also engender 
                                                                 
38 Laan (2010) posits that consistent information will ease an evaluation the fiscal costs distributional impacts 
and effect of the subsidy as well as the development of efficient approaches for subsidy reform. At the glo bal 
level, it will also provide the basis for observing the progress towards subsidy elimination  
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series of country specific research on the issue of energy subsidies. In a typical transitiona l 
economy like China, a reasonable level of energy subsidies may be sometimes justified as 
necessary for attaining social objectives. This and the important effects that energy subsidies 
pose for efficient energy use, fuel choice and sustainable development have stirred further 
investigation. Lin and Jiang (2011) adopt the price-gap method to quantify the size of energy 
subsidies and apply the CGE model to evaluate the economic impacts of energy subsidy 
reforms in China. The results show that China's energy subsidies summed up to about 356.73 
billion Chinese Yuan in 2007 which equalled about 1.43% of the country’s GDP. The 
analyses further revealed the consumption subsidies for oil products to be the largest relative 
to the electricity and coal sectors subsidies. Since the outcomes indicate that eliminating 
energy subsidies will result in a substantial fall in energy demand and emissions but with 
adverse effects on macroeconomic variables, the authors suggest the adoption of 
compensating policies where subsidy savings are moved to maintain other measures of 
sustainable development. 
Larsen and Shah (1992) provide evidence on the level of global fossil fuel subsidies 
and their implications for CO2 emissions under two scenarios. The study contends that 
considerable fossil fuel subsidies prevail in a few but large carbon emitting nations and that 
eliminating such subsidies could significantly reduce domestic carbon emissions in selected 
countries. The results show that global energy subsidies is in excess of US$230 billion with 
about US$20 billion as the associated welfare cost. The paper concludes that world carbon 
emissions could be reduced by 9% supposing there is no change in international fossil fuel 
prices and by about 5% if changes in fossil fuel prices are factored in. 
The work of Bhattacharyya (1995) contends the general conclusion that energy prices 
are not efficiently set in developing countries and specific energy products are extremely 
subsidised by virtually all energy pricing studies. According to the paper, the measurement 
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of subsidies and certain implicit approximations particularly on the use of one end-user prices 
of petroleum products as proxies for opportunity cost at end-user level in cross country studies 
can grossly affects the results and conclusions. Given that the price paid by a country depends 
on the differences in purchasing arrangement, and the considerably variations in the handling 
and local transportation costs across countries, the adoption of a single end-use level prices 
across all others can erroneously ignored countries’ differences and diffuse the errors and 
deficiencies to all the others thereby rendering the inferences based on these results 
inaccurate. The author opines that country specific study can be more rigorous and may 
provide valuable information concerning actual price differentials.  Therefore the study 
provides an estimate of petroleum products subsidies in India and demonstrates how different 
approximations affect the outcomes of subsidy valuations 
In another dimension, Morris et al. (2010) contended that the problem of inefficiency 
and social losses39 associated with the petroleum product subsidies is not subsidisation as 
such but as a result of using different retail prices to estimate subsidy arising from the 
structure of central taxes and the method of subsidisation through prices. They suggested that 
tax and subsidy cannot be tackled separately but simultaneously. Similarly, Coady et al. 
(2010) re-evaluate latest developments in subsidy levels40 and contends that it is crucial to 
reform the policy instrument for setting petroleum product prices with a bid to reduce the 
financial burden of these subsidies and tackle climate change. Estimations of the size of 
consumer subsidies are based on a new database on domestic retail prices of petroleum 
product from 2003 to 2009. The unit subsidy per litre is calculated as the difference between 
                                                                 
39 Few among the social losses associated with subsidy include wasteful use, diversion, sullying, and 
preventable negative externalities of petroleum resources;  tax arbitrage; distortion of consumption and 
production input choices; and product cross hauling. All these result in varying prices for the same or across 
product for different consumers  
40 According to the paper, while global ex-tax consumer subsidies for petroleum products is put at about $60 
billion in 2003 and the estimate for 2010 at nearly $250 billion, the tax-inclusive subsidies are estimated to be in 
the realm of $740 billion in 2010 or about 1 % of world output 
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an appropriate standard price41 and tax inclusive domestic retail prices. The study observed 
that the G-20 member countries account for more than 70% of tax-inclusive subsidies and 
conclude that these countries may well reduce anticipated fiscal deficits and greenhouse gas 
emission by about 17% and 15% respectively if subsidy is reduced by about 50%. Though, 
such subsidy reform scheme should incorporate measures to alleviate the shock of higher 
prices on the poorest households. 
Arze del Granado et al (2010) appraise the available evidence on the effect of fuel 
subsidy reform on household welfare in developing countries. The review finds that the 
burden of subsidy reform is on average, neutrally distributed across income groups with a 25 
cents reduction in the per litre subsidy resulting in a 6% fall in income for all groups and that 
well over half of this influence arises from the indirect impact on prices of other goods and 
services consumed by households. In addition, they contend that fuel subsidies are a costly 
method of protecting the poor due to significant benefit leakage to higher income groups as 
the top income quintile enjoys six times more in subsidies than the bottom on absolute basis. 
The study concludes by suggesting the need for a new approach to fuel pricing in many 
countries and offer insights into the critical issues that should be considered when carrying 
out subsidy reform including but not limited to adequately informing the prospective 
beneficiaries such as the consumers and taxpayers about the shortcomings of existing 
subsidies and the potential benefits of reform. 
In spite of the large quantity of works on energy pricing, clear explanations of issues 
are lacking as most studies continue to place extra emphasis on economic efficiency as 
defined by the “laissez-faire” approach. Yet, the theory can hardly solve the multiplicities of 
socio economic and externalities issues that policy makers are normally confronted with. 
                                                                 
41 The standard price is taken as the international price in US$ for the relevant product at the nearest 
international nucleus adjusted by 10 cents per litre each to allow for the shipping and the distribution and 
retailing costs respectively. The relevant per litre domestic distribution and  retailing costs are as reported in the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2008 
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These and the complications imposed by the existence of the informal sector as well as the 
distorting role of traditional energies in energy pricing were the major issues addressed by 
Bhattacharyya (1996). The paper conducts a broad analysis of the several factors affecting 
energy pricing and contends that current economic theories offer little assistance in real- life 
determination of domestic energy pricing. The conclusions of the paper are that equity 
considerations which are highly essential for political acceptability of any pricing remedy has 
been lost in the quest for efficiency and that economic tariff in the energy sector are set in 
gross violation of economic prescription 
Reforming fossil energy subsidies is no doubt an operational way to advance a better 
energy consumption arrangement but the uncertain impacts it will exert on the economy, 
society and the environment requires the reform to be evaluated carefully in advance. To this 
end, Liu and Li (2011) in their paper use the price-gap approach to assess the degree of fossil 
energy subsidies in China and later establish a CGE model with pollutant emissions and CO2 
emissions account to stimulate the fossil energy subsidies reform under varying assumptions. 
The study applies some environmental and economic analytical framework to monetise the 
pollutant reduction benefits and also analyse the likelihood and scope of enhancing the energy 
consumption pattern. The results confirm that removing coal or oil subsidies can improve in 
different magnitude the pattern of energy consumption with the effect of coal subsidy 
appearing more feasible than oil. The study also concludes by suggesting gradual rather than 
abrupt overall cut in subsidies. 
The report by Burniaux et al (2011) draws on earlier OECD work to evaluate the 
influence of phasing out fossil fuel consumption subsidies in developing and emerging 
economies on international trade using the OECD’s ENV-Linkages General-Equilib r ium 
model combined with the IEA’s price gap estimates of consumer subsidies. The results show 
that a coordinated mutual removal of fossil fuel consumption subsidies between the period of 
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2013 and 2020 would increase world trade volumes by a seemingly negligible 0.1% by the 
year 2020 though with observed large disparities across countries/ regions and products. 
While trade in natural gas would be most affected with a 6% fall by 2020, adjustments in 
trade flows would be most predominant in energy-intensive products and the input of oil 
exporting countries to global trade volumes would continue to be lesser in the long term. 
A typical energy-poverty problem concerning how subsidy reforms can aid fuel 
switching among households was investigated by Park and Kwon (2011) for the Korean coal 
industry in the country’s bid to transit to a low carbon policy. With the use of the 2007 census 
data on briquette consuming households, the study seeks to uncover the factors that influence 
households’ fuel switching decision in line with the coupon program reform policy of the 
government to encourage fuel switching from anthracites to other clean energy. The paper 
found that the coupon program provides an adverse effect to switching fuels to clean energy 
and concludes that reform policy on consumer subsidy must be clearly packaged within the 
framework of a more comprehensive regional energy plans in order to address energy poverty 
concerns. According to Laan (2010), the present level of available information about fossil 
fuel subsidies is less pleasing. Hence, the study draws on existing body of knowledge on fuel 
subsidies to substantiate the position that useful and accurate information could effective ly 
aid reform and suggests ways to accomplish this in good time and with least resources. The 
study concludes that enhanced transparency is crucial and involves improved reporting within 
nations and a new global order. 
Following the major reforms in Iran on December 2010 which led to a rise of about 
twenty folds in the domestic prices of energy and agricultural products, Guillaume et al (2011) 
conduct a review of the economic and technical issues included in the planning and execution 
of the reform as well as the various compensatory transfers to households and many other 
factors that were essential to the realisation of the reform. The study submits that proper 
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planning, information management, transparency and appropriate timing among others led to 
the success of what has turned out to be the first successful markedly implicit energy subsidies 
removal by a major net oil exporter.  
In countries where government transparency is an issue, opinions tends to differ sharply 
on the existence of and even the magnitude of fuel subsidy which create stiff opposition in 
any subsidy reform process. In this kind of situation, there is the need to empirically examine 
these opposing claims to ascertain whether the existence of such subsidy is a fact or fallacy. 
In this regard, Nwachukwu and Chike (2011) sought to clarify this issue in Nigeria by 
employing linear regression to test the hypothesis that there is no significant relationship 
between fuel demand and fuel subsidy factors. The study provide empirical evidence that fuel 
subsidy is a fact and not a fallacy as the results suggest that there is a significant relationship 
between the fuel demand and fuel subsidy factors proxy with fuel subsidy and fuel price. The 
study advocate a gradually controlled withdrawal of fuel subsidy based on its finding that fuel 
subsidy factors account for about 50% of changes in demand for fuel. 
Akpoghomeh and Badejo (2006) reviewed the supply and distribution systems of 
petroleum product in Nigeria among other objectives42. In addition, the shortage between the 
landed cost of imported petroleum products and their selling prices makes importations by 
government and other marketers highly unsustainable and unprofitable. All these, the study 
observes, are not unconnected with national government policy of subsidies on the price of 
petroleum products in the country and advocated for the privatization of domestic refiner ie s 
and pipeline system, removal of government subventions as well as deregulation of the 
petroleum products’ prices as feasible alternatives to attract the required private capital into 
the sector and end the fuel supply problems. 
                                                                 
42 The major aim of this study was to establish the cause of the erratic petroleum products’ supply system in a 
country which ironically ranks tall among the group of net o il exporting nations. Hence the study identified both 
the network density and distribution pipelines connectivity as low and inadequate in ensuring a proficient 
distribution system. 
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Adenikiju (2010) posits that elimination of subsidies usually generate violent resistance 
from those who benefits from them including fuel importers, government officials, labour 
union, and the richer urban elites; but arbitrary use of energy subsidies is costly not only for 
the economy but everybody in the chain. He suggested that the existing low pricing of crude 
oil should typically allow the economy to institute some type of taxes on fuel imports and use 
the proceeds to finance suitable and reliable compensatory programme for the truly vulnerab le 
segments of the population. 
It is important to point out that fossil fuel subsidies and their reform process have not 
given adequate attention to incorporate the peculiar socio economic environments of 
developing countries in the global call for subsidy reforms. While it may be true that price 
subsidy distorts price signals causing inefficient resource allocation and may sometimes 
disproportionately benefits people that are beyond the targeted poor, their reforms may also 
exert unintended consequences on the development of other sectors of the economy 
particularly in developing world. To this end, Bazilian and Onyeji (2012) contemplate the 
implications of fossil fuel subsidy reform policies for businesses within the context of acute 
shortage of power supply in Nigeria. Using the January 2012 petroleum product subsidy 
reform in Nigeria as a reference point, they contended that the reforms administrative process 
fails to properly factor in the veracities of institutional and infrastructural dearth. Hence, 
removal of subsidy in this and other similar economies put further pressure on the existing 
high cost of power supply thereby raising cost of doing business in general. Accordingly, the 
authors suggest that ineffective policies in developing countries (such as the failed subsidy 
removal in Nigeria) results from non-consideration of countries’ specifics in formulation and 
implementation.  
Similarly, Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012) realise that energy subsidies can truly achieve 
some countries’ specific developmental objectives but contend that it may be a costly and 
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inefficient approach. In a recent review of energy subsidies in Arab countries, they mainta in 
that despite the associated negative impacts, energy subsidies represent a significant safety 
net for the poor populace in several Arab countries, such that reducing and or eliminating 
these subsidies without compensatory social programmes would further reduce households’ 
welfare and grind down the competitiveness of some sectors. The likelihood of success for 
any subsidy reform according to the paper depends on the ability of policy makers in 
designing measures to cushion the adverse effects on the poor populace and other sectors of 
the economy in the long run. The paper concludes that while energy pricing reforms may 
offer some potential benefits and appear theoretically plausible, the prevailing peculiar 
geopolitical and economic climate of the Arab region will render implementation practically 
difficult or impossible. 
 
2.4 Methodological Issues 
 
First and foremost, a widely held opinion in the above literature review is that most 
governments subsidize the consumption of goods and services because they want to improve 
certain essential outcomes among the population43, there is need to assess the effect of subsidy 
on these essential outcomes such as income distribution, fuel consumption efficiency, 
consumption of alternative fuels, production and other sectors of the economy, level of 
pollution, deforestation among others. Such investigation can be conducted using different 
approaches depending on the extent of investigation and the desired outcome. For instance, 
if the objective is just to answer the basic question ‘To what extents do governments spending 
on subsidising goods and services improve the lives of the poor’? A benefit incidence measure 
may be computed. This process is describe fully in chapter 3.  
                                                                 
43 Petroleum product subsidies, for instance, can be justified if they improve living standards through enhanced 
access, affordability and reduction in the consumption of hazardous and highly polluting fuels etc.  
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A number of studies have tried to examine energy subsidies from the perspective of 
development using methodology such as the social-cost-benefit (SCB) 44  analysis which 
assesses the impacts of changes in energy subsidies on social welfare. This method permits a 
socio economic appraisal of changes in policy and regulatory framework, identifying, 
measuring and then discounting future costs and benefits in order to calculate the net 
economic merit of a particular policy option.  
Shafie-Pour Motlagh and Farsiabi (2007) employed a typical Environmental Cost-
Benefit Analytical Model (ECBA) incorporating environmental damage costs of energy 
consumption to estimates the trend of total energy subsidies in Iran45. Generally, the ECBA 
model adopted internalises energy cycle externalities and computes the Cost/Benefit ratio for 
implementing price reform policy under different scenarios.  
A major limitation of the social costs-benefits analysis is that the costs and benefits may 
apply to goods and services that have a simple and visible measure in a suitable unit such as 
prices in monetary terms which is seldom the case particularly in the case of the social and 
environmental impacts. Therefore, a number of empirical studies have employed 
macroeconomic models particularly those with optimising framework such as partial 
equilibrium analysis, non-linear dynamic optimization models or dynamic input-output 
models, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to account for some elements of the 
welfare impact of subsidies or their removal. 
Given the widespread opposition that subsidy reforms face, it is important that any 
method adopted to compute the effects of energy subsidies should not only be robust and 
                                                                 
44 SCB analysis is a decision yardstick that is employed regularly by policymakers to determine whether a 
policy should be implemented. It tries to monetise the effects of a policy on individuals or groups and compare 
to the status quo or with other alternative policy measure. 
45 According to the authors, the model predicts that if subsidies continue, energy subsidies will rise from the 
present 0.17% of GDP in 2003 to about 0.2% of GDP by 2019. The results not only show that reducing energy 
subsidies for each energy form has considerably environmental benefits, but also has potential for income 
redistribution in the economy with long run improvement in government revenue and economic growth  
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relevant for policy use but must be as transparent as possible to permit effective 
communication with all stakeholders. To these end, several alternative approach have been 
adopted but there is none that is all encompassing in terms of in depth impact assessment and 
cross country comparisons. The price-gap method is one approach that has been used widely 
owing to its robustness and transparency but the method can only explain specific impacts of 
subsidies.  
The theoretical foundation of the price gap methodology was established by Corden 
(1957) in calculating the cost of protection while McCrone (1962) applied the framework to 
study agricultural subsidies in the United Kingdom. A landmark effort at estimating global 
fossil fuel subsidy by Larsen and Shah (1992) adapted and publicised this price gap approach. 
Another comparative technique for estimating subsidies is the producer subsidy equivalent 
(PSE) or the consumer subsidy equivalent (CSE) method which assesses the impact of 
subsidies by considering the worth/value of the subsidies to the recipients46.  
The partial equilibrium models consider merely the energy product market where 
subsidy reform is taking place and based on simple economic assumptions attempt to estimate 
changes in fossil fuels price, demand and production as a result of subsidy removal. However, 
according to Von Moltke et al. (2004), the sizes of these changes will be reasonably 
influenced by the price elasticity of demand and supply and underlying assumptions. Though 
the use of partial equilibrium models can offer some valuable insights into the impacts of 
subsidy reform, they are very restrictive as regard information on other economic sectors with 
considerable use of energy as input as well as other macroeconomic effects about 
international competitiveness.  
                                                                 
46 Though the producer or the consumer subsidy equivalent approach can offer a practicable way to trail the 
extent of the impacts of subsidies with time, the exclusive calculation of the PSE would offer no information 
about the effects of subsidies on economic efficiency, implication for GHG emissions and energy security 
concerns. This is one major reason why the price-gap technique have enjoyed comparative acceptance as the 
best approach to a quantitative estimation of energy subsidies  
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General equilibrium models on the other hand provide more in-depth answers to 
macroeconomic questions by simulating defined set of equations which consider the linkages 
across several markets concurrently47. Though, the scope of statistical results from general 
equilibrium models is wider than those obtainable from partial equilibrium models, the data 
requirement for the former are much more substantial. As useful as these macroeconomic 
models are, their major drawback lies in the non-homogeneous nature of their theoretica l 
foundation. Interestingly, the increasing consideration of the micro foundation of most 
macroeconomic models in recent time has reduced the clear cut demarcation between 
macroeconomic and General Equilibrium (GE) models. Though a GE model is in principle, 
a class of macroeconomic models whose theoretical foundation, traced to the application of 
an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium framework, they are superior to traditiona l 
macroeconomic models when the structure of the overall economy matters for the analysis or 
when evaluating policies with a long time horizon  
However, going by the essential role that energy plays in economic and social 
development, the analyses of the implications of energy subsidies should be analysed in a 
framework which investigates their links to each of the economic, social and environmenta l 
dimensions of sustainable development. This type of considerations highlights the 
considerable difference between a partial and general equilibrium analysis. Partial 
equilibrium (PE) models are more relevant in analysing the transition from an init ia l 
equilibrium to another while General equilibrium (GE) models mainly focused on long-run 
impacts. GE models can provide answers on economic effects of introducing new taxes or 
subsidies or changes in tax rates in a logical and reliable way and are very appropriate in 
answering important policy questions such as the impacts of structural adjustments, subsidy 
                                                                 
47 The precision of the results from general equilibrium modelling is also determined by the accuracy of the 
assumptions regarding the behaviour of economic agents, factors and markets as well as the data 
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and tax reforms. Although GE models cannot be used to forecast business cycles, they can 
indicate likely extents of policy induced changes from future baselines and are vital for 
ranking alternative policy measures. 
Energy pricing policy usually imply significant costs on economic growth and income 
distribution with severe environmental concerns by causing changes in relative prices which 
often induce general equilibrium effects throughout the whole economy. The effect of such 
policy measures are better evaluated within a framework of a general equilibrium (GE) model. 
Although partial equilibrium models make it possible to estimate the costs of energy pricing 
policy measures particularly when feedback effects are not desired, GE models pay 
considerable attention to the net effect of the multitude of interdependencies and interactions 
among agents and sectors within the economy taking substitution processes in production and 
consumption as well as market clearing conditions into account48. 
The general view from the methodological review is that while the price gap and partial 
equilibrium models appear to be the a visible option for estimating the magnitude and 
evaluating socio economic impacts of subsidies comparatively across countries, detailed 
macroeconomic, welfare and environmental analysis are better assessed using general 
equilibrium framework. For these and many more reasons, applied general equilib r ium 
models like the I-O and the CGE model have been widely used in assessing country specific 
cases. It is important to state that since each of the general equilibrium models has its own 
strengths and weaknesses based on several underlying assumptions, conclusions from their 
                                                                 
48 A typical example is to measure the effect of an emission tax on the performance of the economy. The tax 
raises marginal cost of production due to abatement cost and tax payments which make the firm to reduce output 
under the prevailing price level. If all firms in the industry react similarly, the market supply function shift 
backward and the market price increases. Firms will react by modifying their output decisions. The higher 
domestic price makes imports cheaper and exports dearer. Price increase in the energy-intensive industry 
encourages other markets and industries which produce substitutes or complements. In terms of factor input, 
firm will substitute labour, material and capital for the taxed energy input to cut costs and this will affect both 
the factor markets and factor prices. 
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outcomes should be considered in terms of those assumptions49. Though, the CGE method is 
currently in vogue essentially because of the model’s ability to contain price variable 
adjustment which cannot be accommodated by other models, such as the Input-Output and 
the Social Accounting Matrix, it is however not a magic potion for solving policy and 
planning problems. First, the specification of CGE models rely heavily on judgement and 
inclinations of the model builder as he decides among other things, the variables to model, 
interactions to capture and the functional forms to adopt50. In fact, the heated debate about 
the closure for CGE models is far from been resolved. All these make results from CGE 
model highly sensitive to specification decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
49 Basically, the input-output model facilitates the calculation of the economy-wide changes that may result 
from sector specific exogenously shocks obtained from the solution of a set of simultaneous linear equations 
whereas CGE are sets of simultaneous non-linear equations model which accommodates price and quantity 
variables adjustment as input factor market or commodity market equalises to simulate the optimal condition of 
consumers and producers as well as government role as economic actor in an economy. According to Lewis 
(1993), CGE model comprehends all transactions in money cycle, commodity cycle and services cycle in 
economic mechanism  
50 Though prices are treated as endogenous in CGE models, this process requires that  numerous elasticities must 
be estimated. Quite often, models resort to crude estimates of elasticity based on limited set of observation on 
representative values from other studies or informed opinion.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE: WHO BENEFIT MOST FROM FUEL SUBSIDIES? 
EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014), the global value of subsidies 
for fossil fuel consumption grew from $312 billion in 2009 to $548 billion in 2013, representing 
about 0.53% and 0.73% of world GDP in the respective years. Petroleum products account for 
over half of the total subsidies. However, on average, a meagre 7% of the total fossil fuel 
subsidies reached the poorest 20% of the income group in low and middle income countries 
(IMF, 2013, p. 19). Thus, the concern is not only about the huge amount governments commit 
to subsidising fossil fuels but that the ultimate targets of these subsidies hardly benefits. Despite 
continuous efforts made by countries to reform these subsidies, fossil- fuel subsidies are 
notoriously complex to remove in most countries.  
Nigeria has a long tradition of controlling fuel prices and is listed among the top 20 
countries subsidizing fuel consumption by the IEA (2013). Subsidy payments by the 
government to national oil company and other marketers of petroleum products in Nigeria in 
2010 was about US$4.6 billion compared to the total capital allocation of US$3.76 billion to 
priority sector such as defence and internal security, health and education, essential 
infrastructure, and agriculture and resource development in the 2010 annual budget. This 
amounts to about 4.4% and 3.6% of the GDP. With continued instability in international oil 
prices and the associated fiscal burden, the Nigerian government is determined to gradually 
phase out all fuel subsidies before 2015 as part of the on-going petroleum sector reforms. 
However, several reform attempts have been met with great opposition which often degenerates 
into intense conflicts leading to anarchy and loss of lives. Opponents of the reform include 
petroleum product marketers, labour unions, civil right groups, and sometimes the general 
public. They argue that the government may fail to provide adequate protection for the 
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vulnerable income groups if the subsidies are removed51. For instance, Akosile (2012) reported 
that the United Action for Democracy (UAD), a civil right group, had canvassed indefinite 
mass protest against the 2012 petrol price increase on the ground that the move would cause 
social and economic hardship for the poor who were already burdened by high unemployment, 
decaying infrastructure, high cost of living, and deteriorating livelihoods52. Despite serious 
concerns over the efficacy of fuel subsidies, there is little empirical evidence, particularly in 
the case of Nigeria, on how the benefit of fuel subsidies are distributed among each income 
groups. To what extent has the government subsidy on petroleum products in Nigeria reached 
the targeted poor? This is the focus of this chapter. 
As the subsidy on diesel oil prices has been gradually phased out since 2004,  the paper 
investigates the benefit incidence of kerosene and petrol subsidies on Nigerian households. 
Specifically, the study uses data from a nationally representative household consumption 
expenditure survey to analyse the distribution of fuel subsidies in Nigeria. We first present a 
descriptive analysis of how the household expenditure on petrol and kerosene is distributed 
among different income groups. We then conduct a benefit incidence analysis (BIA) to 
examine how the fuel subsidy benefits accrue to each income groups. The results show that 
while the kerosene subsidy is more evenly distributed across income groups, petrol subsidy is 
concentrated to high income groups. In aggregate, the top 20% income group enjoys twice as 
much the benefit of fuel subsidies as the bottom 20% households.53 Finally, we also examine 
the progressivity of fuel subsidies using a Gini coefficient and find that both fuel subsidies are 
more regressive than the per capita expenditure  
                                                                 
51 It must be noted that the opaqueness in subsidy fund management and the poor credibility of the successive 
governments with respect to subsidy lend support to this argument. At every point of domestic fuel price 
adjustments, government made promises on how the proceeds from the subsidy removal would be ap plied to 
improve the economy or raise the standard of living of the people. However, most times, government reneged 
on its promises and this has led to continuous resistance to attempts to remove subsidy. 
52 http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/fuel-price-hike-uad-canvasses-indefinite-mass-action/106457/  
53 The result is based on the survey of the household sector only. As we noted in section 3, to  the extent that the 
high income groups also likely benefit more from petrol subsidy to other sectors (e.g. public service and 
electricity), the aggregate results could underestimate the benefit accrued to the high income groups.  
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 The economic rationale for government spending in any country rests on efficiency and 
equity considerations54 . Therefore, identifying specific inefficient and poorly targeted fuel 
subsidies is important in many ways. First, subsidies can be quite expensive with serious fiscal 
implications. They can equally set countries on inefficient consumption and production paths 
by distorting price signals55. Moreover, poorly targeted subsidies are often characterised by 
high leakages as they tend to benefit groups other than those intended. Against this background, 
it is useful to conduct a case study in a country whose government finance is beleaguered by 
the burden of fuel subsidies to ascertain the extent to which fuel subsidy has benefited the poor 
and middle income groups. Given the pervasion of fuel subsidies in developing countries, the 
findings of this study could have implications beyond the country border. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section two reviews the literature. 
Section three provides background information about Nigeria refining industry and its pricing 
policies of petroleum products. Section four discusses the methods and data while Section five 
reports the results of the benefit incidence analysis, and evaluates the progressivity of fuel 
subsidies. The last section concludes with relevant policy suggestions. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
The effect of fuel subsidy has been extensively studied by international agencies, analysts 
and policy makers. Broadly, there are two strands of literature. The first strand focuses on the 
impact of subsidy removal on welfare distribution and economic growth. For instance, using a 
micro econometrics simulation approach, Pitt (1985) established that the more affluent urban 
                                                                 
54 According to Rosario, et al (2007), such spending will promote efficiency when it corrects market failures 
and/or generate positive externalities and uphold equity by improving the access of the poor to essential goods 
and services.  
55 Fuel subsidies to consumers which lower end-use prices can encourage disproportionate consumption of 
energy services and cause indirect harm to the environment or act as disincentives to energy conservation. It can 
also discourage consumers from shifting to cleaner fuels while subsidies to producers can lock-in technologies 
to the production of certain fuels and exclude more promising and efficient fuels (see Bacon and Kojima, 2006 
and World Bank, 2009) 
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households (about 18.5% of all households) obtain a top-heavy share of total kerosene subsidy 
in Indonesia. In spite of the regressive distribution, he noted that poor families with little or no 
substitute for kerosene in lighting may bear a significant burden if all subsidies are totally 
phased out. Kpodar (2006) employed an input-output approach to evaluate the size and 
distributional impacts as well as the usefulness of subsidies in protecting poor households in 
Mali. The paper finds that upper income households benefit exceptionally from price subsidies 
on all oil products considered. El Said and Leigh (2006) use the estimated implicit import parity 
prices (IPP) in Gabon to evaluate the overall fiscal cost of subsidy and to analyse the 
distributional impact of implicit subsidies on fuel prices by simulating the effect of subsidies 
on the real incomes of household across income groups. They find that it is the higher income 
households who actually benefits from fuel price subsidies in Gabon since the poorest 30% and 
richest 10% of households receive about 13% and 35% of the subsidy respectively.  
Investigating the distributive effects of liberalising fuel prices in Indonesia, Clements et al 
(2003) observed that both the rich and the poor households are affected, but the urban poor are 
more generally prone to the effects of any reduction in fuel subsidy. Siddig et al (2014) use 
MyGTAP model to investigate the impact of subsidy reduction in Nigeria under different 
policy scenarios. They find that accompanying subsidy reduction with a transfer of government 
revenue to rural households will not only increase the real income of poor households, but also 
alleviate the negative impacts of all households and promote economic growth, and increase 
the government revenue 
The second strand of the literature studies the distributional effect of fuel subsidy across 
income groups. Using a large dataset to on petroleum pricing in 51 developing and emerging 
market, Baig et al (2007) find that fuel subsidies are in favour of the rich and the distribution 
of the total effect tends to be regressive while that of the direct effect appears to be neutral. In 
the case of Venezuela, Barreix et al (2007) find that the distribution of gasoline subsidy to end 
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users strongly aid the high income households with about 65% and 5% of the subsidy benefits 
accruing to the top 20% and the bottom 40% respectively. Using the consumption expenditure 
data from the 2012 National Sample Survey, GSI (2014) assesses liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) subsidies in India and finds that the top 20% expenditure group of the population 
received about 60% of the total subsidy, while the bottom 50% and 20% groups received about 
8% and 0.8% of the subsidy transfer respectively. The World Bank (2012) studies the 
distribution of gasoline subsidy in selected African countries and finds that benefits accruing 
to the poorest group ranges from 3% to 14% compared to the richest group with 30% to 71% 
and that the latter group benefits almost 12 times more from gasoline subsidy than the bottom 
group on average. The Indian Department of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance 
(2004) and Gangopadhyay et al (2005) examine the distribution of subsidized fuel, namely 
kerosene and LPG, to evaluate how a reduction in fuel subsidies would affect the poor. They 
found that the LPG subsidy benefited mostly the upper income groups in the urban areas and 
whereas kerosene was widely used, the urban sector received a larger subsidy on a per capita 
basis56.  
In comparison, our study not only presents an analysis on the distribution of government 
subsidies across different income groups in an important developing country, but also examines 
the concentration of each fuel subsidy by calculating a Gini coefficient measure.  
The benefit incidence analysis popularized by the innovative work by Meerman (1979) 
and Selowsky (1979) combines the cost of subsidizing goods with statistics on their 
consumption or usage to generate distributions of their benefit across target population. The 
BIA is a partial equilibrium analysis but unlike the behavioural method, its evaluation of 
                                                                 
56 The report noted that kerosene subsidy is prone to abuse since about 50% of the subsidized kero sene supplies 
are diverted from reaching the anticipated groups which suggest that both the LPG and kerosene subsidies are 
unproductive in achieving their intended objectives. It therefore recommends a gradual but substantial removal 
of LPG subsidy but a more careful approach in the cutback of kerosene subsidies as over half of the rural 
households basically use kerosene in home lighting 
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current benefits is neither based on individual valuations nor on the behavioural responses of 
households to changes in government spending. This approach has been used widely in public 
sector studies to evaluate the benefit incidence of government spending on education and health 
for Malaysia (Meerman, 1979), for Ghana (Demery et al, 1995), for the Philippines (Cuenca, 
2008), and cross-country study by Davoodi et al, 2010). Hammer, et al (1995) applied the same 
method to analyse the incidence of water supply and sanitation on Malaysia’s households while 
the World Bank (1994) Colombian poverty assessment study applied the BIA to estimate the 
benefit incidence of subsidies on electricity and other sources of power in Colombia. 
 
3.3 Nigeria Refining Industry and Pricing Policy: An Overview 
3.3.1 Refining and Marketing Industry 
Nigeria is the largest oil producing country in Africa. As the end of 2012, the country has 
an estimated 37.1 billion barrels of proven oil reserve which are found majorly along the 
country's Niger River Delta and offshore in the Bight of Benin, the Bight of Bonny, and the 
Gulf of Guinea. Its oil production in recent years averaged about 2.3-2.5 million barrels per 
day (BP, 2014). 
In the downstream refining sector, Nigeria has four refineries (Port Harcourt I and II, 
Warri, and Kaduna) with a total petroleum refining capacity of 445,000bpd and if operated at 
full capacity, the refineries would have the capability to produce 251.6 thousand barrels of 
petrol, 62.9 thousand barrels of kerosene, 56.42 thousand barrels of diesel, 3.9 thousand barrels 
of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and 14.53 thousand barrels of fuel oil per day. These 
quantities can, to a large extent satisfy domestic demand57. The crude oil is to be allocated by 
                                                                 
57According to OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2012), Nigeria’s consumption of main petroleum products 
(including gasoline, kerosene, distillates, residuals and others) averaged 270,600 b/d and 267,100 b/d  
respectively in 2010 and 2011. 
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the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)58. However, all the refineries have been 
operating grossly below their installed capacity in the last decades. For instance, the overall 
utilization rate of Nigeria refineries were 22% and 24% in 2010 and 2011, respectively (EIA, 
2012). Consequently, the country has relied on importation to meet its increasing local demand. 
As shown in Figure 3.1, in 2010 imports account for 85.5% and 67.4%, respectively, of petrol 
and kerosene consumption in Nigeria.  
 
Figure 3.1: Composition of fuel supply in Nigeria 2000 – 2010 
  
Source: computed using IEA (2012) data  
 
The importation of petroleum products into the country is managed by the government 
through the NNPC as well as other major and independent marketers such as African Petroleum 
PLC, Agip PLC, Texaco PLC, and Total PLC. The volumes of importation by these major 
marketers account for about two third of the industry total. These marketers, which are 
registered with the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) purchase the 
                                                                 
58 Despite the low refinery utilization rate, the government continues to allocate 445,000 b/d of crude oil to 
NNPC. However, according to NEITI (2013), on average, only 90,202 b/d of crude oil were delivered to the 
refineries between 2009 and 2011, which represents 20.27% of the total allocation. NNPC claims that that it 
refines the balance through SWAP/Offshore processing arrangement in exchange of refined products   
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refined products in North-west Europe and sell to the public at the fixed domestic price. As the 
domestic retail prices for petrol and kerosene are lower than the purchase prices, the difference 
(i.e. the subsidy) is drawn from the Petroleum Support Fund (PSF) within the custody of the  
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). 
To participate, a registered marketer must give notification and receive approval to 
import from the PPPRA based on the available domestic supplies and other applicable factors 
determined by the agency. The discharge of all imported cargoes must be witnessed and 
confirmed by the staff of the agency alongside that of the Department of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR) and the Nigerian Navy at the jetties and an independent surveyors. The PPPRA and the 
DPR certify and process the import documents when the fuel discharge is confirmed to 
determine the amount due to the marketers and submits the verified documents and subsidy 
claims to the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) for internal auditing, processing and approval. 
The Ministry of Finance will then issue authorization to incur expenditure to the Accountant 
General of the Federation who will in turn issue the payment mandate to the CBN. Finally, the 
PPPRA will issue cheques to the marketers on the basis of the auditor’s report as soon as the 
CBN has credited the PSF with the sum of the subsidy claims.  
 
3.3.2 Petroleum Pricing and Subsidy Policies in Nigeria 
To better understand the historical background of fuel subsidies in Nigeria, we provide a 
brief review of the fuel pricing policies starting the first “oil shock” of 1973.  
A formal control of petroleum products pricing by the Nigerian government commenced 
in 1973 via the introduction of uniform crude pricing in the nation irrespective of the associated 
transportation and cost differences. The main objectives of this policy were (a) to foster 
industrialization, (b) to promote regional development, and (c) to control inflat ion 59 
                                                                 
59 Unfortunately, as argued by Adenikinju (2012), the evidence over the years suggests that these policy goals 
are largely not achieved.  
56 
 
(Adenikinju, 2012). When the policy commenced in 1973, the government provided a subsidy 
of 35.7% by fixing the prices of crude oil at $1.93 dollars per barrel in the domestic market 
whereas the international price of crude oil (i.e. the opportunity cost) was $3.00 per barrel 
(Adeyeye, 1991). The subsidy element was reduced drastically to 2% in 1978 when the 
international price of crude oil rose to $14.10 per barrel while the government increased the 
price of crude oil to domestic refineries to $13.80 per barrel. However, as the internationa l 
price of oil rose to $40/b in 1980 and there was no corresponding adjustment in the prices to 
local refineries, the subsidy element amplified to 65.5%. As the export price of crude crashed 
to $15.11 per barrel in 1988, the price of crude to local refineries was dropped to $2.0 per 
barrel. In that way, the subsidy element increased to 86.8%.  
Between 1960 and 1978, the pump price of petrol remained unchanged at 0.088 
Naira/litre. The first attempt to increase the price of petroleum products (petrol in particula r) 
dated back to October 1st, 1978 when General Olusegun Obasanjo raised the price by 73.9% to 
0.153 Naira/litre. In April 1982, the price was increased to 0.20 Naira/litre by President Shehu 
Shagari.   The military government in 1986 declared that owing to the devaluation of the Naira 
within the framework of the country’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), the 
unreasonably cheap domestic price of fuel had become a burden to the federal government’ s 
revenue and resolved to raise the price of petroleum products. This led to the then military 
government of General Ibrahim Babangida increasing the price of petrol four times between 
1986 and 1993: from 0.20 to 0.395 Naira/litre in 1986, 0.42 Naira/litre in 1988, 0.60 Naira/litre 
in 1989 and 0.70 Naira/litre in 1993. These represent 97.5%, 6%, 43%, and 16.6% increases 
respectively. 
For the same reason of budgetary burdens due to the further devaluation of the Naira, 
President Ernest Shonekan increased the price of petrol in 1993 to 5.00 Naira/litre. With the 
return of the military in November 1993, General Abacha in a bid to gain public support 
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reduced the price of petroleum products (petrol) by 35% to 3.25 Naira/litre. However, a year 
later in 1994, the same government announced a sharp increase in the price of petroleum 
products with petrol sold for 11.00 Naira/litre. General Abdulsalami who ascended power upon 
the death of General Abacha increased the price to 25.00 Naira/litre but was later reduced to 
20.00 Naira/litre in January of 1999 as a result of public outcry and labour resistance. 
 
Figure 3.2: Pump price of petroleum products $US/litre in Nigeria 1990-2012 
 
Source: World Bank data 
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A new democratic government brought retired General Olusegun Obasanjo to power in 
May 1999 and his government increased the price of petroleum products four times within 8 
years all in the name of eliminating waste, freeing government funds, and encouraging foreign 
and local investment in the country’s downstream sector. During the 8-year period, the price 
of petrol went from 20.00 Naira/litre to 22.00 Naira/litre in 1999; 34.00 Naira/litre in 2003; 
40.00 Naira/litre in 2006, and finally increase to 75.00 Naira/litre as a parting gift in 2007. The 
next President Yar’dua who succeeded Obasanjo reduced the official price of petrol to 65.00 
Naira/litre in 2008. In January 2012 President Goodluck Jonathan increased the price of petrol 
from 65.00 Naira/litre to 120.00 Naira/litre. The price was however reduced to 97.00 
Naira/Litre after serious nationwide strike and protests by the organised labour and civil society 
groups. The top panel of Figure 2 shows the average pump price of petrol for the period of 
1990-2012. 
Unlike petrol whose subsidy level has been reduced, kerosene is still highly subsidised 
at the price of 50.00 Naira/litre for kerosene is the domestic fuel for the poor. However, while 
a large chunk of NNPC’s subsidy claims is on kerosene, the fuel is often not accessible in retail 
outlets at the subsidised price because kerosene are mostly vended in tanks, kegs, cans, and 
bottles by petty retailers  and they charge a price higher than the official prices of 50 Naira/litre.  
A recent report by a committee set up to verify the arrears of 2011 subsidy claims 
observed that two-thirds of the kerosene sold by NNPC between 2010 and 2011 was sold to 
both depot owners and middle men while the middle men sold the product to owners of retail 
outlets at inflated prices of about 115.00 to 125 Naira/litre which leaves the consumers to pay 
prices higher than the 50 Naira/litre set by the government60.Our field observation reveals that 
the product is available at the official retail price of 50.00 Naira/litre at most filling station but 
                                                                 
60 See http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/sustaining-the-scam-on-kerosene-subsidy/122819/ 
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with long queues. To avoid the long queues, many consumers patronise private vendors who 
charge higher prices.  
The price of diesel has been deregulated since 2004 and is no longer subsidized. As 
shown in Figure 3.2, diesel prices are 75-90% higher than that of petrol in recent years.  
 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
3.4.1 Methodology 
The BIA involves a three-step process. The first step is to obtain estimates of the unit 
subsidy of providing a particular product usually based on official public spending on 
subsidising the product. The second stage is to identify the various households or individua ls 
who consumes the product and in effect, enjoy the transfer in kind. It is the distribution of this 
transfer across the population that the BIA seeks to measure. The last stage entails aggregating 
the households (or individuals) into sub-groups of the population so as to evaluate how the 
subsidy is distributed across different welfare groups. The common grouping is by income, or 
a related measure of the welfare of the individual e.g. expenditure. Apart from analysing the 
distribution and incidence of subsidy benefits, BIA can offer insight into the concepts of 
targeting and progressivity of social welfare spending by allowing government to concentrate 
the benefits of social assistance programs on the poorest segments of the population. BIA 
assesses how tax policy or government subsidy affects the distribution of welfare in the 
population by evaluating the distribution of government subsidies among different groups in 
the population (Cuenca, 2008). 
Benefit incidence hinges on both the household behaviour of consuming the subsidised 
goods and the composition of government spending by assigning benefits to the consumers of 
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the good ranked by specific measure of current welfare indicator. Following Demery (2000) 
and Cuenca (2008), the study employs the following equations61 
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where Xj is the amount of subsidy that benefits group j, S and E refer to the government subsidy 
and household expenditure on goods or services respectively. The subscripts (i) denotes the 
category of goods/service (in this case, fuel type – petrol and kerosene). Equation 1.1 suggests 
that the amount of benefits accruing to welfare group j depends on two factors (i.e. the
ije ’s, 
and is ’s). The ije ’s are the shares of each expenditure group in total expenditure for fuel i 
while the is ’s are the share of subsidy spending across various fuels. To compute the incidence 
of fuel subsidy accruing to group Xj, we use equation (1.1) above.  
 
Figure 3.3: Gini Measure of Welfare distribution  
 
Source: graphical sketch by the Author 
 
                                                                 
61 Readers are advised to see Demery (2000) and Cuenca (2008) for detailed methodological notes on BIA computations, 
applications and other developments and extensions 
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We further calculate a concentration ratio, similar to the Gini coefficient, to measure the 
extent of the inequality in the distribution of the subsidies and compare to that of the income 
distribution. Mathematically, the Gini (concentration) coefficient is the ratio of the area 
bounded by the diagonal and the Lorenz (concentration) curve (represented by X) to the total 
area below the diagonal (i.e., triangle ABC or Area Y) which is illustrated in figure 3.3. In 
Figure 3.3, the horizontal axis represents the cumulative distribution of the population sorted 
in an ascending order of household income. The vertical axis represents the cumulat ive 
distribution of welfare. In this study, the welfare is measured by the amount of the relevant 
subsidy enjoyed by each household. For any welfare measure of y between 0 and 1 on the 
vertical axis, the Lorenz curve indicates it as the fraction of the total welfare enjoyed by that 
corresponding bottom fraction of the population. From figure 3.3 therefore, the Gini or the 
Concentration coefficient is computed as follows: 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑋 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐵𝐶⁄      (2) 
Since the area of Triangle ABC = 0.5, the Gini Coefficient = 2 * Area of X  (2.1) 
Let N denote the number of equal divisions and 𝐴𝑖 as the percentile of the welfare measure, the 
area of X is given as: 
1
2
−  [
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐴𝑖 +  (
1
𝑁
) 𝐴𝑁
𝑁−1
𝑖=1 ] ; 𝐴𝑁 = 1.
62      (2.2) 
Since there is no reliable government spending data on fuel subsidy from official sources in 
Nigeria63, the study resort to estimating the subsidy amounts using the price gap model. The 
method is appropriate as Nigeria has relied on imports for the supply of petroleum products. 
                                                                 
62 Here we use the formula of Cuenca (2008). Alternative formulae for calculating the Gini coefficient can be 
found in Lubrano (2014). 
63 For instance, the Presidential Committee on Verification and Reconciliation o f Fuel Subsidy Payments in 
2011 led by Mr Aigboje Aig-Imoukhuede revealed in its report that 197 subsidy transactions worth N232bn 
were illegitimate http://saharareporters.com/news-page/31-billion-stolen-under-president-jonathan-nigeria-
%E2%80%93punch  
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The implicit subsidy (S) for the consumption (C) of any petroleum products (i) at any time (t) 
is calculate as follows 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡)                    (3) 
and   𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖,𝑡                   (3.1) 
where: 
S, C, and all lower case scripts are as defined above; 
Y is the reference price and X is the retail price;  
P is the international border price for each fuel; 
M is the marketing, distribution costs and all other applicable charges; while  
T represents all applicable consumption taxes. 
 
3.4.2 The Data       
The study uses the Harmonized Living Standard Survey of 2009/10 (HNLSS 2010 
henceforth), which is a blend of the Nigeria Living Standard Survey (NLSS) and the World 
Bank’s Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ). The survey covered 34,770 households 
(about 1.1% of the total population households) in 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of all 
36 States and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The data was collected on a quarterly basis 
between November 2009 and October 2010. All monetary units are in Nigerian Naira. A careful 
look at the HNLSS data reveals that it was most likely contaminated with errors arising from 
misreporting or recording, which is not unusual for survey data64.  Following Cowell, F. A. and 
Victoria-Feser (1996, 2006a), we two-tail trimmed the data by 5% (top and bottom each 2.5%), 
thereby reducing the coverage to 32,921 households. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
64 For example, in the original dataset, 15 household have an expenditure of over 1 billion naira which is simply 
impossible. Our personal communications with the National Statistics office (NBS) confirms that it is most 
likely due to typographic errors.  
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3.5 Results and Discussion  
3.5.1 Household Fuel Consumption Patterns  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of household size, total household expenditures 
and household expenditure on fuels stratified by expenditure quintile groups. Quintiles are 
defined in terms of expenditures rather than income throughout the analysis. In the survey, 
expenditures greatly exceed income for many ‘hard to track’ groups like self-employed and 
social income recipients. Therefore, expenditures appear to be a better means of describing the 
well-being of the households than the reported income as they shed more light on poverty status 
(also see World Bank, 2011)65. We use expenditure and income interchangeably in this paper. 
There are 6,584 households in each quintile group. The number of people in a household 
appears to be inversely related to the income level, with a mean of 4.4 people in a household.  
The total expenditure of an average household in the poorest quintile is 20,968 Naira per 
annum, 29% of an average household in the richest quintile. The average household 
expenditure in the median quintile is 38, 969 Naira per year, which is slightly lower than the 
grand mean expenditure for the survey, indicating the income distribution is slightly skewed to 
the right.  
As for expenditures on fuels, the table reveals two interesting patterns. First, the 
expenditure on kerosene are more evenly distributed among different income groups than the 
expenditure on petrol. An average household in the poorest quintile spent 1824 Naira per year 
on kerosene, which is about 86.4% of that in the richest quintile. In comparison, the household 
spending on petrol is concentrated to the richest quintile. The average household expenditure 
on petrol in the first four quintiles is respectively 7.5%, 19.5%, 35.5%, and 61.6% of that of 
                                                                 
65 The World Bank (2011) submitted that consumption is a better indicator of welfare than income because it is 
more closely related to household’s  well-being in terms of meeting current basic needs. It is believed that 
income is limited as it cannot address the questions of access, availability that may ultimately determine 
consumption. 
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the highest income group. Second, all but the richest household group spend more on kerosene 
than petrol. Because of the low electrification rate and poor state of nature gas pipelines, 
kerosene is still one of the main fuels for cooking and lighting among the Nigerian households 
in both urban and rural areas. As shown in Table 2, 66% of households use kerosene throughout 
the country and there is little variation in kerosene usage among different income groups. 
According to National Bureau of Statistics (2011), the share of households using kerosene for 
cooking and lighting is respectively 22.8% and 57.8%. In essence, kerosene is still a necessity 
good for the majority of households in Nigeria.  
Table 3.2 presents the share of households using petrol and kerosene across expenditure 
groups. As aforementioned, 66% of households in Nigeria use kerosene. This is compared to 
only 6% of households consume some amount of petrol. From the fuel expenditure and average 
price, we computed the average household fuel consumption for each income group. The result 
is shown in the last two columns. While there is little variation in kerosene consumption across 
income groups 66 , petrol consumption differs dramatically. The richest 20% households 
consume nearly 30 times more petrol than the poorest quintile.67  Also shown in Table 2 are 
the budget shares of the two fuels. The budget share of petrol is increasing with income whereas 
the share of kerosene is inversely related to total household income. On average, a household 
in the poorest group spent 8.7% of its total expenditure on kerosene while a household from 
the richest group only spent 2.9% of their income.  Clearly, the poorest group will feel a heavier 
burden of any increase in the price of kerosene if the subsidy is removed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
66 As income increases, the share of inferior fuel like kerosene in the fuel mix should decline. However, limited 
access to quality substitutes such as LPG and electricity keeps consumers from shifting away from kerosene   
67 It is notable that the households in the bottom quintile also consume a minimum amount of petrol. This is 
probably because the use of motorcycles which are petrol-fuelled.  
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Table 3.1: Distributions of H/hold expenditure, Size and Fuel expenditures by Quintiles  
Household Expenditure 
Quintiles 
Number of 
people in 
household 
Total 
household 
expenditure 
Per capita 
household 
expenditure 
Annual 
expenditure 
on Petrol 
Annual 
expenditure 
on Kerosene 
1 
(Poorest) 
Mean 6.38 20968 3331 188 1824 
St. dev 2.14 8086 761 1525 2056 
Minimum 1.00 1956 1827 0 0 
Maximum 10.00 45838 4585 38933 14600 
2 
Mean 5.29 30708 5841 489 2024 
St. dev 2.10 12484 753 2840 2192 
Minimum 1.00 4747 4587 0 0 
Maximum 10.00 71537 7203 44895 14600 
3 
Mean 4.38 38969 8954 890 2087 
St. dev 2.08 18823 1105 4485 2287 
Minimum 1.00 7219 7204 0 0 
Maximum 10.00 110290 11033 79083 14600 
4 
Mean 3.53 49715 14280 1542 2126 
St. dev 2.03 29080 2176 7611 2344 
Minimum 1.00 11038 11034 0 0 
Maximum 10.00 177373 18708 146000 14600 
5 
(Richest) 
Mean 2.45 72497 30837 2505 2111 
St. dev 1.91 61302 10806 12068 2355 
Minimum 1.00 18709 18708 0 0 
Maximum 10.00 604037 64601 194667 20197 
Total 
Mean 4.41 42571 12648 1123 2034 
St. dev 2.46 36730 10992 6891 2252 
Minimum 1.00 1956 1827 0 0 
Maximum 10.00 604037 64601 194667 20197 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics by expenditure quintiles from the HNLSS 2010 
survey. There are 6584 households in each quintile group for a total of 32921 households in the sample  
 
3.5.2 Benefit Incidence of Fuel Subsidies in Nigeria 
Table 3.3 reports the summary of the total expenditure and total subsidies on both petrol 
and kerosene from 2009 to 2011 using the price-gap model. Data on spot price, retail prices are 
in national currency, daily consumption and official exchange rates where applicable are 
obtained from OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2012. Unit subsidy is calculated by 
subtracting the retail price from the reference price which is the sum of spot price at Rotterdam, 
freight, insurance, domestic cost elements and distribution margin. The applicable cost 
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elements (lightering expenses, port authority charges, financing, jetty depot throughput and 
storage charge) and distribution margin (retailers, transporters, dealers, bridging fund, marine 
transport average and admin charges) are obtained from the Nigerian Petroleum Products 
Pricing and Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) template and measured in Naira/Litre.68 From the 
table, Nigeria spent 584.90 billion naira, or about 3.7% of GDP and 17.9% of government 
revenue subsidizing petrol and kerosene subsidies in 201069.  
Table 3.2: Percentage of H/holds using fuels, Fuel Budget and Consumption in Nigeria 
Household Exp. 
Quintiles 
% of Households using 
fuels 
Fuel Budget Share  
(%) 
Fuel Consumption   
(litres) 
Petrol Kerosene Petrol Kerosene Petrol Kerosene 
1 (poorest) 2.2 62.4 0.9 8.7 120.0 1162.3 
2 4.2 65.6 1.6 6.6 311.7 1289.6 
3 6.1 66.6 2.3 5.4 566.9 1329.6 
4 7.4 67.6 3.1 4.3 982.0 1354.1 
5 (Richest) 8.7 68.0 3.5 2.9 1596.1 1345.0 
Total 5.7 66.1 2.6 4.8 3576.6 6480.6 
Data source: HNLSS 2010 survey data. Fuel consumption is calculated by dividing the average 
expenditure on a particular fuel by the retail price of 2010 of that fuel. 
 
Table 3.4 presents the distribution of subsidies across income groups based on the survey 
data. The first two columns depicts the shares of each expenditure quintiles in total petrol (epj) 
and kerosene (ekj) expenditures respectively. Column (3) and column (5) show the total subsidy 
accrued to each expenditure quintile while columns (4) and (6) are the shares of subsidy 
enjoyed by each income group for petrol and kerosene, respectively. The subsidies are 
                                                                 
68 From PPPRA historical data, the cost element and distribution margin as a percentage of cost plus freight in 2011 are 
8.71% and 11.07% respectively for petrol and 7.95% and 11.72% for kerosene respectively. The study applies these 
percentages. 
69 Our estimate of total subsidy spending is likely underestimating the total government expenditure on subsidy. 
A report by the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) noted that in 2010 the total 
subsidy recorded by PPPRA and OAGF were N694.51 billion and N744.78 billion respectively (NEITI, 2013) 
However, it also noted the discrepancy should ordinarily not occur since the OAGF manages and controls the 
PSF and only the amount processed for payment by PPPRA is paid by OAGF. The significant difference 
between our estimate and the PPPRA and OAGF figures lies mainly in the consumption where we use OPEC 
data and the PPPRA data is aggregated from independent marketers. Our benefit incidence analysis in 
subsequent sections does not rely on the total subsidy spending figures. A detailed comparison between our 
estimates and the PPPRA figures as reported by NEITI is available from the authors upon request   
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calculated by multiplying the sum of fuel consumption for each group by the unit subsidy as 
detailed above. Finally, column (7) and (8) summaries the total amount of subsidy and the share 
accrued to each income group.  
Table 3.3: Fuel Consumption, Price and Subsidy in Nigeria 
   
Spot 
Price 
 
Official 
Retail 
Price 
 
Unit 
Subsidy 
Annual 
Consumption 
(litre) 
 
Total Subsidy 
Spending (N'b) 
Petrol (Naira/Litre)       
2009 65.98 65.00 19.2 9,760,631,580 187.4 
2010 87.3 65.00 43.8 11,111,238,000 486.67 
2011 116.46 65.00 77.53 12,496,209,115 968.77 
Kerosene (Naira/Litre)       
2009 65.96 50.00 31.12 1,468,074,030 45.68 
2010 85.83 50.00 55.28 1,776,786,840 98.22 
2011 122.38 50.00 99.63 2,532,393,000 252.31 
Note: Unit subsidy is calculated by subtracting retail price from the reference price as defined in the 
text. Total subsidy spending is calculated by multiplying the unit subsidy with annual consumption.  
 
As one would expect, the petrol subsidy benefits more the upper income groups while 
the kerosene subsidy are more evenly distributed across income groups. From the results, the 
ratio of petrol subsidy captured by an average household in the first four quintiles is 7.6%, 
19.5%, 35.4%, and 61.7% of the highest income group respectively, the first three quintiles 
captured 86.7%, 95.7% and 98.6% of the kerosene subsidy benefited by the richest quintile. 
This shows that the relative welfare gain for each quintile groups is more even for kerosene as 
against petrol. In terms of the total subsidy, whereas the poorest quintile gained just 14% of the 
total fuel subsidy, the richest group benefited a disproportional of 27.1%. The ratio of total fuel 
subsidy enjoyed by an average household in the first four quintiles is 51.7%, 62.4%, 70.8%, 
and 83.8%, respectively, of the highest income group.  A caveat here is that the results are 
calculated from the household survey data only. As shown in Table 3.3, the government spent 
five times more in subsidizing petrol than subsidizing kerosene, yet, from the HNLSS survey 
data, total subsidy on petrol is less than 40% of that on kerosene. The discrepancy is likely 
because petrol is used not only by the household sector, but also by industry, government and 
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commercial sectors. To the extent that the richer households also benefit more from the services 
provided by these sectors, the results in table 3.4 will underestimate the benefit enjoyed by the 
richer households and consequently the inequality in benefit distribution. Second, considering 
the fact that kerosene is often not available to end-users at the subsidized price of 50 Naira/litre, 
the results could on the other hand overestimate the benefit enjoyed by the low income groups. 
Taken together, both caveats imply that the actual inequality in subsidy distribution is likely 
worse than the results shown in this analysis. 
 
 Table 3.4:  Benefit Incidence Estimates in Nigeria 
Exp. 
Quintiles 
Expenditure shares (%) Subsidy benefits (Millions of Naira)  
Petrol (epj)   Kero (ekj) Petrol (spj) (%) Kero (skj) (%) Total (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 (poorest) 3.4 17.9 1.01 0.9 14.7 13.1 15.7 14.0 
2 8.7 19.9 2.60 2.3 16.3 14.6 18.9 16.9 
3 15.8 20.5 4.71 4.2 16.8 15.0 21.6 19.2 
4 27.5 20.9 8.20 7.3 17.2 15.3 25.4 22.7 
5 (Richest) 44.6 20.8 13.31 11.9 17.1 15.3 30.4 27.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 29.83 26.6 82.14 73.4 112.0 100.0 
Data source: HNLSS 2010 survey. 
 
3.5.3 Analysis of concentration of fuel Subsidies in Nigeria 
To further analyze how well-targeted and progressive is the distribution of fuel subsidies 
relative to that of household expenditure, we calculate the Gini coefficients for the total 
household expenditure, petrol subsidy, kerosene subsidy and the total fuel subsidy and the 
results are reported in Table 3.5. All the estimated Gini values are significant at the 
conventional levels.  The estimated Gini coefficient for household expenditure (42.83%) is 
fairly close to the World Bank Gini index of (42.95%) for Nigeria in 201070. The welfare 
                                                                 
70 http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/NGA 
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(measured by household expenditure) are more equally distributed than that of the fuel 
subsidies as the Gini coefficients of both fuel subsidies are significantly higher than that of the 
household expenditure. This suggests that fuel subsidy is not alleviating but exacerbating the 
welfare inequality and will not be an efficient policy tool for income redistribution in Nigeria. 
Given that only 6% of the households use some amount of petrol, it is not unexpected the Gini 
coefficient for petrol subsidy is close to one. It is also worth noting that even though the 
kerosene subsidy appears more evenly distributed, the Gini coefficient measure for kerosene is 
also significantly higher than that of the household expenditure. 
Table 3.5: Gini/Concentration Coefficient of Household Expenditure and Subsidy 
 
Household 
exp. 
Petrol 
Subsidy 
Kerosene 
Subsidy 
Total Fuel 
Subsidy 
Estimated Gini coefficient   0.4283 0.9741 0.6747 0.7081 
Std. error (SE) of Gini 0.0253 0.0052 0.0222 0.0011 
Sample standard deviation(SD) 0.2529 0.0516 0.2216 0.2062 
No of Households 32921 
Note: (SE) and (SD) represent standard deviation of the mean and the sample respectively. While the 
SE expresses the precision of the 𝑥̅ as an estimate of μ, the SD defines the spread of the sample values 
 
Figure 3.4 plots the concentration curves of household expenditure, total fuel subsidy and 
subsidies of petrol and kerosene from the 2010 HNLSS data. The distribution of fuel subsidy 
shown in the concentration curves can be interpreted in two different ways – absolutely and 
relatively. First, by comparing the concentration curves with the 45o diagonal, the distribution 
is progressive in absolute terms if the curve lies above the diagonal because in that case the 
poorest quintiles gain proportionally more from the subsidy than the richest quintiles.  Second, 
comparing the concentration curves, a concentration curve lying above the welfare Lorenz 
curve but below the 45o diagonal are progressive relative to the welfare (expenditure in our 
case), which implies that if beneficiaries were given income instead of the in-kind subsidy 
transfer, income distribution would become more equitable. From the figure, the expenditure 
Lorenz curve and the subsidy concentration curves all lie below the diagonal. So, in absolute 
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terms, the distribution of both petrol and kerosene subsidies are regressive and poorly targeted 
as the poorest 20% of the population captures less than 20% of the benefits. Using the relative 
criteria, a benefit concentration curve situated above (below) the Lorenz curve of welfare 
implies that the subsidy benefits is progressive (regressive) relative to the welfare measure. 
The results indicate that the distribution of both petrol and kerosene subsidies are more 
regressive than income distribution71. This suggests that if the benefits from the subsidy on 
either fuel are converted to its income equivalent, the post fuel subsidy distribution of income-
cum-benefit would be less equitable than the original distribution of income. The concentration 
curve of the aggregate fuel subsidy lie above the petrol curve but below kerosene and household 
expenditure curves corroborating the results of the Gini coefficients. In general, the research 
findings show clearly that government expenditures on fuel subsidies has no redistributive 
impact in Nigeria.   
Figure 3.4: Benefit Concentration Curves of Per capita Expenditure and Subsidy in Nigeria 
 
Source: Computed with the HNLSS (2010/). 
 
 
                                                                 
71 A progressive distribution benefits the lower income groups  more than the higher income groups (i.e. pro-poor 
distribution) while regressive distribution is pro-rich and implies benefits in favour of higher income groups  
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3.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The study combines estimates of fuel subsidy with household expenditure data contained 
in the HNLSS 2009/10 survey to examine the distribution of fuel subsidy benefits across 
different income groups in Nigeria. Fuel subsidies are supposed to benefit the low-income and 
poor segment of the population who otherwise cannot afford to consume these fuels. The results 
show that fuel subsidies are poorly targeted as they benefit rich more than the poor. The survey 
shows that the top 20% households enjoy twice as much the benefit of fuel subsidies as the 
bottom 20% households.  While the kerosene subsidy is more evenly distributed, petrol subsidy 
is heavily concentrated to the high income groups. The paper also evaluates the extent of 
concentration and progressivity using Gini coefficient measures and the Lorenz concentration 
curves and find that both fuel subsidies are more regressive than total household expenditure. 
The policy implications from this study can be summarized as follows.  
First, as we demonstrated in this paper, fuel subsidy is not only costly to the government 
but also poorly targeted as it benefits the rich more than the poor. Thus, as a policy goal, the 
government should continue its effort to remove the subsidy by liberalizing the price or by 
setting a robust price adjustment mechanism that reflects changing market conditions. 72 
Meanwhile, to make the reform acceptable to the public, the government must ensure that the 
proceeds from the removal of the subsidy will actually be used for the benefit of the broad 
population (IMF, 2013). 
Second, since petrol subsidy is concentrated only to six percent of total households and 
kerosene is more widely used, one policy option for the government to reduce the growing 
financial burden of fuel subsidies is to gradually remove subsidy on petrol. As kerosene is used 
                                                                 
72 For example, since 2013 China has established a price-setting mechanism by which the prices of petroleum 
products are adjusted according to the moving average of international benchmark crude oil prices of the 
previous two weeks. Turkey had an automatic mechanism involving a 3 percent small band (1.5 percent above 
or below the existing price), frequent price adjustments, and a smoothing mechanism based on weekly averaging 
(Baig et al, 2007). 
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by two thirds of Nigerian households for lighting and cooking purposes and has environmenta l 
and health benefits particularly to the poor and women, subsidy on kerosene should be retained 
in the short- to medium-run. However, as the current implementation of kerosene subsidy is 
creating room for corruption and distortions, the system should be redesigned to ensure that 
the fuel is available at the subsidized price for the targeted households.73   
Third, considering the widespread protests following the increase of petrol price in 
January 2012, radical price increases, particularly in times of rising international oil prices, is 
not advisable. From international experience, a pragmatic approach to phasing-out the petrol 
subsidy is to choose the right timing. For example, China had planned to increase the fuel 
consumption tax and reform the price-setting mechanism of petroleum products since 1998, 
but waited until the end of 2008 when the international oil price plummeted to fina lly 
implement the reform (Mu, 2015). Recently, in January to February 2015, China again 
increased the fuel tax three times in the background of a much lower international oil price. 
After consumers experienced periods of high oil prices, a policy of increasing fuel tax or 
decreasing fuel subsidies is likely to be more acceptable, although a gradual approach does 
imply a higher fiscal cost.  
Fourth, since kerosene is used for both lighting and cooking by many households, the 
long term option is for government to encourage LPG use among the rural poor and improve 
its rural electrification projects to deliver reliable electricity for the country’s lighting needs. 
Without reliable electricity for possible substitution in lighting, reducing or elimina ting 
kerosene subsidies will cause severe burden for the poor households. 
  
                                                                 
73 For example, in an interview to the Punch, Professor Adeola Adenikinju argued “we need to redesign the 
system that will cut off the middlemen and the politically-connected people that are currently benefitting from 
the present system.” (Punch, 2014)   
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: ECONOMIC EFFECT OF GASOLINE SUBSIDY 
REMOVAL IN NIGERIA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The impacts of fuel subsidies in an economy are quite enormous. In fact, the 
consequences of subsidies on economic growth go beyond aggravating fiscal imbalances and 
public debt (Kumar and Woo, 2010) to depressing private investments, crowding out priority 
public spending and hastening the depletion of the particular resource endowments (IEA, 2011 
and IMF, 2013). Yet, the size of subsidies on petroleum products is growing among oil 
exporting countries. For instance, according to IMF (2013), the post-tax subsidy on petroleum 
products in 2011 is as high as 13.27% of its GDP in Saudi Arabia and 30.89% of government 
revenue in Iran74. Worst still, as shown in the previous chapter, these subsidies are often poorly 
targeted as each consumer enjoys per unit subsidy on any quantity consumed with low 
expenditure groups capturing the least benefit, thereby reinforcing rather than correcting 
inequality.  
Nigeria is among the top 25 countries that heavily subsidize petroleum products (World 
Energy Outlook, 2014). Until the recent collapse in international crude oil prices, the low prices 
of petroleum products within the country combined with the rapid increase in international oil 
prices have widened the gap between reference and retail prices (see figure 1). This has resulted 
into higher government spending on fuel subsidies and the resultant financial burden severely 
constrains government investments in other essential sectors of the economy. For instance, the 
Nigerian government spent US$3.89 billion subsidising petroleum products compared to 
US$3.76 billion on priority sectors in 2010. 
                                                                 
74 See http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/rankings/#?prodact=53-1&cy=2011&pid=53&aid=1&tl_id=1-
A&tl_type=a for the ranking of countries by petroleum exports  
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Motivated by the increasing financial burden of fuel subsidy, several heads of Nigerian 
governments have enforced a number of arbitrary upward adjustments in the domestic prices 
of petroleum products in a bid to bring it closer to the opportunity cost of the products. In 
January 2012, the Nigerian government raised the domestic pump price of petrol by 49.23 % 
(from N65/litre in 2011 to N97/litre) in what became the most resisted fuel price review in the 
country. While the government argues that the reform is on-going and is committed to full 
eradication of petrol subsidy in Nigeria by 2015, the civil society and organised labour in the 
country has vowed to resist further subsidy removal. The expected reforms like prior domestic 
fuel price increases will, through its sectoral linkages affect not only the household but also 
firms’ production and investment decision as well as other macroeconomic aggregates.  
In this paper, I employ an input-output model to study the economic effect of fuel subsidy 
removal of 2012. To examine the effect on various economic sectors and households, I augment 
the input-output analysis with the 2011 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and other relevant 
macroeconomic indicators such as government and private consumption expenditures, imports, 
exports, and investments. The results show that while the increase in gasoline price increase 
could result in a marginal decline of 0.013%, 0.005% and 0.2% in GDP aggregate investments 
and government revenue respectively if the savings from the subsidy reduction is not reinjected 
to the economy, economic growth, investment and government revenue can improve by 1%, 
0.53% and 12.4% respectively when subsidy saving is reinjected.  
This analysis is important in two ways. First, given the world faced with rapid change in 
oil prices and a number of domestic fuel price increases in Nigeria over the last few years, the 
economy and the various economic agents will be impacted directly or indirectly75. Yet, no 
study on the sectoral analysis of the economic effects of these fuel price reforms in Nigeria has 
                                                                 
75 For instance, between 1993 and 2012, domestic price of petrol has been reviewed upward about eighteen (18) 
times from as low as N5/litre in 1993 to N65/ litre in 2009. Yet, no effort has been made to quantify the micro 
and macroeconomic effects of any of these past price adjustments in Nigeria  
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been documented till date. Second, previous attempts to assess the economic impacts of fuel 
price increases have been limited by the slight attention paid to sectoral analysis which gives 
ambiguous results as to its micro effects. By assessing the impacts of a reference case of 
gasoline subsidy reduction and the reinjection of the saving therefrom in Nigeria using the 
recent year 2011 base data will capture the current structure of the economy and the conclusion 
of this analysis, arguably, conveys the actual effects better than potential impacts obtained in 
previous studies, This will no doubt add value to existing knowledge and also provides a guide 
for evaluating other fuels’ subsidy policy in the future based on current economic structure.  
The chapter is organised into five sections. Section 2 provides the background with a 
brief review of relevant literature while the methods, model and the data used are presented in 
Section 3. The result is discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes with the policy inferences  
Fig. 4.1: Trends of Petroleum Products Prices in Nigeria (US$/bbl.)
Data Sources : Data on spot and retail prices and official exchange rate are obtained from OPEC 
Statistical Bulletin, 2014. Reference prices is the sum of the international border price (c.i.f.) plus 
marketing, distribution and other applicable charges 
 
4.2 Related Literature 
Given the multi-prong nature of the fuel subsidy issues, the literature is replete for studies 
on the analysis of the economic effects of fuel price increases. For instance, Adam and Lestari 
(2008) use econometric analysis to investigate the influence of an increase in fuel price on 
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social welfare in Indonesia and find that increasing the price of fuel without a compensatory 
fund for the households exerts adverse effect on households. Nwanfor et al (2006) conducted 
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulation to study the effects of fuel subsidy removal 
on households’ welfare and poverty in Nigeria. The study shows that the effects of fuel price 
increase on households’ welfare depend largely on the corresponding fiscal policy of the 
government. While the removal of subsidy without spending the savings would increase the 
aggregate level of poverty, a noninflationary income transfer to households reduces poverty the 
most. Bazilian and Onyeji (2012) consider the implication of the 2012 gasoline subsidy 
reduction for businesses in Nigeria and argue that raising fuel prices will likely reduce firms’ cost 
competitiveness in electricity-constrained nations and suggest that the country should ensure key 
building blocks in place prior to removing or reducing fuel subsidies. Lin and Jiang (2011) study 
the impacts of subsidies removal on energy consumption in China and find that elimina ting 
energy subsidies will result in a substantial fall in energy demand and emissions but with 
adverse effects on macroeconomic variables and suggests the adoption of compensating 
policies where subsidy savings are moved to maintain other measures of sustainab le 
development. Hartono and Resosudarmo (2008) use SAM to assess the implications of subsidy 
reduction on energy efficiency and income of Indonesian households and find efficiency 
improvement superior to energy conservation policy. While constraining energy use lowers 
households’ income, efficiency improvements resulting from subsidy reduction increases 
income for most groups. The simulation results further suggest that subsidy reduction with 
efficient use of energy produces the best results on households. Negara (2000) considered the 
impact of increasing energy price on macroeconomic variables including economic growth, 
saving and unemployment rate, and income distribution. The study concludes that increases in 
fuel price could effectively enhance efficiency in energy consumption and strengthen the 
government budget but increases the level of unemployment in Indonesia. Recently, an IMF 
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study (2013) analyses the incidence of subsidy distribution on different income groups and 
discussed the effect of reforming energy subsidy on economic growth in a sample of 176 
countries.  
Particular efforts focusing on the use of SAM multiplier analysis in developing countries 
for evaluating the price and quantity effects on the economy are also well documented. 
Thornback and Jung (1996) decompose their SAM to see how the economic growth in different 
sectors in Indonesia impact on poverty alleviation and observed that growth in the services and 
agriculture sectors enhance poverty alleviation better than industrial sector. Khan (1999) 
replicates the Thorbecke and Jung (1996) technique to assess the economic sectors-poverty 
link in South Africa. They identified three principal sectors, namely agriculture, mining and 
general services, where growth can translates into highest benefits the South African rural and 
urban poor.  
Recent literature tend to argue that partial equilibrium is naturally less ideal compared to 
a multi-sectoral method since the latter provides better understanding of the intricate economic 
linkages particularly when a general equilibrium feedback effects are expected (Nganou et.al, 
2009). In fact, applied general equilibrium analysis can in principle, be conducted using 
econometrics but the data required are substantial and rarely unavailable even in developed 
countries. To bypass the data limitation problems, studies on developing economies have relied 
more on general equilibrium models such as the Input-Output and SAM using a recent annual 
data as the basis. By transforming the Input-Output and the SAM data to general equilibr ium 
representations, they produce static simulations relating to the values of the initial year which 
can be used to evaluate the economic effects of exogenous shocks say, an increase in the prices 
of gasoline (arising from subsidy removal) on endogenous accounts. Though, the general 
equilibrium models usually include some underlying assumptions, their strengths trace to the ir 
ability to account for multiplier effects among the principal actors in the economy. In contrast, 
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the partial equilibrium models simply consider the energy product market where subsidy 
reform is taking place.  
Although partial equilibrium models can offer valuable insights into the direct impacts 
of subsidy reform, the usefulness of these models in assessing policy interventions is often 
limited as only the direct effect of the shocks can be accounted for in a partial equilibr ium 
framework. This consideration is crucial given the fact that petroleum products constitute an 
important intermediate goods in the economy such that changes in their prices have direct and 
indirect effects on other sectors and agents in the economy. This has led to the wider usage of 
applied general equilibrium methods like the Input-Output models, SAM multiplier models, 
and CGE modelling in country-specific studies76. Though, the CGE models make possible the 
simulation of complex interrelationships and can provide a structure with which the numerous 
dynamics under study can be accounted for in complex policy issues, it is however not a magic 
potion for solving policy and planning problems. First is that the assumption of general 
equilibrium limits the use of these models for practical policy analysis 77 . Second, the 
specification of CGE models relies heavily on the modeller’s judgement about sector 
decomposition, elasticities of demand and supply, and the functional forms to adopt78. All these 
make results from CGE model highly sensitive to model specifications and are not adopted in 
this study. It should be noted however that the SAM method has its own weaknesses. First, it 
is a static model whereas the structure of an economy changes over time. This implies that in 
                                                                 
76 Basically, the input-output model facilitates the calculation of the economy-wide changes that may result 
from sector specific exogenously shocks obtained from the solving of set of linear equations simultaneously 
whereas CGE are sets of simultaneous non-linear equations that can accommodate adjustments in price and 
quantity as both factor and commodity market equalises to simulate the optimal condition of consumers and 
producers as well as government role as economic actor in an economy 
77 In fact, CGE not only assumed that all markets find their equilibrium but also that nothing happens until 
equilibrium is attained. This is a better way to say that no transaction takes place in disequilibrium implying that 
all economic agents delay their actions and decisions until equilibrium is found. For many types of policy 
issues, the main point is actually the situation of persistent disequilibrium 
78 Though prices are treated as endogenous in CGE models, this process requ ires that numerous elasticities must 
be estimated. Quite often, models resort to crude estimates of elasticity based on limited set of observation on 
representative values from other studies or informed opinion 
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reality, the parameters of the model may change and reduces its potential for long run 
projection. Second, the Leontief technology assumption of fixed technical coefficients suggest 
further that production technologies remain constant for a particular time frame as in the base 
year which may not usually be the case. Nevertheless, SAM typically offers the basic taxonomy 
of the CGE modelling and according to Thorbecke (2000), CGEs can only supplements the 
SAM framework by capturing the behaviours of the main actors in response to price changes. 
The outcome of the Bautista et al, (2001) study clearly indicates that Input-Output models and 
SAM multiplier analysis can, despite its limitations yield results similar to that of CGE. They 
perform simulations on Indonesia using both the CGE and SAM and obtained identical results.  
Many studies have actually combined the SAM techniques with the I–O models to 
analyse energy policy. Tarancon et al. (2010) use a cross country I–O models to analyse the 
electricity demand of 18 manufacturing sectors in 15 European countries. The simula t ion 
results show that while some manufacturing sectors are more vulnerable to electricity price 
increase across countries, rise in electricity prices will affect most sectors substantially in few 
countries namely Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Spain. Ter-Minassian et al (2008) employ the 
SAM method to assess the impact of a rise in the price of fuels and foods on major 
macroeconomic variables across several countries globally. Akkemik (2011) adopts the SAM 
based price model to appraise the potential influence of variations in the price of electricity on 
economic sectors and households’ cost of living in Turkey. The simulated price multipl ie rs 
show that while households’ costs of living are slightly affected, prices are mostly affected in 
the energy producing and energy-intensive sectors including mining, iron and steel and water. 
Nganou et al (2009) evaluate the impact of an oil-price increase on households grouped (by 
gender and poverty status of the household’s head) in Kenya. The results indicate the likelihood 
that poorer households particularly those with female heads bear more burden by a hike in oil 
price than the richer group due to differences in consumption patterns. 
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4.3 Data and Methodology 
This study employs the input-output and SAM multiplier method. This will on the one 
hand, keep the analysis as simple and transparent as possible for the various stakeholders in the 
subsidy reform debate. Less complex models clarify underlying judgements, introduce fewer 
ad hoc restrictions and ease the task of unravelling economic interactions to understand how 
results are produced. On the other hand, the data requirement is lesser compared to that of CGE 
and like other modelling techniques, data problems can influence the model specification and 
the numerical outcomes of models. Moreover, SAM multiplier method has an advantage over 
the simple Input-Output analysis as survey data on household income and consumption can be 
incorporated into the investigation.  
Typically, the interdependence among the production sectors of any economy can be 
established by simple I–O table analyses. However, SAM are superior to the input-output 
analysis in that they augments the basic I–O multipliers with additional multiplier effects 
engendered by the circular flow of income among activities, factors and economic agents (such 
as the government, the households, the firms, and the foreign sector) of the economy. 
Predominantly, data is structured in SAM as a square matrix recording transactions 
(expenditures or payments in columns and incomes or receipts in rows) of all economic agents 
in double entry manner. Thus, it is a suitable template for exploring the impacts of any change 
on all actors and sectors in the economy. SAM multiplier models by their very nature, rest on 
certain assumptions. First, prices and technology coefficients are fixed and the average 
propensity to spend are constant for all actors in the economy (see Akkemik, (2011). Second, 
accounts are segregated into endogenous and exogenous components and exogenous shocks 
are assumed to cause changes in the level of endogenous accounts by means of the multip lier 
process (see Miller and Blair, 1985; Nganou et al, 2009). Despite these simplifying 
assumptions, the SAM multiplier method is a very useful and appropriate policy analysis tool 
81 
 
as it can show the impact of exogenous changes like the increase in petroleum product prices 
on other economic sectors and agents in a disaggregated manner and provide transparent and 
traceable transmission paths. As a traditional double accounting system, SAM is a partition 
matrix which records transactions between sectors within production (activity and 
commodities) blocks, factors (labour and capital) blocks and institutions (households and 
government) blocks in the economy 
 
4.3.1 Input-Output and SAM Framework 
The theoretical framework of I–O analysis hinges on Leontief Input-Output techniques 
and SAM-Based Multipliers. The analytical framework of the I–O as a typical applied general 
equilibrium model traced to the seminar work of Leontief (1951a; 1951b; and 1953). Though, 
there have been several developments and extensions, the key concepts lay down by Leontief 
constitutes the major wheels of the most I–O based economic analysis. The simple 
mathematical relationships stem from the concept of inter-industry transactions table anchored 
on the notion that the production by sector (i) in a given economy depends on the transactions 
between pairs of sectors plus the final demand by exogenous sectors such as households, 
government and foreign sectors which can be expressed as: 
𝑞𝑖 =  𝑧𝑖1 + 𝑧𝑖2 + ⋯ +  𝑧𝑖𝑗 + ⋯ +  𝑧𝑖𝑛 + 𝑓𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝑓𝑖        (1.1) 
Where (𝑞𝑖) and (𝑓𝑖) are the output and final products demand of sector 𝑖 respectively while (𝑧𝑖𝑗) 
is the intermediate purchases from sector 𝑖 by all sector 𝑗 including itself – all in monetary 
values79. The unique solution (see appendices 4A) can be obtained by applying standard matrix 
algebra as:  
𝑞 = (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 𝑓 = 𝑳𝑓         (1.2) 
                                                                 
79 Note that the volume of final demands (𝐹𝑖 ) is net of competitive imports for product (𝑖) 
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Given that:  
(𝑞) = the gross output vector   
(𝐼 − 𝐴) , and  (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 = Leontief matrix and the corresponding inverse respectively 
𝐼 = Identity matrix 
𝐴 = Technical coefficients or I–O coefficients matrix 
𝑓 = Final demand 
While the I–O table contains detailed statistics about the production structure of an 
economy, the SAM framework gives a broader view of the economy by combining the I–O 
tables in a structure with transactions between other economic agents to produce a model where 
the effects of exogenous injection or withdrawal on endogenous variables (production, factors 
and institutions are examined.. The role of I–O table is vital in the construction of SAM 
framework. By modelling the entire circular flows of income, the SAM framework extends the 
basic I–O model which is based on inter-industry transactions. Hence, the SAM multip lier 
augments the I–O multipliers by the extra multiplier effects prompted by the endogenous 
activities, factors and institutions in the circular flow of income. To ensure that transactions in 
the SAM are balanced, the row total must equals the column total. In deriving the basic SAM 
multiplier, the first decision is to determine the endogenous accounts (items 1 – 5) and the 
exogenous accounts (items 6 – 8) as illustrated in table 4.1 below80. Suppose the highlighted 5 
by 5 cells in table 4.1 is the matrix of endogenous transactions (𝑇𝑛), the matrix can be defined 
akin to the Leontief’s I–O model in terms of its corresponding matrix of column shares (𝐴) 
as81: 
𝑇𝑛 = 𝐴𝑞𝑛           (1.3) 
                                                                 
80 It is sufficient for simplicity sake to aggregate all exogenous accounts as one with records of  the aggregate 
set of injections to and leakages from the system whereas the endogenous transactions are d efined in a way that 
will showcase the basic interaction between 2-agents (production activities and households) and 2-markets 
(factors and commodities)   
81 The matrix (T) is a summary representation of the endogenous transactions matrix which defines the matrix of 
column shares (A). Therefore, (A) is simply the elements in each column divided by the corresponding total of 
column (T) in the lower segment of figure B.1 in appendices B (i.e. A12 = T12/q2; A31 = T31/q3; and so on). 
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Table 4.1: Abridged depiction of Social Accounting Matrix 
  
  
  
  
Expenditures 
Endogenous Accts. 
Exogenous 
Accts Total Activities Commodities 
Factor: 
Labour 
Factor: 
Capital 
H/holds 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6, 7, 8) 
 Activities               (1) 
 
T12 
 
  x1 q1 
Commodities         (2) T21 
   T25 x2 q2 
Factor: Labour      (3) T31 
    x3 q3 
Factor: Capital      (4) T41 
    x4 q4 
Households           (5) 
  T53 T54 
 x5 q5 
Exog. Accts  (6, 7, 8) E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
 qn 
Total q'1 q'2 q'3 q'4 q'5 q'n  
Source: Author’s Sketch 
Since 𝓆 and 𝑥  are the vector sum of endogenous accounts and exogenous injections 
respectively in table 4.1 above, the endogenous row accounts in the table can be presented and 
solved as a series of linear identities as 
𝓆𝑛 = 𝐴𝓆𝑛 + 𝑥         (1.4) 
𝓆𝑛 = (𝐼 − 𝐴)
−1𝑥         
𝓆𝑛 =  𝑀𝑥             (1.5) 
Where 𝑀 =  (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 can be defined as the multiplier obtained from the SAM matrix. 
Note that the SAM matrix (𝑀) will be fixed as long as (𝐴) (i.e. the coefficients of expenditure 
plus distribution) remains constant. Consequently, equation (1.5) defines the set of 
withdrawals/injections (𝑥) that is consistent with total equilibrium outputs and income (𝑞𝑛).  
 
4.3.2 Model Specification 
In a usual production process, transactions of all economic agents ordered in an I–O table 
form the basis for the Leontief Material balance equation for each sector (i.e. the flow of outputs 
and inputs to and from one industry to other industries and vice versa. The derived multip lier 
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of the SAM matrix {(𝑀 = (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 } from the basic SAM framework depicts the whole 
impacts of the changes in a given sector in the economy on others, hence: 
𝑞𝑗 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝑥𝑖         (1.6) 
The variables 𝑞 and 𝑥 are as earlier defined. Equation (1.6) is in fact, the total effects 
(direct and indirect) on the whole economy of any sectoral change in total output of final 
demand. However, the direct effects (𝛼𝑗) of a unit change in final demand on (𝑗𝑡ℎ) sector can 
be obtained from equation (1.6) above as:   
𝛼𝑗 = (𝐼 − ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 )         (1.7) 
The equilibrium prices of commodities and services can be solved for from the revenue 
function of each industry at equilibrium by expanding vertically on the primal I–O table. The 
equilibrium revenue function is given as: 
𝑝𝑗 𝑞𝑗 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑤𝑗𝐿𝑗        (1.8) 
Where (𝑝𝑗 ) is the price of product 𝑗 and (𝑤𝑗) is the price of primary input 𝐿 used by sector (𝑗). 
Solving for (𝑝𝑗 ) by dividing equation 1.8 by (𝑞𝑗) yields: 
𝑝𝑗 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝓋𝑗          (1.9) 
Where (𝓋𝑗 = 𝑤𝑗𝐿𝑗 𝑞𝑗⁄ ) is the value added per unit of product (𝑗) and the technology coefficients 
of the endogenous sectors (𝑞𝑖𝑗 𝑞𝑗⁄ ) is signified by (𝑎𝑖𝑗). Applying matrix notation to equation 
(1.9), SAM multiplier approach posits that product’s price is the sum of all inputs’ cost from 
the remaining sectors and the per unit value addition to output. Hence, costs is related to prices 
by the equation (2.0) below  
𝑝 =  𝐴′𝑝 + 𝑣           (2.0) 
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Where 𝓅  and 𝑣  are vectors representing sectoral prices and per output value added 
respectively. With price assumed constant in relation to output, sectoral prices can be 
articulated in terms of the I–O and the per output value added coefficients82 
 𝑝 =  {𝐼 − 𝐴′}−1 ∗ 𝓋         (2.1) 
Equation (2.1) is the basis for our analysis on how the change in the coefficients of value 
added impact on sectoral prices83. If we denote the initial and the final value added coefficients 
as 𝓋(0) and 𝓋(1) respectively and the initial prices and final output prices as 𝑝(0) and 𝑝(1) 
respectively, the link between the change (𝛿) in gasoline subsidy and changes in the prices of 
output can be expressed as: 
𝛿𝑝 =  {𝐼 − 𝐴′}−1 ∗ 𝛿𝓋        (2.2) 
The usual I–O table treats all inputs per unit of output as expenditures and the final price 
changes can be expressed as a change in relation to the initial year in percentages by setting 
the base set of each output prices to one. Therefore, the increment in aggregate prices (𝑝) is 
obtained by combining changes in sectoral price with budget shares in total expenditure of 
consumer as:  
𝛿𝑝 =  ∑𝛿𝑝𝑖 𝑘𝑖          (2.3) 
Where: 
(𝑘𝑖  ) = budget share of good (𝑖)’s to aggregate expenditure ratio 
Note that the above model presumes that reducing subsidy on a particular fuel (gasoline in this 
case) increases cost of all relevant intermediate inputs to the fuel production which further 
increases the fuel price since we assume wage and profit per output to be fixed. 
 
                                                                 
82 The assumption that the price is constant in relation to output infers that profit, wage and indirect tax per 
output, are fixed   
83 From equation (2.1), any potential or actual reduction of gasoline subsidy is akin to indirect tax levy per 
output or negative subsidies on the gasoline sectors which can instantly be added to the product’s prices through 
the Í-Ò structure, then to those of the products which directly uses gasoline as input, and subsequently to 
indirect users and so on. It should be noted also that prices are taken as endogenous in equation (2.2), hence the 
value added vector is the only source of shocks.  
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4.3.3 The Data 
The base data for the analysis in this study is the 2011 I–O Table of Nigeria provided by 
the Nigerian Institute of Socio-Economic Research (NISER)84. The various households and the 
2011 I–O activity sectors classification used in the SAM model is presented in figure 4.2 below. 
Of the 34 activities, 4 are agricultural (items 1-4) while 7 are in the energy sector category 
(items 5-11) of which three are petroleum products namely premium motor spirit (gasoline), 
dual purpose kerosene, and automotive gas oil (diesel) as items 8, 9, and 10 respectively. Items 
12-14 and 15-17 are industrial activities and public utilities respectively. Items 18-22 are in the 
transport sectors while last 12 items are essentially in the private and public service categories.  
Table 4.2: Activity Sectors Classifications of the Nigerian I-O Table 
Sector Classification 
1 Crop Production 18 Water Transport 
2 Livestock 19 Air Transport 
3 Forestry 20 Transport Services 
4 Fishing 21 Telecommunications 
5 Crude Petroleum  22 Post 
6 Natural Gas 23 Distributive Trade (Wholesale & Retail Trade) 
7 Solid Minerals  24 Hotels & Restaurants  
8 Premium Motor Spirit 25 Financial Institutions 
9 Dual Purpose Kerosene 26 Insurance  
10 Automotive Gas Oil 27 Real Estates 
11 Cement 28 Business Services (Not Health or Education) 
12 Other manufacturing  29 Public Administration 
13 Electricity 30 Education 
14 Water 31 Health 
15 Building & Construction 32 Private Non Profit Organisations  
16 Road Transport  33 Other Services  
17 Rail Transport & Pipelines 34 Broadcasting 
Source: compiled from the I-O table; Nigerian Institute of Socio Economic Research (NISER) 
The 34 by 34 sectors input-output table is complemented by additional relevant and 
current macroeconomic indicators such as imports, exports, value added, savings, investments, 
consumption expenditures, and capital flows. These data are sourced from the Nigeria’s 
National Bureau of Statistics. Central Bank Report and IMF’s Financial Statistics for 2011. In 
the SAM preparations, the underlying input-output table come with two components 
                                                                 
84 The surveillance and forecasting department of NISER has produced the Nigerian Í-Ò Table biennially since 
1999 and the 2011 version is the most recent made available in May, 2013 is used in this study.  
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(commodity use and supply tables) which conventionally distinguish production activities from 
commodities. This study adopts the NBS’s classification of the country’s household into 6 main 
socio–economic groups i.e. 3 income groups (non-poor, moderately poor and the poor) by 2 
locations (the urban and rural Nigeria). The main simulation scenario of the study is the actual 
reduction of gasoline subsidy that led to a rise of 49.23% in the price of gasoline. The detailed 
macro SAM which is available on request cannot be included here due to space. However, the 
aggregate SAM is presented and discussed in the next section. 
4.3.4 SAM and Scenarios 
Table 4.3 below shows the aggregate picture of the Nigerian macroeconomic structure in 
year 2011 as the starting point. From the table, the total receipts amount to N58.71 trillion (net 
producer of government services) and is equal to total expenditure. The receipts comprised 
sales of domestic commodity supplies (N36.592 trillion) and exports plus export subsidies of 
N22.12 trillion. The expenditures consist of total intermediate inputs (N21.86 trillion); wages 
and salaries (N12.47 trillion); depreciation allowance and operating surplus (N24.21 trillion); 
and indirect taxes less subsidies (N0.17 trillion). Total absorption in the economy is N43.18 
trillion which, at the expenditure side, is composed of total intermediate inputs (N21.86 
trillion); private consumption expenditure (N15.23 trillion); government consumption 
expenditure (N2.50 trillion); and investment (N3.58 trillion). On the income side, total 
absorption is made up of domestic commodity supplies (N36.59 trillion) plus tariffs and total 
imports (both competitive and non-competitive) of N6.59 trillion.  
We use the 2011 Nigeria I-O table and build a SAM to study the effect of fuel subsidy 
removal on sectoral output, inflation, investment (capital accounts), and household income.  In 
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January 2012, the Nigeria government increased the price of petrol (premium motor spirit in 
the list of activity sector) by 49.23% from N65 to N9785. 
Table 4.3: 2011 Social Accounting Matrixes of Nigeria (units: ₦'trillions) 
` 
Expenditures 
Activities  
Commo
dities 
Factor: 
Labour 
Factor: 
Capital 
Inst: 
H/hold 
Inst: 
Govt. 
Capital 
Acct or 
Invt. 
Rest of 
the 
World 
Total 
Receipts 
R
e
c
e
ip
ts 
Activities    36.59           22.12 58.71 
Commodities 21.86       15.24 2.50 3.58   43.18 
Factor: Lab 12.47               12.47 
Factor: Cap 24.21               24.21 
Inst: H/hold     12.47 24.21         36.68 
Inst: Govt. 0.17       1.25       1.42 
Capital Acct         20.20 -16.6     3.58 
Rest of the 
World   6.59       15.53     22.12 
Total Exp. 58.71 43.18 12.47 24.21 36.68 1.42 3.58 22.12 202.37 
Source: Author’s computations 
The study considers two scenarios for the analysis. In the first scenario, the savings from 
the subsidy reduction is not reinjected to the economy86. In the second scenario, the savings 
from petro subsidy reduction is reinjected to the economy and used in education, health, public 
administration, and road transport sectors. The results are presented in the section below. While 
the technology coefficients are value-based, the results can be interpreted as physical units 
since the model normalizes all prices in the base year to 1. 
    
                                                                 
85 Though the domestic price of gasoline was raised from N65/litre to N97/litre, the fuel was still much 
subsidised as the open market price was N146/litre in January 2012  
86 While the best option is for subsidy saving to be reinvested back into the economy, the saving may sometimes 
be used to repay debts where such debts have become an economic burden. However, lack of transparency and 
accountability by governments in third world countries raise the possibility of embezzlements and 
mismanagements. Whatever the case, this is the first time the Nigerian government will appropriate subsidy 
saving as budgetary expenditures into the economy 
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4.4 Results and Discussion 
4.4.1 Effects of Subsidy Reduction – Base case scenario (BS) 
4.4.1.1 Sectoral effects (BS) 
The value of output in the gasoline sector increases the most with the reduction in 
gasoline subsidy. Other sectors whose output increase slightly are the road transport, crude 
petroleum and the electricity sectors in decreasing order. All the remaining sectors experienced 
a decline in gross output due mainly to the input price rise brought about by the reduction in 
gasoline subsidy. This is anticipated as road transport is a major component in the overall 
services sector which in Nigeria depends heavily on this product so much that their production 
costs are directly affected in different degrees 87 . As intermediate inputs cost increases, 
production costs are directly affected through the reliance on the services sector then indirect ly 
through the use of other oil products.  On the whole, total gross output declined marginally by 
0.013% which implied that if the price of gasoline is doubled, gross output will decline by a 
meagre 0.03%. This result conforms to the findings of Choucri and Lahiri (1984) for Egypt and 
Nwanfor et al (2006) for Nigeria. 
  Apart from health sector with 5% rise in prices and 7 other sectors with less than 20% 
price rise, 23 of the 34 sectors experience price increases of more than 20%. Of these, 4 sectors 
are in the oil and gas manufacturing, 3 sectors are in the agriculture and the industrial sectors 
while the remaining 13 sectors are in the services category. Five sectors namely crude 
petroleum; natural gas; crop production; water transportation; and real estate are the most 
affected with price increases of more than 40%. While the crude petroleum and the natural gas 
sectors are important as productive sectors, the other three sectors are purchased directly by 
households and the effects will be easily visible as their costs enter directly into household  
                                                                 
87 The increase in road transport is more of truck transport rather than personal cars or public commuters which 
is occasioned by the need to distribute additional fuel imports to the economy  
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budgets. The largest increase in producer prices aside the refined petroleum product sectors, 
occurs in the service sectors which is anticipated as the service sector relies to a large extent 
on the use of gasoline in Nigeria. More importantly, apart from the crude petroleum, solid 
minerals and the petroleum products’ sectors, all other sectors that experience price increases 
are substantially non-tradable sectors and dismisses the threats of possible loss in export 
markets or foreign competitiveness. In all, the effect of the reduction in gasoline subsidy on 
the aggregate price level is 23.6% which translates to a rise of 0.48% in producer price index 
for every 1% rise in the price of gasoline88. This result indicate clearly that gasoline prices is a 
key driver of the inflationary impacts in the country given that gasoline account for 4.6% and 
2.5% of aggregate intermediate inputs and total domestic demand respectively 
Only 4 sectors of the economy experienced positive stimulus in investments and boost in 
export with the reduction in gasoline subsidy, these are however prime sectors for the policy. 
As expected, the greatest impact occurs in the gasoline sector itself (see table 4). The results 
show that a 1% rise in gasoline price results in 0.79%, 0.06%, 0.02%, and 0.01% increase in 
investment in gasoline, crude petroleum, road transport, and electricity sectors respectively. 
This, and the fact that these sectors also experience substantial increases in GDP/value added 
indicate that the reduction in gasoline subsidy raises the attractiveness of these sectors to 
investors. 
With the fixed international price of oil, the 0.11% rise in crude petroleum export despite 
a 23.63% increase in producer prices will imply a reduction in the sector’s surplus89. Though, 
this will however be offset with the rise in government revenue resulting from the reduction in 
gasoline subsidy. The fuel price increase also increases both import and exports in the road 
transport by 3.06% and 2.99% and in the electricity sectors by 0.06% and 0.07% respectively.  
 
                                                                 
88 This can be referred to as the elasticity of producer prices to gasoline price 
89 The increase in domestic fuel price resulting from subsidy reduction  encouraged oil marketers to buy more 
crude and refined abroad. Hence, the increase in crude petroleum exports  
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Table 4.4: Effects of Petrol Subsidy Removal in Nigeria 
Activity Sectors 
Gross 
output 
Producer 
prices  
Invt. export Import 
Expenditure Income 
H/hold Govt. Labour Capital 
Crop Production -0.26 43.14 -0.24 -0.15 -0.70 -0.34 -1.81 -0.53 -0.56 
Livestock -1.01 28.70 -2.09 -2.06 -2.14 -0.57 -2.15 -1.42 -1.20 
Forestry -1.01 24.08 -1.29 -0.43 -1.68 -1.39 -1.25 -0.91 -1.34 
Fishing -0.01 10.70 -0.04 -1.78 -2.09 0.10 -0.08 -0.35 -0.41 
Crude Petroleum  0.41 46.06 3.04 0.11 3.54 13.98 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 
Natural Gas -0.15 46.22 -0.73 -0.03 -0.52 -0.47 -1.02 -0.39 -0.43 
Solid Minerals  -1.32 21.90 -2.90 -0.17 -2.85 -2.74 -2.89 -1.23 -0.99 
Premium Motor Spirit 15.71 19.23 39.23 35.47 47.72 21.05 4.66 40.83 41.54 
Dual Purpose Kerosene -0.86 14.22 -1.97 -0.72 -1.01 -0.82 -0.31 -2.04 -2.20 
Automotive Gas Oil -0.63 24.39 -1.97 -0.78 -1.01 -0.42 -0.31 -2.10 -2.26 
Cement -0.26 -5.70 -0.14 -0.37 -0.68 -0.20 -0.16 -0.84 -0.83 
Other manufacturing  -1.30 12.55 -1.63 -0.87 -0.99 -1.10 -1.34 -1.63 -1.65 
Electricity 0.17 29.76 0.33 0.07 0.07 0.55 0.40 -0.21 -0.14 
Water -0.10 22.57 -0.06 -0.78 -0.78 0.03 -0.12 -0.43 -0.53 
Building & Construction -0.45 24.97 -0.63 0.00 -0.13 -0.52 -0.16 -0.64 -0.71 
Road Transport  1.03 16.46 1.00 2.99 3.06 1.55 0.70 0.86 0.73 
Rail Transport & 
Pipelines -0.01 18.16 -0.42 0.00 -0.18 -0.16 0.00 -0.46 -0.51 
Water Transport -0.96 43.69 -2.11 -0.47 -1.65 -0.83 -1.61 -1.60 -0.92 
Air Transport -0.18 24.48 -0.17 -0.03 -0.34 -0.04 -0.28 -0.88 -0.81 
Transport Services -0.13 28.37 -0.11 -0.15 -0.15 0.01 -0.09 -0.66 -0.52 
Telecommunications -0.31 21.76 -0.39 -0.67 -0.78 -0.12 -0.30 -1.05 -1.15 
Post -0.08 25.05 -0.06 -0.65 -0.65 0.05 -0.10 -0.43 -0.66 
Distributive Trade 
(Wholesale & Retail) -0.78 32.48 -1.77 -1.00 -1.22 -0.41 -1.60 -1.12 -0.91 
Hotels & Restaurants  -0.01 37.37 -0.11 0.00 -0.18 0.10 -0.01 -0.33 -0.37 
Financial Institutions -0.49 39.48 -0.19 -0.91 -1.01 -0.41 -0.65 -0.53 -0.69 
Insurance  -0.13 -20.33 -0.09 0.00 -0.95 -0.16 -0.03 -0.55 -0.51 
Real Estates -0.41 45.20 -1.02 0.00 -0.37 -0.17 -0.67 -0.49 -0.63 
Business Services (Excl. 
Health & Education) -0.35 18.54 -0.05 0.00 -1.68 -0.56 -0.09 -0.93 -1.10 
Public Administration 0.00 37.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 -0.32 -0.35 
Education -0.82 35.34 -0.59 0.00 -2.14 -0.71 -0.50 -0.60 -1.49 
Health -0.03 5.11 -0.01 0.00 -2.28 0.07 -0.02 -0.39 -0.47 
Private Non Profit Org. -0.10 -26.85 -1.48 0.00 -2.15 0.05 0.00 -0.39 -2.27 
Other Services  -0.36 25.31 -0.16 0.00 -1.11 -0.39 -0.17 -0.49 -0.73 
Broadcasting -0.11 33.31 -0.05 0.00 -1.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.38 -1.02 
Total -0.01 23.63 -0.01 0.08 0.95 0.33 -0.18 -0.29 -0.34 
Source: Author’s simulation results  
The highest level of imports as a result of the gasoline price increase occurs in the 
gasoline sector itself with about 0.96% rise in import per 1% increase in price. Though the 
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country relies on imports to meet local demand for the products even before the price increase 
owing to inadequate refinery capacity, the increase in price and the resultant rise in domestic 
production costs might have contributed to favour the high importation. 
Factor incomes reduce in most sectors and with the rise in producer prices and the 
consequent higher input costs in these sectors, the reduction in factor incomes implies that the 
rise in producer prices do not totally make up for the increase in costs of production. In addition, 
the share of income received by labour appears smaller compared to income payments to 
capital. This points to the facts that the petroleum sectors in general exhibits a lower 
employment potential and that it provides jobs and income to a very small number of 
households. Government expenditures declined in all but gasoline, road transport and 
electricity sectors while households experience expenditure increase in the utility sectors 
(electricity, water, health, transport, and post) as well as in other private service sectors (see 
table 4). The increase in gasoline price reduces government expenditures in terms of subsidy 
spending while the expected fall in gasoline consumption will make more crude petroleum 
available for exports which increases foreign earnings and revenue. More so, the marginal rise 
in foreign savings by 0.3% if gasoline price is doubled implies that the increase in exports more 
than compensates for the increase registered in imports. 
4.4.1.2 Effects on Household Income and Expenditure (BS) 
The results shows that all but the poor households in both urban and rural Nigeria 
suffered a decline in income as a result of subsidy removal. Two factors may contribute to this. 
First, unlike the rural households who are engaged mainly in agricultural activities and earn 
income from these activities/sectors, urban households earn labour and capital income more 
from non-agricultural sectors than agricultural sectors. From the simulation results, all these 
sectors recorded noticeable decline in labour and capital income and also experienced decline 
in output. Second, the non-poor households essentially consume more gasoline compared to 
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their poor counterparts in both urban and rural areas which may either be due to more cars in 
their possession or the need to power their gasoline-fuelled electricity generators. This result 
compares remarkably with (Nganou, 2009) but contrast sharply with Fetini and Bacon (2000) 
and Nwanfor et al (2006). The result as also shows that both the urban and rural non-poor 
households suffer dissaving as a result of the subsidy reduction. This is essentially because this 
group uses more gasoline compare to the poor counterpart in both urban and rural areas due to 
possession of more cars. On the whole, the January 2012 reduction in gasoline subsidy in 
Nigeria increased average households’ expenditure by 0.33 but reduces income by -0.32. This 
translates to an aggregate dissaving of about 0.97 for an average representative household90 
Table 4.5: Effects on subsidy reduction on H/hold Income and Expenditure (BS) 
NBS CLASSIFICATION OF HOUSEHOLD  Income Expenditure (Dis)saving 
Urban Non Poor -2.05 15.81 -0.13 
Urban Moderately Poor -0.62 -5.09 0.12 
Urban Poor 2.27 4.98 0.46 
Rural Non Poor -0.32 2.58 -0.12 
Rural Moderately Poor -2.00 -15.81 0.13 
Rural Poor 1.17 5.29 0.22 
Total -0.32 0.33 -0.97 
Source: Author’s computations 
4.4.2 Effects of reinjecting the Subsidy saving-Alternative Scenario (AS)  
The planned reinvestment and empowerment programme of subsidy saving in key sectors 
of the economy by the Nigerian government kicked-off with the subsidy reduction exercise in 
201291. A sum of N180 billion were appropriated as subsidy saving in the 2012 budget and 
injected into five main sectors namely Road transport, Health, Education, Public Admin, and 
Other Services in the ratios 83%, 8.9%, 4.8%, 2.8%, and 0.6% respectively. The results of the 
simulation show that the saving reinjection impact on most sectors and households.  
                                                                 
90 The sectoral analysis of the impacts on households’ income of increasing gasoline prices can be accurately 
evaluated if the income accruing to individual household can be trace to the particular sectors where they are 
employed. In the absence of such data as the case with Nigeria, it is only logical to report the impact on the 
aggregate household on the assumption of representative household  
91 The reinvestment and empowerment programme of subsidy saving is tagged  SURE-P.  
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4.4.2.1 Sectoral effects (AS) 
Gross output has improved positively in all sectors with the aggregate GDP increasing 
by about 1% as a results of reinjecting the subsidy savings. This is a significant improvement 
given that the gross output is valued in constant prices and the I–O model is a fixed price model.  
The level of investments has also increased substantially in all sectors including the livestock, 
solid minerals water transport sectors which suffered the most decline as a results of the subsidy 
reduction. This appear remarkable as only 4 sectors initially experienced positive investment 
when the gasoline subsidy was removed. On the whole, the reinjection of subsidy saving raised 
aggregate investment by 12.35% after the reinjection of the subsidy saving.  
The factor incomes which fall in most sectors as a result of the subsidy reduction 
witnessed significant increase due to the reinjection of subsidy saving. The reinjection of the 
entire subsidy saving constitutes a large increase in government expenditure which stimula tes 
the economy thus increasing both the effective demand and output in most sectors. Though, 
the rise in government expenditure creates demand and also leads to inflation which increases 
the cost of inputs but since the greater population engaged in primary sectors e.g. agriculture 
which are less capital-intensive, labour factor incomes tend to rise faster than capital income. 
In addition, the share of income received by labour now appears greater compared to payments 
to capital. This points to the fact that the target sectors of subsidy reinvestment and 
empowerment program (SURE-P) have high employment potential and create jobs and income 
to a large number of households. At the macro level, government revenue (particularly from 
import duties, petroleum profit tax and VAT) has increased about three folds while foreign 
sales of crude oil also rose by about 37%. With the reinjection of the subsidy savings, household 
income increased by 0.2% which resulted in aggregate saving of about 0.59 for an average 
representative household compared to an earlier aggregate dissaving of about 0.97. 
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Table 4.6: Sectoral Effects of Reinjecting Petrol Subsidy Saving in Nigeria 
Activity Sectors 
Gross 
output 
Producer 
prices  Invt. Export Import 
Expenditure Income 
H/hold Govt. Labour Capital 
Crop Production -0.17 43.14 0.50 -0.15 -0.70 -0.34 -1.75 0.00 -0.06 
Livestock -0.46 28.70 8.07 -2.06 -2.14 -0.57 -2.08 -0.89 -0.69 
Forestry -0.37 24.08 5.93 -0.43 -1.68 -1.39 -1.17 -0.38 -0.83 
Fishing -0.01 10.70 0.17 -1.78 -2.09 0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.10 
Crude Petroleum  0.48 46.06 7.01 0.11 3.54 13.98 0.00 0.50 0.50 
Natural Gas 0.05 46.22 6.90 -0.03 -0.52 -0.47 -0.98 0.14 0.08 
Solid Minerals  -1.11 21.90 -1.15 -0.17 -2.85 -2.74 -2.88 -0.70 -0.49 
Premium Motor Spirit 
17.76 19.23 79.22 35.47 47.72 21.05 
-
31.90 41.58 42.26 
Dual Purpose Kerosene 0.70 14.22 24.82 -0.72 -1.01 -0.82 -0.29 -1.52 -1.70 
Automotive Gas Oil 0.51 24.39 24.82 -0.78 -1.01 -0.42 -0.29 -1.58 -1.76 
Cement 0.14 -5.70 1.25 -0.37 -0.68 -0.20 -0.15 -0.31 -0.32 
Other manufacturing  0.06 12.55 12.10 -11.33 -0.99 -1.10 -1.25 -1.11 -1.15 
Electricity 0.24 29.76 1.41 0.07 0.07 0.55 0.41 0.32 0.37 
Water 0.01 22.57 0.42 -0.78 -0.78 0.03 -0.12 0.10 -0.02 
Building & Construction 0.44 24.97 8.26 0.00 -0.13 -0.52 -0.09 -0.11 -0.20 
Road Transport  9.27 16.46 61.98 2.99 3.06 1.55 0.74 1.40 1.24 
Rail Transpt & Pipelines 0.01 18.16 6.44 0.00 -0.18 -0.16 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Water Transport 0.09 43.69 17.35 -0.47 -1.65 -0.83 -1.55 -1.08 -0.42 
Air Transport 0.21 24.48 2.38 -0.03 -0.34 -0.04 -0.26 -0.35 -0.31 
Transport Services 0.20 28.37 1.85 -0.15 -0.15 0.01 -0.08 -0.13 -0.01 
Telecommunications 0.09 21.76 3.88 -0.67 -0.78 -0.12 -0.28 -0.53 -0.65 
Post 0.02 25.05 0.49 -0.65 -0.65 0.05 -0.09 0.10 -0.15 
Distributive Trade 
(Wholesale & Retail) 0.72 32.48 24.88 -31.62 -1.22 -0.41 -1.53 -0.59 -0.41 
Hotels & Restaurants  0.00 37.37 0.51 0.00 -0.18 0.10 0.00 0.20 0.14 
Financial Institutions -0.10 39.48 1.21 -0.91 -1.01 -0.41 -0.56 0.00 -0.18 
Insurance  0.00 -20.33 0.49 0.00 -0.95 -0.16 0.01 -0.02 0.00 
Real Estates 0.44 45.20 12.60 0.00 -0.37 -0.17 -0.09 0.04 -0.12 
Business Services (Excl. 
Health & Education) -0.32 18.54 0.02 0.00 -1.68 -0.56 -0.09 -0.40 -0.59 
Public Administration 1.43 37.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 3.82 0.21 0.16 
Education 1.70 35.34 12.11 0.00 -2.14 -0.71 -0.37 -0.07 -0.99 
Health 8.04 5.11 0.08 0.00 -2.28 0.07 40.08 0.14 0.04 
Private Non Profit Org. -0.03 -26.85 3.41 0.00 -2.15 0.05 0.00 0.14 -1.77 
Other Services  0.49 25.31 1.63 0.00 -1.11 -0.39 0.82 0.04 -0.22 
Broadcasting 0.05 33.31 0.44 0.00 -1.07 -0.03 0.00 0.15 -0.52 
Total 1.00 23.63 12.35 0.08 0.95 0.33 0.12 0.24 0.17 
Source: Author’s simulation results 
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4.4.2.2 Effects on Household Income and Expenditure (AS)  
With the reinjection of the subsidy saving, income increased for all except for the urban 
and rural poor households. This may be due to several reasons. One is that the four main 
agricultural sectors experienced decline in output going by the reinjection scenario analys is 
(see table 6 above) and as noted earlier, these rural households are engaged predominantly in 
agricultural activities. Another important reason is that typical Urban impacted policy like 
gasoline subsidy may not affect the poor who mostly dwells in the rural area as much given 
that cooking and heating in rural Nigeria are done mostly with firewood while kerosene (via 
kerosene lantern) is relied on for lighting. The design of the SURE-P is an additional factor. 
About 97% of the fund was channelled to road construction, health and tertiary education which 
are often accessed mostly by the non-poor and urban dwellers. With the reinjection of the 
subsidy saving, there is a decline in the expenditures of the poor and the non-poor in both the 
rural and urban Nigeria. Usually, the change in household expenditure depends on the large 
extent to which the households spend on the sectors that are affected greatly by the policy. The 
general increase in prices occasioned by the subsidy removal implies that expenditure should 
fall. Interestingly, only the non-poor household now suffer dissaving after the reinjection. The 
increase in the aggregate household income from -0.32% to 0.2% combined with expenditure 
changes to transform the 0.97% aggregate dissaving to 0.59% saving for the average 
representative household. 
Table 4.7: Effects of Reinjecting Subsidy saving on H/hold Income and Expenditure (AS) 
NBS CLASSIFICATION OF HOUSEHOLD  Income Expenditure (Dis)saving 
Urban Non Poor 2.29 -13.37 -0.17 
Urban Moderately Poor 0.82 5.71 0.14 
Urban Poor -2.03 -4.43 0.46 
Rural Non Poor 0.52 -2.19 -0.24 
Rural Moderately Poor 2.25 9.18 0.24 
Rural Poor -0.96 -4.71 0.20 
Total 0.20 0.33 0.59 
Source: Author’s computations 
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4.5 Conclusions 
From the findings in this study, it is obvious that an important step in implementing a 
fuel subsidy removal is to know how the removal of such sub-optimal fuel subsidy will impact 
on economic sectors and agents as well as the macro economy at large. Motivated by the 
various stakeholders concern about the recent 49.23% increase in gasoline price in Nigeria, the 
study explores the economic effects of the subsidy reduction and the reinjection of the subsidy 
saving with the I–O model and the SAM multiplier method. The simulation results clearly 
indicate that not only does fuel subsidy removal affects all economic sectors but quite 
enormously and disproportionately across sectors consistent with the extent of each sector’s 
dependence on the gasoline sector too. Aside the directly affected gasoline sectors, particular 
effects were observed in the crude petroleum, road transport and the electricity sectors. The 
refined petroleum products sectors experience increase in nominal output but these sectors have 
low employment potentials and provide income for a very small number of households. The 
rise in foreign savings despite the country’s heavy reliance on imported refined petroleum to 
meet domestic gasoline consumptions shows that raising gasoline price can make more crude 
petroleum available for exports which ultimately increases foreign earnings and revenue.  
The simulation results from the reinjection of the saving generally affirm that reforming 
fuel subsidies can be a win-win approach for all the economic sectors and agents in a country. 
Removing fuel subsidy and reinvesting the saving in key sectors as conceived in the Nigerian 
Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme led to significant increase in GDP and 
investment in all sectors; increases government revenue and foreign saving; raised factor 
incomes; and led to higher aggregate household saving. These inferences highlight that the 
success of reforming fuel subsidies depends largely on what governments does with the subsidy 
saving. Hence, reform programme can be more beneficial when accompanied with a well-
structured and targeted reinvestment plan.  
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However, the Nigerian subsidy reinvestment programme appear hastily designed as a 
quick response to the nation-wide strike action and mass protest against the subsidy removal. 
The fact that most of the road and rail projects predates the reinvestment and empowerment 
programs affirm the likelihood that they are, a mere scaling up the existing budgetary capital 
expenditure projects. Therefore, the programme needed to be reworked with better specifics and 
clear targets. The implementation should be timed and adequately monitored.  
In conclusion, there is need for governments planning reforms to addresses as pre-subsidy 
reform programmes critical areas like transportation, power and food which were directly impacted 
by the removal. It may also be necessary to develop an efficient social protection policy 
measures with better targeting to ensure social safety nets for the poor who are seriously hurt 
by fuel price increase as the results indicated.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF SUBSIDIES ON FUEL 
CONSUMPTION, CO2 EMISSION AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN OPEC 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, we have provided empirical evidence on the poor targeting 
of fuel subsidies and estimated the economic impact of removing subsidies using input-output 
table from Nigeria. In this chapter we will investigate the effect of subsidies on fuel 
consumption, CO2 emissions and welfare in OPEC countries. The predominance of fuel 
subsidies in OPEC cannot be overemphasised. From the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2014 
estimates of global fossil fuel subsidies, all the twelve OPEC member countries are among the 
top 25, five of which are among the top 10. OPEC member countries account for about 51% of 
the estimated US$295 billion global petroleum product subsidies in 2013.92 
As shown in Chapter 4, the effects of fossil fuel have been extensively studied in the 
literature. However, certain gap still exists which provides motivation for this effort. First, 
while there has been considerable efforts to evaluate the magnitude of fuel subsidies, the effects 
of subsidies on consumption, carbon emission and social welfare have attracted less attention 
at global and regional level. Since the pioneering work of Larsen and Shah (1992) on the global 
estimates of fossil fuel subsidies, the associated CO2 emission and social welfare impact, only 
a handful of studies have conducted similar investigation with recent data93. Without current 
estimates, reform policies may be impaired.94 Second is the dearth of effort on OPEC95. With 
                                                                 
92 The estimate of global fossil fuel subsidies in 2013 is US$548 in line with (WEO, 2014). Out of this total, 
54% (US$295) are on petroleum products  
93 As at 2010, only five of these studies are available on records and they include, Burniaux et al., 1992; IEA, 
1999; Saunders and Schneider, 2000; OECD, 2000; and Burniaux et al., 2009.  For additional details on the 
outcome of these studies, see Ellis, (2010) 
94For instance, Larsen and Shah (1992) estimated that phasing out petroleum product subsidies can reduce 
global CO2 emissions by up to 7.1% and attributes the bulk of the savings to the former USSR. These estimates 
are less relevant given the recent rate and direction of changes in the structure of fuel consumption globally  
95 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries founded in September 1960 presently with twelve members. 
These are Algeria Angola Libya Nigeria from Africa; Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates from the Middle East; and Ecuador and Venezuela from South America  
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the exception of Gürer and Ban (2000), no other study has been documented on the analysis of 
fuel subsidies in OPEC as a group96 , even as member countries are known to subsidise 
petroleum products’ prices for political, social and economic reasons97. Though the role of 
OPEC in the global oil market dynamics has been well researched, little effort has been given 
to the analysis of petroleum products pricing within the members' domestic markets. Third is 
on the measurement of subsidy and certain implicit approximations in virtually all regional and 
global fuel subsidy studies. A typical example is the use of one end-user prices (typically in 
the U.S.) of petroleum products as proxies for opportunity cost at end-user level whereas the 
prices paid by countries depend on the differences in purchasing arrangement, and the 
considerable variations in the handling and local transportation costs across countries 98 . 
Adopting a single end-user level price across countries can ignore countries’ differences, 
grossly affects the results, and render the inferences based on such outcomes inaccurate 
Member countries of OPEC are major oil exporters accounting for an average of 43.4% 
world crude oil production in 201399 . Yet, very few econometric studies have examined 
domestic petroleum product demand for this group of countries. International Energy Agency 
(2005) and Bhattacharyya and Blake (2009) focussed on MENA countries while Chakravorty 
et al. (2000) examined some OPEC countries100. Dahl (2012) provided a comprehensive review 
of studies on demand elasticities of petroleum products for 124 countries from 240 gasoline 
studies and 60 diesel studies to establish the pattern of price and income elasticities for 
countries in different income bands and fuel prices. She concludes that while low income 
                                                                 
96 There are several studies on some of the member countries or and one particular product. 
97 The work by Gürer, Nadir and Jan Ban published in OPEC Review 2000 focussed on the economic cost of 
low domestic product prices in member states using 1990 to 2000 data. No effort was made to quantify either 
the environmental or the welfare effects of these subsidies   
98 The much-cited paper by Larsen and Shah (1992) uses United States pre-tax end-user prices of petroleum 
products as proxies for opportunity cost at end-user level for all sampled countries. 
99 OPEC Statistical Bulletin 2014 
100 While the IEA study is basically from perception of countries’ export potential, the Bhattacharyya and Blake 
study employed a single equation dynamic model with lagged endogenous variable. Above all, data employed 
by the most recent of these studies dated 2005. 
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countries have lower price elasticities but higher income elasticities for gasoline, price 
elasticities of gasoline and diesel are generally lower in countries with low price regimes.  
The present analysis differs from the existing literature in two ways. First, while many 
studies have modelled OPEC behaviour as net oil exporting countries by analysing oil 
production and pricing policy of OPEC as a cartel, very few studies have investigated the 
demand for oil products within member countries. Studies that have modelled petroleum 
product demand for OPEC have either concentrated on aggregate products (e.g. Al-Janabi, 
1979) or considered a subset of OPEC members alongside other sub groups like Middle East 
and MENA (e.g. Bhattacharyya and Blake, 2009; Narayan and Smyth, 2007; Al Yousef, 2013). 
Several other studies have focused on individual OPEC countries (e.g. Al‐Sahlawi, 2003; Al-
Mutairi and Eltony, 1995; Iwayemi et al, 2010). No previous studies have examined OPEC 
fuel demand as a group. Second and more importantly we adopt a new econometric method 
in estimating the fuel demand elasticities. To our knowledge, no previous studies have analysed 
the fuel demand with panel data using the common correlated effects mean group (CCEMG) 
estimator developed by Pesaran (2006). Unlike the fixed and random effect and other 
generalised least square models which typically assume independence in the error terms and 
homogenous slopes across sections but only allows heterogeneity in intercepts, the CCEMG 
estimator models cross-sectional correlation of errors in panel data while allowing country-
specific slopes, and can yield consistent estimates when there exists cross-sectional dependence 
(see Pesaran, 2006). In analysing cross-country panels for typical heterogeneous group like 
OPEC, it is important to control for the differential effects of unobserved common factors by 
using the aggregates of the cross sections to filter the individual specific regressors.  In addition, 
we also employ the cross-sectionally augmented Im, Pesaran, and Shin test and a new error 
correction-based panel cointegration test developed by Westerlund (2007) to respectively test 
for panel unit roots and cointegration in the data. Unlike the commonly used cointegration tests 
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such as the Engle-Granger tests or Johnansen procedure, the Westerlund test is centred on 
structural instead of residual dynamics and does not impose common-factor restriction between 
the long-run parameter in levels and short-run parameter in differences101. Consequently the 
Westerlund tests has more power to reject the null hypothesis of in-cointegration.  
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is twofold. One is to analyse the fuel consumption 
pattern of OPEC member countries and also determine the magnitude of the fuel subsidies. The 
other is to estimate the effects on fuel consumption, carbon emission and social welfare.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a general background 
about fuel pricing and subsidies in OPEC member states. The estimation methods and data are 
described in section 3 while the results are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 will 
contain some concluding remarks. 
  
5.2 Background: Subsidies in OPEC 
The general drive for fuel subsidies in subsidising countries according to Adenikinju 
(2012) and IEA (1998) is to guarantee social stability, augment the economic development of 
certain sectors or areas, protect employment and respond to equity worries. However, while 
subsidies are allegedly aimed at protecting consumers, the least benefits are enjoyed by low-
income household groups. In fact, the much acclaimed logic behind the fuel subsidisa t ion 
policy as a pro-poor measure has received little or no support in most documented empirica l 
investigations (see Baig, et al, 2007; IMF, 2013; Soile and Mu, 2015 among others). 
In OPEC member countries, subsidies are often designed to alleviate energy poverty by 
enabling access to reasonably priced energy products. Hence, petroleum products’ subsidies 
and their reform process should be cautiously examined within each country’s economic, social 
                                                                 
101 A common-factor restriction in a residual based co-integration tests requires the long-run parameters of 
variables at levels to equal the short-run parameters of the variables in differences (Banerjee, et al, 1998). 
Persyn and Westerlund (2008) contend that such failure can cause a significant loss of power in a typical 
residual-based cointegration tests. 
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and political context, particularly in line with their goals relating to economic growth, poverty 
reduction, and pollution control. It follows therefore that national environments should form 
an important components of analysing fuel subsidies in these countries.  
  
Figure 5.1: Petroleum Exports and Pre-tax Petroleum Products Subsidies in OPEC 
 
Sources: Data are sourced from OPEC statistical bulletin. Pre-tax petroleum products subsidies are compiled  
from IMF (2013).  
 
The prevalence of petroleum products subsidies in most oil producing non-OECD 
countries, particularly among OPEC members calls for concern for a number of reasons. First, 
petroleum is the major export commodity of OPEC and thus constitute a significant proportion 
of the revenue available for the governments of these countries. Second, for historical reasons, 
traditionally domestically-sold crude and refined petroleum products are heavily subsidized in 
OPEC countries thereby increasing domestic demand for these products as well as the 
associated greenhouse gas emission. For instance, available evidence (presented in figure 5.1 
above) shows that petroleum subsidies account for over 10% of government revenue in seven 
of the current twelve OPEC member countries by 2011 estimate. Similarly, petroleum accounts 
for over 70% in total exports revenue in nine of the twelve countries 
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Figure 5.2: Petroleum Products Consumption, Subsidisation Rate and GHG Emission in OPEC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Consumption data from OPEC Statistical Bulletin, 2013; Average Subsidisation rates from 
IEA 2012 and GHG Emission from World Resources Institute, 2015.  
 
Figure 5.2 above shows on the upper panel the average subsidisation rate as a proportion 
of supply costs and aggregate domestic consumption of petroleum products in 2012 and on the 
lower, the GHG emission in 2012 and the average annual growth in total greenhouse emission 
from 2000 to 2012 among OPEC members. The average subsidisation rate is highest in Kuwait 
and lowest in Angola while Saudi Arabia has the highest consumption of petroleum products.  
Not only is this subsidisation trend financially worrisome, the associated welfare and 
environmental implications are grave. For instance, GHG emission grew at an average of about 
80% in Angola, Saudi Arabia and UAE and about 150% in Qatar between 2000 and 2012.  
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5.3 Methods and Data 
5.3.1 Fuel Consumption Model  
Except for inferior goods, standard (micro) economic theory relates demands for a 
particular product as a function of price, income, and other determinants. Following this 
underlying framework, energy demand literature regards consumption of petroleum products 
as a positive function of real income and negative function of own price (Al Yousef 2013, 
Narayan and Smith 2007, Dahl 1994). In line with this convention, we specify petroleum 
products consumption for OPEC countries as follows: 
          𝒬𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡 , x𝑖𝑡)                                           𝑖,… , 𝑁; 𝑡, … , 𝑇   3.1 
Where 𝒬𝑖𝑡 is per-capita fuel consumption, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is real gross domestic product per-capita, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is 
real fuel price for country (i) at time (t). 
5.3.1.1 The CCEMG Model 
Econometric specification of the above functional equation is written below: 
               𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  ,  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁    3.2  
Where 𝑞𝑖𝑡 the logarithm of vector of dependent variables in equation 3.1; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm 
of 𝑘x1 set of regressors as set out in equation 3.1; 𝛷𝑖  is a country-specific intercept, and 𝑖𝑡 is 
the error term. Allowing cross section dependence in the model, this study assumes that errors 
in equation 3.2 have the following multifactor structure: 
        𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆
′𝑓𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  ,         3.3 
in which 𝑓𝑡 is the (mx1) vector of unobserved common effects and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a country-specif ic 
error assumed to be independently distributed. From (3.2), correlation arises because the 
response to common external forces or perturbations is similar, though not identical, across 
countries. It should be noted that common factors induce a correlation between pairs of 
statistical units that do not depend on how close they are in the geographical space. In model 
(3.2), we allow 𝑥𝑖𝑡 to be correlated with the unobserved effects 𝑓𝑡 as suggested by Pesaran 
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(2006). Therefore, common factors can impact consumption of petroleum products not only 
directly via the factor structure (3.3), but also indirectly by affecting the regressors. 
            In line with Pesaran (2006), the estimation and testing procedure to equation (3.2) with 
multifactor errors (3.3) is based on the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) method where 
unobserved effects  𝑓𝑡 can be well approximated by the cross section averages of the dependent 
and explanatory variables. Technically, this can be specified as: 
    𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽′𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛷𝑖 + g′𝑖𝑧̅𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  ,       3.4  
where 𝑧̅t = (𝑞t, ?̅?′𝑡) with 𝑞t and ?̅?t being the cross section averages of the dependent variable 
and regressors respectively. Computation of CCE Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator for the 
mean of the slope coefficients (Pesaran, 2006) will be presented. Heterogeneity is captured by 
the individual specific fixed effects 𝛷𝑖, and the loadings g𝑖. The fixed effects (FE) regression 
method will also be computed for comparison purpose. It can be observed that the CCEMG 
and the FE frameworks differ in that the latter assumes that gi is zero, and the β′𝑖s are the same.  
5.3.1.2  Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models 
Fixed effects specification for our model is relayed in equation (3.8) below: 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛷𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 ,      𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇   𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑁     3.5  
where the variables are as defined before except that β is a vector of coefficients for the vector 
of variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡 that is invariant by country. Also, 𝛷𝑖 is assumed to be fixed parameters to be 
estimated while the remainder disturbance 𝑖𝑡  is assumed to be stochastic with 𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0,𝜎𝜀
2). 
Equation (3.5) represents a one-way fixed effects error component model. Another way of 
presenting model (3.5) above is through Least Square Dummy Variable Regression Model 
(LSDV). In the LSDV model country-specific effects is represented through the differentia l 
intercept dummies. More appropriately, LSDV is specified below: 
   𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑎𝑎 + 𝑖𝑡 ,       3.6  
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where  𝑍𝑎 is a matrix of intercept dummies. The model assumes identifying restrictions∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 =
0 . This may be achieved by using 𝑁 − 1 individual dummies and an “inhomogeneous” 
intercept. In order to ascertain whether country-specific intercept 𝑎𝑖  can be allowed to be 
correlated with remainder disturbance 𝑖𝑡 , random effects model of the equation (3.7) type will 
also be estimated and Hausman test performed.  
Unlike fixed effects (FE) model where unobserved effects as represented by country-
specific effects are assumed to be fixed and might be correlated with the regressors, Random 
Effects (RE) model however, treats unobserved effects as a random error component that is 
assumed to be independent of regressors. Specification of the one-way random effects model 
is related as: 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎 + 𝑧𝑡 ,   𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁     3.7  
where 𝑧𝑡 = (𝑣𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡) ;   𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑣𝑖  ;  𝑣𝑖 and 𝑖𝑡 are independent and identically distributed 
random component with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝑣
2 and 𝜎𝜀
2 respectively. In addition, vector of 
regressors 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are independent of 𝑣𝑖, and 𝑖𝑡 in the model. 
We employ the Hausman test to determine whether a fixed effects or random effects 
model is more appropriate for our data. The null hypothesis underlying the Hausman test is that 
the FE and RE estimators do not differ substantially. The test statistic developed by Hausman 
has an asymptotic χ2 distribution. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the conclusion is that RE 
estimator is not appropriate and that we should use the FE estimator. 
5.3.2 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
5.3.2.1 Panel Unit Root Tests  
The study applies the most recent cross-sectionally augmented Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
Panel unit root testing (see, Pesaran, 2007; Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2011). We begin 
with the idea of Common Correlated Effects in testing for panel unit-root with cross-section 
dependence in the panel series. The idea is to augment variable to be tested with its cross-
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section averages as proxies for the unobserved common factors, in the context of a Dickey-
Fuller regression. Consider the 𝑝𝑡ℎ order Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression below: 
 𝛥𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 𝛥𝑞𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + µ𝑖𝑡        3.8  
where 𝑞𝑖𝑡 is either the logarithm of demand for petroleum products, the logarithm of the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ 
regressor 𝑥𝑗,𝑖𝑡 , or regression residuals from equation (3.2). µ𝑖𝑡 are errors that we assume to 
have a single factor structure. The null hypothesis of unit root in equation (3.8) is: 
          𝐻0: 𝑏𝑖 = 0;   𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁;          3.9 
With the alternative hypothesis that 
𝐻1: 𝑏𝑖 < 0;   𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑁1;  𝑏𝑖 = 0;   𝑖 = 𝑁1 + 1, … , 𝑁;    3.10 
Where N1 is such that N1/N is nonzero and tends to a fixed constant as N goes to infinity. 
Pesaran (2007) proposes to test (3.9) against (3.10) by computing the simple average of the t-
ratios of the ordinary least squares estimates of bi in equation (3.14), as follows 
 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑆 = 𝑁−1 ∑ ?̃?𝑛𝑖=1          3.11 
Where 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑆 is cross-sectionally augmented Im, Pesaran, and Shin, and ?̃?i is the ordinary least 
squares t-ratio of bi in the following Dickey Fuller regression augmented with the cross section 
averages 𝑞𝑡−1 and Δ𝑞𝑡−𝑗, for j = 0, …, p 
 𝛥𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 𝛥𝑞𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + g′𝑖𝑧̅𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  ,       3.12 
where  𝑧̅𝑡 = (𝑞𝑡−1, 𝛥𝑞𝑡 ,𝛥𝑞𝑡−1, … , 𝛥𝑞𝑡−𝑗)
′ .  
         The CIPS test has been designed for testing the unit root hypothesis with various sources 
of cross sectional dependence and it is widely accepted as the most recent Panel unit root 
testing. (Pesaran, 2007; Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2011). 
5.3.2.2 Pre and Post Cross section Dependence Tests 
As a pre-estimation test, we will utilize Pesaran (2004) cross-section dependence (CD) 
test to determine the direction, magnitude and significance of correlation among cross-sectional 
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unit of our panel series. It is a statistic that captures the overall amount of cross section 
dependence in the data. Below specifies average pairwise correlation coefficient 𝜌̅. 
 ?̅? =
2
𝑁 (𝑁−1)
∑ ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑁−1
𝑖=1  ,       3.13 
Where 𝜌𝑖𝑗 is given by                                       
 𝜌𝑖𝑗 =
∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
√(∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=1 )   √(∑ 𝑒𝑗𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=1 )
        3.14  
where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are regression residuals from equations (3.2) or (3.11). 
Post-estimation cross section dependence test based on the pairwise correlation coefficients 
above will also be determined. Specifically, we consider CDLM test based on Lagrange 
Multiplier statistic 
𝐶𝐷𝐿𝑀 = √
1
𝑁 (𝑁−1)
∑ ∑ (𝑁𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑁 −1
𝑖=1 𝑇𝜌𝑖𝑗
2 − 1)      3.15   
Under the null hypothesis of cross section dependence, the 𝐶𝐷𝐿𝑀 tends to a N(0, 1) with  𝑇 →
 ∞ and then  𝑁 → ∞.  
5.3.2.3 Cointegration Test  
In order to determine whether long-run relationship exists between demand for petroleum 
products and the considered determinants, we employ the four panel cointegration tests 
developed by Westerlund, 2007; Persyn and Westerlund, 2008) 102 . This structure-based 
cointegration tests have good small-sample properties and high power relative to popular 
residual-based panel cointegration tests (e.g. Pedroni, 2004). Furthermore, asymptotic and 
bootstrap p-values are computed, the latter making inference possible under very general forms 
of cross-sectional dependence. The tests are designed to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration by testing whether the error correction term in a conditional error correction 
                                                                 
102 See Westerlund (2007) for further details about the tests’ equations and statistics as well as the new Stata 
command description by Persyn and Westerlund (2008) 
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model is equal to zero. If the null hypothesis of no error correction is rejected, then the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is also rejected.  
5.3.3 Estimating Fuel Subsidies 
Three main methodologies for estimating fuel subsidies have been identified in the 
literature. These are the effective rate of assistance (ERA), the producer subsidy equivalent 
(PSE), and the price gap (PG) methods. By design, the ERA is generally broad in scope which 
perhaps, is the bane of its practical relevance103. The PG contrast sharply with the OECD 
developed PSE in two unique ways. First, while the PSE provides the means to assess the extent 
of subsidy impacts on recipients over time, the price gap estimates on subsidy impact are static 
based on the assumption of ‘all else held constant’. Second, the PG method considers 
consumption subsidies with a specific focus on end users whereas the PSE on its part, measure 
subsidies’ impacts as the value to the recipients.  
Given that subsidies on petroleum products in OPEC member countries are on fuel 
consumptions and directed to end users, the study adopts the price gap method. The price gap 
method originally advanced by Corden (1957) defines price gap as the difference between the 
reference and the end user retail price of a product. Ever since, the technique has been embraced 
more than any other in estimating consumption subsidies (see McCrone, 1962; IEA, 2008; Liu 
and Li, 2011; Coady et al, 2010; and Lin and Jiang 2011 etc.). In particular, the method is 
conceptually and analytically simple to apply. 
In order to obtain our estimate of subsidies (𝑆𝑖𝑗) - the product of price gap (𝑃𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑗 ) and 
quantities of product consumed (𝐶𝑖𝑗), we first compute the price gap as reference price (𝑃𝑟𝑓) 
minus retail price (𝑃𝑟𝑡)
104. In arriving at the reference price for each fuel, the study adopts the 
                                                                 
103 As noted by Lin and Jiang (2011), the ERA is hard to employ in practice due to the  challenges to acquire the 
necessary level of consistent data 
104 While the retail price is the prevailing subsidised consumer price of a fuel, the reference price relates to what 
a product will cost in a country without subsidy. It is defined as the border price (i.e. international spot price 
minus (plus) freight cost for net exporter (importer) plus the costs of domestic transport and distribution and 
value added tax where applicable. 
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spot prices of petroleum products (gasoline, diesel and fuel oil) in the three major markets-US 
Gulf, Rotterdam and Singapore and spot freight rates to major export destinations. Both the 
spot price and the freight cost are adjusted for each country’s petroleum product exports trade 
pattern (i.e. each country’s petroleum product exports by destination). Price of kerosene is 
taken as the average of the three major fuels. These data are for 2013 and sourced from the 
OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2014. The price gap are expressed in the equations below.  
𝑆𝑖𝑗 =  𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑔𝑝𝑖𝑗           3.16 
𝑃𝑔𝑝 =  𝑃𝑟𝑓 −  𝑃𝑟𝑡          3.17 
𝑃𝑟𝑓 =  𝑃𝑏𝑑𝑟 +  𝑍𝑐 + 𝑉𝐴𝑇        3.18 
 
Where: 
(𝑖) denotes relevant product while (𝑗) is the particular OPEC country 
𝑉𝐴𝑇 = value added tax  
𝑍𝑐  = the applicable costs of domestic transport and distribution  
𝑃𝑏𝑑𝑟 = the border price  
5.3.4 Subsidy Impact on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions 
In assessing how subsidy impacted on fuel consumption, the study applied the method 
explained in IEA (1999). We follow Liu and Li (2011) and Lin and Jiang (2011) by specifying 
an inverse demand function with constant elasticity (CEI)105. Using 𝑞, 𝑃 and 𝜖 as demand, 
price and long run price elasticity respectively, the CEI demand function for fuel (𝑖)  is 
expressed as follows:  
𝑞𝑖 =  𝑃𝑖
𝜖          3.19 
In log linear form, equation 4 becomes 
𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 =  𝜖 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖          3.20 
                                                                 
105 The preference for this type of function is anchored on the fact that the elasticity of demand remains 
invariable within a range of likely values. More so, it is compatible with limited data  
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The price change (𝛿𝑃𝑖) due to price gap removal can be expressed as 
𝛿𝑃𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝑃1 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃0         3.21 
From equation 5 and 6, we can infer that: 
𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 = 𝜖 ∗ (𝑙𝑛𝑃1 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃0) + 𝑙𝑛𝑞0       3.22 
The impact on consumption is the resultant change in demand (𝛿𝑞𝑖) which can be expressed as 
follows: 
𝛿𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞0 −  𝑞𝑖         3.23 
Given the carbon emission factor (CEF)106 of fuel 𝑖, the environmental impacts of subsidy on 
CO2 emission is estimated as: 
𝛿𝐶𝑂2 = 𝛿𝑞𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝐹𝑖         3.24 
 
5.3.5 The welfare impact of fuel subsidy 
The study estimates the welfare effects of subsidising petroleum products in OPEC and 
member countries by adapting the Larsen and Shah (1992) framework107. Welfare is defined 
as the addition of both consumer and producer surplus at the subsidised price of respective 
petroleum products. Taken 𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠  as our inverse demand and supply functions and 
𝑄𝑝  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄𝑐 as domestic production and consumption respectively, welfare can be expresses as: 
𝛿𝑊 =  𝑊𝑃𝑟𝑓 −  𝑊𝑃𝑟𝑡        3.25 
𝛿𝑊 = [− ∫ 𝑑𝛿𝑄𝑐
𝑄𝑐 𝑃𝑟𝑡
𝑄𝑐 𝑃𝑟𝑓
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑓 (𝑄
𝑐
𝑃𝑟𝑡
− 𝑄𝑐
𝑃𝑟𝑓
) − ∫ 𝑠𝛿𝑄𝑝
𝑄𝑝𝑃𝑟𝑓
𝑄𝑝𝑃𝑟𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑓 (𝑄
𝑝
𝑃𝑟𝑓
− 𝑄𝑝
𝑃𝑟𝑡
)]  3.26 
Equation 11 can be expressed as the sum of the % change in consumption due to subsidy 
removal multiplied by total subsidies and the % change in production due to subsidy removal 
assuming a linear demand and supply functions, constant world price and that the removal of 
subsidy will prompt no supply response in subsidising countries. 
                                                                 
106 http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/coefficients.html  
107 The estimates provided in this study represent the net-welfare effects as most of the countries consumed 
more than their output of one fuel or the other and conversely.   
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𝛿𝑊 =  0.5 (𝑄𝑐
𝑃𝑟𝑡
− 𝑄𝑐
𝑃𝑟𝑓
) (𝑃𝑔𝑝) + 0.5 (𝑄
𝑝
𝑃𝑟𝑓
− 𝑄𝑝
𝑃𝑟𝑡
)    3.27 
The welfare impacts associated with subsidy removal for net exporting and importing counties 
is illustrated graphically in figure 2 below108. 
 
Figure 5.3: Welfare effect of subsidy removal – Importers & Exporters  
 
Source: adapted from Larsen and Shah (1992). 
 
5.3.6 Data 
This study analysed demand for petroleum products in 9 of the 12 OPEC member 
countries109. The three countries excluded due to lack of reasonable data are Iraq which has 
been affected by war; Ecuador has been in and out of OPEC; while Angola is a new member 
of OPEC and was in civil war for a long time. In order to have a detailed analyses on the issue 
as well as to obtain robust empirically-validated estimates, we will adopt Panel Fixed Effects 
(FE) or Random Effects (RE) regression and the most recent Common Correlated Effects 
(CCE) Mean Group Estimators. The techniques coupled with other tests to be carried out will 
                                                                 
108 Positive (+) sign represents a welfare gain 
109 The OPEC countries considered include Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirate (UAE) and Venezuela 
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be performed on STATA 13. The a priori expectation of the coefficients of the variables 
selected as determinants of demand for petroleum products are: INC (+), GP (-), DIP (-), KP (-
), FOP (-). Descriptions of variables are presented in table 5.1. 
The countries’ time series data on fuel consumption, prices and income covering the 
period of 1980 to 2013 used for this study are sourced from OPEC Statistical Bulletin 2014 
with the exception of CPI (2005=100) obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank data110. All 
consumption variables are calculated in litres per capita while income per capita and prices are 
in real 2005 $US. We expressed all variables in natural logarithm for easier measurement of 
direct elasticity of coefficient estimates. Table 5.1 below presents the definition as well as panel 
composition of variables for quick reference. The panel has N=79 and T=297  
Table 5.1: Description of Variables 
Variable                                Description     N T 
GC Gasoline consumption 9     33 
GP Price of gasoline 9 33 
DIC Diesel consumption 9 33 
DIP Price of diesel 9 33 
KC Kerosene consumption 9 33 
KP Price of kerosene 9 33 
FOC Fuel oil consumption 8 33 
FOP Price of fuel oil 8 33 
INC Income per capita 9 33 
 
5.4 Results and Interpretation 
5.4.1 Fuel Consumption Estimation Results 
This section presents the estimation results of demand for petroleum products in OPEC 
countries. Specifically, the analysis is broadly divided into two parts, namely: descriptive and 
inferential analyses. The former mainly describe the variables of interest based on the 
minimum, maximum, the mean and the standard deviation. The inferential analysis comprises 
                                                                 
110 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2  
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correlation, cross section dependence test, cross-sectional augmented Im-Pesaran-Smith unit 
root test (CIPS), Westerlund cointegration test, fixed effect, and common correlated effect 
panel data estimates. Besides the aggregate estimates, the inferential analysis also focuses on 
the country-specific estimates. 
5.4.1.1 Descriptive Analysis of the Variables 
Table 5.2 shows the summary statistics of the log of all variables used in the analys is. 
The gasoline consumption (GC) has a mean of 1.49 litre per day with a standard deviation 
value of 0.97 litre while the price of gasoline (GP) has a mean of 11.42 and a standard deviation 
of 42.04. Also, the mean value of the diesel consumption (DIC) in OPEC countries is 1.68 litre 
with a standard variation of 1.31 litre while the mean price of diesel (DP) is 5.41 with a standard 
deviation of 19.24. In the case of kerosene, the mean value of consumption (KC) is 0.74 with 
a standard deviation of 1.24 litre while the price of kerosene in OPEC has a mean and standard 
deviation of 8.11 and 30.21 respectively. Similarly, the fuel oil consumption (FOC) has a mean 
value of 2.75 and a standard deviation of 3.76 litre while the mean of fuel oil price is 3.91 with 
a standard deviation of 13.98. The income variable measured by per capita income for OPEC 
countries ranges between US$494 to US$81,947 with a mean value of US$14,212.  
Table 5.2: Descriptive Analysis of the Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gasoline consumption 306 1.494 0.971 0.090 3.690 
Diesel consumption 306 1.675 1.310 0.030 5.670 
Kerosene consumption 306 0.739 1.239 0.030 6.720 
Fuel oil consumption 272 2.745 3.761 0.010 17.150 
Price of gasoline 306 11.421 42.039 0.010 293.870 
Price of diesel 306 5.407 19.243 0.008 118.460 
Price of kerosene 306 8.112 30.210 0.008 198.610 
Price of fuel oil 272 3.906 13.976 0.003 109.190 
Income per capita 306 14212.080 16944.610 494.240 81947.240 
Computed by the Author using STATA 13 
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5.4.1.2 Results of Correlation Analysis  
Table 5.3 presents the correlation analysis for each model111. The model for gasoline 
shows that while gasoline consumption is negatively and significantly correlated with price, it 
is linearly positive and significantly related to per-capita income with correlation coefficient 
values of -0.02 and 0.862 respectively.. A cursory look at the relationship between the price of 
gasoline and per capita income shows that there exists a negative and significant relationship 
between the two variables. In the model for diesel, it was found that consumption is linear ly 
negative and significantly correlated with the price of diesel, and positive and significantly 
correlated with per-capita income. The model also shows positive but insignificant association 
between the price of diesel and per-capita income.  
Similarly, the kerosene model results show that consumption is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the price of gasoline and significantly positive with per capita 
income with correlation coefficient values of -0.162 and 0.664 respectively. However, there is 
a positive and significant association between the price of kerosene and per capita income with 
correlation coefficient value of 0.046. Finally, the model for fuel oil shows that fuel oil 
consumption is negative and significantly correlated with the price of fuel oil with correlation 
coefficient of 0.043 while there is a positive and significant association between the 
consumption of fuel oil and the per-capita income with correlation coefficient of 0.867. The 
empirical results also show positive and significant association between the price of fuel oil 
and per capita income with correlation coefficient of 0.046. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
111 Models for gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and fuel oil consumption 
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Table 5.3: Correlation Analysis of Petroleum Products Consumption in OPEC 
 Gasoline Consumption Gasoline Price Per Capita Income 
Gasoline Consumption 1   
Gasoline Price -0.020** 1  
Per Capita Income 0.8625*** -0.102*** 1 
 Diesel Consumption Diesel Price Per Capita Income 
Diesel Consumption 1   
Diesel Price -0.177*** 1  
Per Capita Income 0.823*** 0.002 1 
 Kerosene Consumption Kerosene Price Per Capita Income 
Kerosene Consumption 1   
Kerosene Price -0.162*** 1  
Per Capita Income 0.664*** 0.046 1 
 Fuel Oil Consumption Fuel Oil Price Per Capita Income 
Fuel Oil Consumption 1   
Fuel Oil Price -0.043 1  
Per Capita Income 0.867*** 0.046 1 
Computed by the Author using STATA 13 
Note: *, **, and ***, denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
 
5.4.1.3 Results of the Cross-Section Dependence Tests  
Following section (5.3.2), the result of cross-section dependence is presented in Table 
5.4 below. From the table, it can be observed that both the consumption of kerosene (KC) and 
diesel (DIC) and their prices (DP) and (KP) do not reject the null hypothesis of cross-section 
independence at levels. The cross-section dependence statistic (CDLM) for other level variables 
are all significant at 1%. The average pairwise correlation coefficient 𝑝̅ ranges between 0.274 
and 0.512 for level variables, and 0.089 and 0.220 for variables at first difference. At first 
difference, income per capita (INC) is the only variable that rejected the null of cross-sectional 
independence at conventional level of 5%. It is important to recall that cross-section 
dependence tests are performed on the error terms obtained from the regression of each variable 
on the intercept term. 
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Table 5.4: Pre Cross-section Dependence Test 
Variable ?̅? 𝐶𝐷𝐿𝑀 Variable ?̅? 𝐶𝐷𝐿𝑀 
GC 0.310 4.47*** Δ GC 0.148 1.68* 
DIC 0.512 1.280 Δ DIC 0.143 0.310 
KC 0.438 -1.480 Δ KC  0.138 -0.130 
FOC 0.302 5.15*** Δ FOC 0.137 -0.540 
GP 0.317 5.80*** Δ GP 0.140 0.080 
DP  0.274 -1.470 Δ DP 0.115 -0.500 
KP 0.304 -0.320 Δ KP 0.089 0.750 
FOP 0.463 7.05*** Δ FOP 0.108 0.810 
INC 0.468 10.88*** Δ INC 0.220 6.42*** 
Computed by the Author using STATA 13 
Note: *, **, and ***, denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
Δ represents First Difference. Null Hypothesis assumes cross-section independence 
 
5.4.1.4 Panel Unit Root Results  
Though we conduct three unit-root test for individual countries’ time series for 
comparison and robustness check112, the panel unit root test are more powerful in two ways. 
First, unlike the time series unit root test for each country with nonstandard limit ing 
distribution, the distribution of the panel unit root tests are asymptotically standard normal. 
Second, in addition to the power of large observations, panel unit root tests capture variation 
across countries and across time to produce extra accurate parameter estimates (see Sarno and 
Taylor, 1998) 
The results of the unit-root test for individual countries are contained in appendices 1. 
Table 5.5 presents the results of cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) unit root as advanced 
by Pesaran (2007). Under the approach, the null hypothesis that all series in the panel are non-
stationary is tested against the alternative hypothesis that some series in the panel are stationary. 
We report only the case of deterministic intercept with a maximum of 3 lags113. The results 
show that most of the variables are not stationary at levels at all lag length considered. The 
only two variables that rejected the null of non-stationarity at levels are price of diesel (DP), 
                                                                 
112 The three tests include Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and  Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 
113 Since the CIPS tests has no information criteria for lag length selection, we experiment with several lags and 
even allowed for deterministic trends. None of these trials changes the results significantly  
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and price of Kerosene (KP). While price of diesel reject the null at 1% and 10% at first and 
second lags significant level, the price of kerosene do so at 5% level of significance at both 
first and second lag. However, all the variables reject the null of unit-root at first difference at 
all lag specification. 
Table 5.5:    CIPS Panel Unit Root Test Statistics 
Lags 0 1 2 3 
GC -0.672 -0.973 -0.092 0.355 
DIC 1.634 1.296 0.79 0.277 
KC 1.012 0.078 1.393 1.678 
FOC -0.717 -0.668 0.542 0.52 
GP 0.457 -0.815 0.446 1.50 
DP  -1.388* -2.804*** -1.555* 0.767 
KP -0.778 -2.308** -1.994** -0.141 
FOP 0.695 0.188 -0.999 -0.309 
INC 0.115 -0.762 0.865 0.663 
     
Δ GC -10.450*** -6.776*** -4.457*** -1.685** 
Δ DIC -10.436*** -6.495*** -3.484*** -3.181*** 
Δ KC  -10.314*** -6.999*** -4.707*** -3.211*** 
Δ FOC -9.137*** -5.953*** -3.556*** -1.805** 
Δ GP -9.275*** -7.599*** -5.919*** -3.234*** 
Δ DP -10.386*** -7.469*** -6.355*** -3.907*** 
Δ KP -9.909*** -6.689*** -5.499*** -5.023*** 
Δ FOP -10.171*** -5.267*** -3.893*** -2.703*** 
Δ INC -9.669*** -6.514*** -3.438*** -2.374*** 
Computed by the Author using STATA 13 
Note: *, **, and ***, denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Δ represents First Difference 
 
5.4.1.5 Westerlund Cointegration Results  
Below is the results of the panel cointegration analysis based on the strategy proposed by 
Westerlund and Persyn (2007) described briefly in section 3.2. In table 5.6 below is a display 
of Westerlund cointegration results for consumption of gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and fuel oils. 
In the table, reports of group-mean statistics (Gt) and (Ga) are presented114. Since evidence of 
cross-section correlation among our panel series surfaces in the cross-section dependence tests 
performed in section 4.4, we deem it fit to obtain robust p-values in our cointegration test 
                                                                 
114  Note that we also perform for panel statistics (Pa) and (Pt). However, the decision on cointegration results 
was not different from that of Ga and Gt reported. Evidence on that is available on request. 
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through bootstrapping techniques. From the result, we cannot reject the null of no cointegrat ion 
for all the models. By implication, the relationship between demand for petroleum products 
and its determinants are temporary and not error-correcting.  
 Table 5.6: Westerlund Cointegration Results 
Computed by the Author using STATA 12; Null Hypothesis assumes no cointegration.  
Note that the value Gt and Ga reported represent Westerlund group-mean error-correction statistic 
5.4.1.6 Panel Estimation Results for Petroleum Products Consumption in OPEC  
Having determined the existence of no cointegration among the variables of interest in 
all the models selected to capture demand for petroleum products in OPEC, we proceed to carry 
out panel data analysis based on fixed or random effects estimate and common correlated 
effects mean group (CCEMG). In line with the overall objective of study, estimates measuring 
demand for petroleum products in OPEC countries are presented in Table 5.7 below. The 
results represent aggregate view on demand for petroleum products in OPEC. Country-specific 
estimates are presented in Table 5.8.  
From Table 5.7, under CCEMG income per-capita (INC) exerts positive and statistica l ly 
significant influence on gasoline consumption (GC), diesel (DIC), kerosene (KC), and fuel oil 
(FOC) with elasticity of 0.19, 0.29, 0.33, and 0.25 respectively. More appropriately, a 1% 
increase in per-capita income will lead to about 0.19%, 0.29%, 0.33%, and 0.25% increase in 
gasoline consumption, diesel, kerosene, and fuel oil respectively. However, price of petroleum 
products are not statistically significant in all the models under CCEMG. All the fuel prices 
exert negative influence on demand. However, the Wald Chi-Square Statistic shows that 
      Model 1 (GD)    Model 2  (DID)     Model 3 (KD) Model 4 (FOD) 
Statistic Gt Ga Gt Ga Gt Ga Gt Ga 
Value -1.767 -5.805 -2.023 -6.715 -1.400 -4.626 -1.666 -5.656 
Z-value 0.872 1.558 0.038 1.152 2.067 2.152 1.134 1.564 
P-value 0.809 0.944 0.515 0.875 0.981 0.984 0.872 0.941 
Robust P-value 0.640 0.660 0.260 0.370 0.860 0.920 0.660 0.610 
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income and price are jointly significant in explaining consumption of gasoline, kerosene and 
fuel oil under CCEMG method. 
The decision on which of the two models to use with respect to the Fixed or Random 
Effects regression estimates, Hausman test is employed. From the Hausman test statistic, it is 
observed that the null hypothesis of random effects cannot be rejected for all fuels. Hence we 
report only the Random Effects (RE). In all the four models, income per capita exerts positive 
and significant influence on consumption of gasoline, diesel, kerosene and fuel oil with 
elasticity of about 0.07, 0.1, 0.29, and 0.25 respectively. All the fuel prices except kerosene has 
the expected inverse relationship with demand but all are statistically insignificant. Also, 
income and prices of petroleum products are jointly significant in explaining petroleum 
products consumption going by statistical significance of Wald chi-square in all the models 
considered. 
Table 5.7: Empirical Results on Demand for Petroleum Products in OPEC Countries  
  
                   CCEMG RESULT          RANDOM EFFECTS 
GC DIC KC FOC GC DIC KC FOC 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
  
0.001 
(0.27) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
0.004 
(0.33) 
-0.007 
(-0.48) 
0.010** 
(1.96) 
0.008 
(0.94) 
0.014 
(0.89) 
-0.021 
(-1.21) 
ΔINC 
  
0.188*** 
(2.84) 
0.290** 
(2.10) 
0.332** 
(2.28) 
0.249** 
(2.04) 
0.065** 
(2.42) 
0.097** 
(2.18) 
0.299*** 
(4.17) 
0.248** 
(2.52) 
ΔGP 
  
-0.038 
(-1.48) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.014 
(-1.50) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
ΔDP 
  
  
  
-0.007 
(-0.21) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.002 
(-0.11) 
  
  
  
  
ΔKP 
  
  
  
  
  
-0.039 
(-1.31) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.031 
(1.27) 
  
  
ΔFOP 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.134 
(-0.79) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.006 
(-0.27) 
RMSE 0.071 0.099 0.189 0.184 0.089 0.148 0.236 0.292 
No of Obs. 297 297 297 264 297 297 297 264 
No of groups 9 9 9 8 9 9 9 8 
F-Stat/Wald Chi2 41.13*** 4.41 13.60*** 21.08*** 8.21** 4.78* 18.67*** 6.43** 
Hausman Chi2     1.08 0.43 1.29 0.19 
CDLM -3.54*** -3.05*** -3.17*** -3.13***  1.19 0.93 0.16 0.84 
Note: *, **, and ***, denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
In Parenthesis (  ) are values of z-statistics.  
The CDLM here is the post cross-section dependence statistic 
RMSE is the Root Mean Square Error. Δ denotes First Difference 
Source: Estimation results using STATA 13 
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5.4.1.7 OPEC Country-Specific Results Using CCEMG 
As aggregate analysis tends to obscure relative effects, we carried out country-specif ic 
analysis to explore the behavioural effects exhibited by each country as regards the fuel 
consumption. As noted earlier, the uniqueness of the CCEMG estimation techniques is that it 
treats each country’s peculiarities as unique. Table 3.8 below displays country-specific results 
on consumption of petroleum products in sampled OPEC countries. As can be observed in the 
table, income is a significant determining factor in explaining variations in gasoline 
consumption in Iran, Kuwait, and Venezuela with elasticity of 0.47, 0.11, and 0.39 respectively. 
The price of gasoline has negative impact on gasoline consumption in all the countries except 
UAE and Venezuela but it is only statistically significant in Iran, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. 
Thus, a one percent increase in the price of gasoline will result in 0.03, 0.132 and 0.130 percent 
decrease in gasoline consumption in Iran, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia respectively. 
The results of country-specific analysis on diesel fuel using CCEMG show that per capita 
income has a positive impact on diesel consumption in most of the OPEC countries except 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  Specifically, if per capita income increases by one percent, diesel 
consumption will increase by 1.05 percent, 0.31 percent, 0.56 percent, and 0.78 percent in 
Algeria, Kuwait, the UAE and Venezuela respectively. With respect to the effect of diesel price 
on diesel consumption in OPEC countries, there are mixed results. While the price of diesel 
has a negative impact on diesel consumption in Algeria, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
the United Arab Emirate, and Venezuela, it has a positive effect on diesel consumption in Iran 
and Libya. However, the effects are significant only in Algeria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Specifically, an increase in the price of diesel by one percent will result in reduction in diesel 
consumption by 0.12, 0.22 and 0.11 percent in Algeria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia respectively.  
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Table 5.8: Country-Specific Results for Petroleum Product Demand using CCEMG 
S/N Country  Income Z-Statistic Price  Z-Statistic 
Gasoline     
1 Algeria 0.205 0.42 -0.016 -0.22 
2 Iran  0.467** 2.07 -0.029* -1.87 
3 Kuwait 0.106*** 2.76 -0.058 -0.63 
4 Libya 0.084 1.53 -0.005 -0.06 
5 Nigeria -0.002 -0.01 -0.132** -2.73 
6 Qatar 0.067 0.76 -0.091 -0.61 
7 Saudi Arabia -0.066 -0.44 -0.130*** -3.59 
8 UAE 0.439 1.16 0.109* 0.38 
9 Venezuela 0.394*** 4.43 0.003 0.41 
Diesel     
1 Algeria 1.046*** 2.90 -0.118*** -2.61 
2 Iran  0.009 0.05 0.014 1.24 
3 Kuwait 0.313** 2.69 -0.215* -1.73 
4 Libya 0.035 0.43 0.059 0.47 
5 Nigeria 0.017 0.04 -0.036 -0.54 
6 Qatar -0.001 0.00 -0.057 -0.48 
7 Saudi Arabia -0.146 -0.79 -0.105** -2.33 
8 UAE 0.559** 2.83 -0.032 -0.50 
9 Venezuela 0.780*** 2.63 -0.003 -0.15 
Kerosene     
1 Algeria 0.507 0.87 -0.069* -1.66 
2 Iran  0.309 0.95 -0.061*** -2.89 
3 Kuwait 0.695** 2.49 -0.117 -0.29 
4 Libya 0.169 1.37 0.078 0.38 
5 Nigeria -0.024 -0.05 -0.053 -0.72 
6 Qatar 0.067 0.19 -0.057 -0.17 
7 Saudi Arabia -0.137 -0.20 -0.179 -0.98 
8 UAE 0.130 0.34 -0.013 0.07 
9 Venezuela 1.267** 2.13 0.115*** 2.89 
Fuel Oil     
1 Algeria 0.511 0.30 -0.004 -0.05 
2 Iran  0.177 0.53 0.001 0.06 
3 Kuwait 0.235 0.84 -0.446 -0.69 
4 Libya 0.119** 1.82 0.001 0.02 
5 Nigeria 0.160 0.22 -0.013 -0.15 
6 Saudi Arabia 0.419 1.21 0.492*** 2.69 
7 UAE 0.317 0.85 -1.139 -1.56 
8 Venezuela 0.053 0.08 0.033 0.89 
*, **, and ***, denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively  
 
Source: Computed by the Author using STATA 13.  
Note: Qatar is omitted in the consumption of diesel equation due to several missing data on fuel oil 
consumption and price 
 
The results of kerosene consumption indicate that per capita income has positive effect 
on kerosene consumption in all countries but Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. However, statistica l 
significance of the effects is only recorded in Kuwait and Venezuela. Going by this, a one 
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percent increase in per capita income in Kuwait and Venezuela will lead to increase in kerosene 
consumption by 0.69 percent and 1.27 percent respectively. From the result, the price of 
kerosene also has negative effect on kerosene consumption in all the countries except Libya 
and Venezuela.  However, this effect is only significant in Algeria and Iran where the elastic ity 
estimate is about 0.07 and 0.06 percent respectively. Price of kerosene is positively and 
significantly related to the kerosene consumption in Venezuela. Specifically, while an increase 
in the price of kerosene in Algeria and Iran by one percent will lead to a decline of 0.07 and 
0.06 percent respectively in kerosene consumption, a similar increase in the price of kerosene 
in Venezuela will increase kerosene consumption by 0.12 percent 
The fuel oil consumption results using CCEMG for each OPEC member countries show 
that per capita income is positively related to fuel oil consumption all the countries considered. 
However, the positive effect of per capita income on fuel oil consumption is only statistica l ly 
significant in Libya. We can infer from the results that an increase in per capita income in Libya 
by one percent will increase for the consumption of fuel oil by 0.12 percent. In the case of pric e 
effects of on fuel oil consumption, the results show that the price of fuel oil has negative impact 
on fuel oil consumption in Algeria, Kuwait, Nigeria, and the United Arab Emirate while it 
exhibits positive effect on the fuel oil consumption in Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Venezue la. 
However, the effect of fuel oil price is only statistically significant consumption in Saudi 
Arabia with elasticity of 0.49.  
 
5.4.2 OPEC fuel subsidies and their impacts 
Four petroleum products considered in this study include gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene 
and fuel oil. The respective retail price per barrel contained in the OPEC statistical bulletin for 
member countries are adopted as the end user consumer price115. In arriving at the reference 
                                                                 
115 The retail prices are available in national currencies and were converted to US dollars for ease of comparison 
using each country’s annual average exchange rate  
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price for each country, we consider the spot price of petroleum products in the three major 
markets-US Gulf, Rotterdam and Singapore and the spot freight rate to major export 
destinations. Both the spot price and the freight rate are adjusted for each country’s oil trade 
pattern and partners. We also consider both the production and consumption data of each 
products in all countries to determine net exporter/importer by fuel type rather than aggregates. 
For instance, while most of the countries are net exporter of oil products on the aggregate, all 
OPEC countries are net importer of one product or the other. 
The study estimates the size of petroleum products subsidies in OPEC member countries 
based on 2013 data. The consumption elasticities116 obtained from section 5.3:4-5 were used 
to compute products’ consumption without the price gap and we estimate the differences in 
consumption and CO2 emissions at subsidised and non-subsidised prices. With these estimates, 
the study calculates the impacts of subsidies on consumption, emissions and welfare for each 
products in OPEC and the 9 countries considered supposing these subsidies are removed. The 
aggregate statistics and product specific details are contained in table 5.9 and 5.10 below 
respectively. 
Table 5.9: Petroleum products’ subsidies and impacts of removal in OPEC 2013 
     Potential Effects of Subsidies on 
 Subsidies 
$USb 
Country 
% of OPEC 
Subsidy 
% of GDP 
Health exp 
% of GDP 
Consumption 
(M'bbl) 
Emission 
(M’ton ) 
welfare 
($USb) 
Algeria 10.96 6.04 4.90 4.92 17.72 7.50 46.28 
Iran 55.39 30.49 15.12 2.73 39.67 16.67 17.45 
Kuwait 8.93 4.91 4.85 2.39 38.53 16.33 8.33 
Libya 8.92 4.91 12.09 3.02 6.36 2.69 26.58 
Nigeria 5.39 2.97 1.04 1.02 5.22 1.99 0.98 
Qatar 4.80 2.64 2.37 1.83 8.13 3.31 5.51 
S/Arabia 49.81 27.42 6.68 2.03 132.87 54.83 13.35 
UAE 11.48 6.32 2.90 2.25 83.37 35.48 1.96 
Venezuela 25.97 14.30 6.94 0.98 16.51 6.49 25.03 
OPEC 181.64 100.00 5.89 NA 348.38 145.29 145.48 
Source: Author’s computation, *NA – not applicable 
                                                                 
116 We apply the respective fuel elasticity of each in each country to arrive at new co nsumption values. Few of 
the country’s fuel elasticity with wrong signs are substituted with OPEC estimates. The substitutions do not 
however exert significant change on the results  
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The results indicate that consumption subsidies on petroleum products in OPEC sum up 
to $US 181.64 billion which is about 6% and 8.8% of GDP and government revenue 
respectively117. Two striking features can be observed from the OPEC aggregate subsidies. 
First, about 74% of the subsidies are on gasoline and diesel oil whereas subsidies on kerosene 
and fuel oil account for about 7% and 19% of the total respectively. As a percent of GDP, 
OPEC subsidies on gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene, and fuel oil estimates are about 1.7%, 2.7%, 
0.4%, and 1.1% of GDP. Second, and more interesting is the fact that just three-member 
countries namely Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela in descending order of magnitude make up 
72.2% of the total subsidies for OPEC. Qatar has the least subsidy estimates followed by 
Nigeria with about $US 4.8 and $US 5.4 billion – about 2.4% and 1% of GDP respectively. 
Except in Algeria, government in all the countries considered expend more on health than fuel 
subsidy as at 2013. Our subsidies estimates are quite similar with the IEA 2013 oil subsidy 
estimates for Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela but contrast with estimates for other 
countries particularly Iran and UAE118. Several factors including the exchange rate adopted 
and what makes up ‘oil’ in the IEA’s fossil fuel classification may account for these differences. 
The average subsidisation rate (ASR) is least in UAE and Nigeria with about 40% and 45% 
respectively and most in Venezuela with 92.6%119. On the whole, the ASR value ranged from 
74% to 89% for the other countries. 
Theoretically, demand will vary inversely with price120. Hence, demand for petroleum 
products is expected to reduce in the absence of price gap121. From table 4.1, the aggregate 
petroleum products consumption for OPEC will decrease by 348.38 million barrels – about 
                                                                 
117 The calculations are based on 2013 statistics and the nine (9) member countries that were considered 
118 See IEA’s World Energy Outlook, (2014) chapter 9 Pp 321. 
119 The ASR is the ratio of price gap to world reference price. The single value reported for each country is the 
average of all products for the country   
120 This is based on the assumption that demand elasticities are negative. The results in section 3 show that one 
or more products in few countries have positive elasticities coefficients, so we replaced such elasticity values 
with that of OPEC which are all negative and significant.   
121 Higher prices of petroleum products will lower demand/consumption that there is no fuel substitution.  
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17.5% of total consumption. Owing to the differences in demand elasticity for each product, 
the prospective saving from oil consumption amounts to 8.1%, 11%, 22%, and 42% for 
gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene, and fuel oil respectively. Fuel oil has the highest saving potentials 
followed by kerosene. While it might be delicate to raise the price of kerosene in some of the 
countries as the product is often consumed by low income households, reforming fuel oil, diesel 
and gasoline which are significantly price inelastic may be a welcome policy option. These 
reduction in consumption is expected to reduce fuel related CO2 emission. As a result, the 
would-be CO2 emissions reduction for OPEC is 145.29 million tons which translates to about 
13.13% of total CO2 emission from oil consumption. Diesel and fuel oil jointly accounts for 
about 79.6% of this potential emission saving while gasoline accounts for about 14.2% of oil 
consumption related CO2 emission in OPEC 
Combining the estimates of percentage change in production and that of consump tion 
with and without the price gap gives the welfare gains122. The welfare gains, assuming there is 
no change in international prices amount to an average of $US 145.48 billion for OPEC (about 
4.7% of GDP). The highest gain of $US 54.5 comes from fuel oil followed by kerosene, diesel 
oil and gasoline in descending order respectively. These potential gains account for about 
0.52%, 0.9%, 1.6%, and 1.8% of GDP for gasoline, diesel, kerosene and fuel oil respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
122 The estimates in table 4.1 are the net of gains and losses depending on whether a country is a net importer or 
exporter of a product. 
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Table 5.10: Impacts of Subsidies by Products 2013 
Countries Fuels 
Consumption 
litres/day 
millions 
Retail 
Price 
$US/ltr 
Subsidy 
$USb 
Emission 
Saving 
(Mt) 
Potential 
welfare 
gain 
$USb 
Saving as % 
of 
Consumption 
ALGERIA 
Gasoline 12.83 0.18 2.62 0.25 1.58 2.26 
Diesel  32.92 0.11 7.75 6.59 2.97 20.44 
Kerosene 1.80 0.01 0.44 0.40 22.91 23.31 
Fuel oil 0.72 0.02 0.15 0.27 18.82 38.72 
IRAN, I.R. 
Gasoline 62.73 6.12 9.62 1.10 0.52 2.03 
Diesel  98.55 0.82 30.74 1.88 7.87 1.95 
Kerosene 16.61 0.82 4.34 2.34 6.60 14.94 
Fuel oil 54.64 1.63 10.69 11.35 2.47 21.23 
KUWAIT 
Gasoline 10.45 0.25 2.15 0.59 1.11 6.57 
Diesel  9.01 0.19 1.99 2.31 1.56 26.24 
Kerosene 3.07 0.19 0.60 0.42 1.39 14.41 
Fuel oil 20.95 0.06 4.18 13.01 4.27 63.42 
LIBYA 
Gasoline 14.07 0.12 3.47 0.11 2.85 0.95 
Diesel  15.59 0.13 3.83 0.19 2.50 1.25 
Kerosene 1.50 0.06 0.35 0.13 5.07 8.97 
Fuel oil 6.16 0.02 1.26 2.26 16.15 37.49 
NIGERIA 
Gasoline 43.55 0.62 3.85 1.60 0.20 4.28 
Kerosene 8.47 0.74 1.54 0.39 0.78 4.88 
QATAR 
Gasoline 4.71 0.25 0.92 0.40 1.05 9.80 
Diesel  6.30 0.27 1.46 0.41 1.15 6.59 
Kerosene 9.14 0.11 2.42 2.51 3.30 29.17 
S/ARABIA 
Gasoline 80.21 0.14 14.47 12.29 1.76 17.83 
Diesel  116.01 0.07 24.52 24.08 4.34 21.21 
Kerosene 11.13 0.12 1.81 2.58 1.92 24.60 
Fuel oil 57.89 0.04 9.02 15.88 5.33 28.04 
UAE 
Gasoline 21.30 0.45 2.34 0.35 0.33 1.93 
Diesel  14.69 0.62 0.78 0.10 0.12 0.67 
Kerosene 16.34 0.49 1.08 0.19 0.18 1.21 
Fuel oil 46.19 0.16 7.29 34.85 1.32 77.09 
VENEZUELA 
Gasoline 47.56 0.01 13.15 3.89 6.47 9.53 
Diesel  39.60 0.01 10.94 0.30 6.26 0.78 
Kerosene 1.04 0.70 0.26 0.09 6.21 9.63 
Fuel oil 7.70 0.01 1.61 2.20 6.10 29.22 
OPEC 
Gasoline 331.38 ---- 52.58 20.58 15.89 8.05 
Diesel  391.05 ---- 82.00 35.86 26.77 11.01 
Kerosene 82.80 ---- 12.86 9.03 48.37 13.88 
Fuel oil 233.56 ---- 34.20 79.83 54.45 41.99 
Source: Author’s estimation 
Note: While fuel oil is not consumed in Qatar since 2005, Nigeria only subsidise gasoline and 
kerosene having deregulated diesel prices since 2004.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we conduct an analysis of domestic demand for petroleum products and by 
extension, estimate the magnitude of fuel subsidies, the embedded economic costs, and the 
associated environmental and welfare effect of these subsidies in OPEC member countries. 
Both the panel and country specific results show that historical prices in OPEC member 
countries have been consistently too low to impact a significant effect on demand. However, 
this should not be misconstrued to imply that raising the domestic end user prices of these 
petroleum products cannot bring about significant reduction in excess demand for these 
products. 
Overall, two things can be inferred from the results. First, all petroleum products 
considered are in general, highly price inelastic. The indication from these is the potential for 
price reforms as most of the countries studied presently maintain high subsidies on fuel prices. 
The low sensitivity of demand to changes in their prices suggests that price reforms and fuel 
taxes can on their own achieve a win-win solution to improved revenue, energy conservation 
and CO2 emission reduction. Second, the price elasticity values are generally lower compared 
to what obtained in the literatures, Bhattacharyya and Blake (2009) reported between (0.008 
&-1.064) and (-0.033 & -2.694) while Dahl (2012) estimates ranged between (-0.11 & -0.33) 
and (-0.13 & 0.38) for gasoline and diesel fuel elasticities respectively123. Our estimated values 
ranges between -0.003 & 0.29; -0.006 & -0.19; -0.05 & -0.26; and -0.01 & 0.39 for gasoline, 
diesel, kerosene and fuel oil respectively. This may be due to the structure-based cointegrat ion 
approach employed in the study as against the levels-based approach commonly employed by 
previous studies. 
                                                                 
123 The Bhattacharyya and Blake (2009) study covers MENA countries while  Dahl (2012) developed his 
elasticities from wide-reaching historical studies  
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The nine OPEC member countries considered in this study account for about 70% (36%) 
of the IEA estimated global oil (fossil fuel) consumption subsidies for 2013. Our findings show 
that removing these subsidies can reduce oil consumption and CO2 emission by as low as 5.2 
million barrels and 1.99 million tons in Nigeria to as high as 132.9 million barrels and 54.8 
million tons in Saudi Arabia respectively. The associated aggregate welfare gains amounts to 
about 4.7% of member countries’ GDP. The import of these is that OPEC member countries 
need to reform these oil subsidies to check inefficient consumptions and minimise CO2 
emissions. However, the differences in products’ elasticities implied that countries need to 
consider each fuel individually and design subsidy reform policy in line with country’s 
peculiarities and social objectives.  
In conclusion, OPEC member countries need to urgently address these inefficient fuel 
subsidy by putting in place a well-designed subsidy reform and fuel tax policies within the 
context of their national macroeconomic policy. This will in addition to resolving the fiscal 
burden associated with subsidies, assist member countries to meet their emission reduction 
targets and improve social welfare.   
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6 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
Major efforts are currently on in several countries globally to cut or abolish end users 
fuel subsidies which do not only creates huge fiscal burden and encourage wasteful fuel 
consumption but also results in welfare loss and exacerbates carbon pollution. Fuel subsidies 
are very predominant in OPEC with member countries accounting for about 51% of the 
estimated global petroleum product subsidies in 2013. Therefore, this study assesses the scope 
of fuel subsidies and evaluates the economic, environmental and welfare effects in oil exporting 
countries. Following a specific to general approach, the investigation focus on Nigeria and later 
extends to OPEC. The first two chapters covers the introduction and general literature while 
the three major research question of the thesis are addressed in chapters three, four and five 
respectively. In spite of the numerous call for the elimination of fuel subsidies globally, my 
general conclusion is that subsidies may persist for a long time than anticipated. While there 
are enough arguments in favour of fuel subsidy removal, the literature is also rich with equally 
compelling opinions against cutting subsidies. However, not only has this study lends a voice 
to the most contentious areas of the fuel subsidy debate, it has applied unique and robust 
methodology to add value and provide new evidences. Based on the analysis conducted in the 
study, the following conclusions can be drawn from the results. 
In chapter three, the study investigates how the benefits from fuel subsidies accrue to 
each household group using the Nigerian household group using the 2009/10 World Bank 
Harmonized Living Standard Survey. Two conclusions can be drawn from the findings. First, 
we have evidence to conclude that fuel subsidy is inefficient mechanism to assist the poor since 
income transfer equivalent to subsidy on either fuel will be less equitable than the origina l 
distribution of income. Second, while fuel subsidies may be poorly targeted and benefit the 
rich more, the outcome may be fuel specific. In the Nigerian case, kerosene subsidy is more 
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evenly distributed across income groups while petrol subsidy is concentrated to high income 
groups.  
The recent reduction of gasoline subsidy in January, 2012 and the resolve of the Nigerian 
government to continue form the focus of the question addressed in chapter four where we 
examine the economic effects of the removal and also simulate the impact of reinjecting 
subsidy saving back into the economy using the Input-Output and SAM multiplier approach. 
We can conclude from the results that fuel subsidy removal exerts disproportionate effects 
across sectors consistent with the extent of each sector’s use of gasoline. It is also important 
for countries to have well-structured and targeted plan on the re-injection of the subsidy saving 
before subsidy removal. While subsidy removal may increase government revenue, poor 
households may suffer if saving are not reinjected back into the economy. However, reinjecting 
subsidy saving ultimately led to significant increase in GDP and investment in all sectors; 
increases government revenue and foreign saving; raised factor incomes; and lead to higher 
aggregate household saving.  
Chapter five employed 1980-2013 panel data on fuel consumption, prices and income to 
estimate fuel elasticities and subsidies and evaluate the effects on consumption, pollution and 
welfare for OPEC as a group and member countries in specific. Three conclusions can be drawn 
from the results. First, the results show that fuel subsidy estimates are large and growing 
particularly in OPEC countries and the need to intensify reform process is now.  Second, though 
the historical fuel prices in countries studied appear excessively low to impact significantly on 
fuel consumption, this however does not imply that raising the domestic prices of these fuels 
cannot bring about substantial reduction in consumption. Third, the petroleum products 
generally have low price elastic in OPEC countries which suggests that reforming fuel prices 
and taxes can assist member countries to improved revenue, reduce wasteful fuel consumption 
and reduce CO2 emission. 
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6.2 Recommendations 
6.2.1 Policy Recommendation 
The main recommendations of this study are summarized as follows.  
 Countries need to intensify their efforts to remove fuel subsidy by liberalizing the price or 
by setting a robust price adjustment mechanism that reflects changing market conditions. 
 Subsidies on fuel consumed majorly by the poor (e.g. kerosene) should be retained pending 
the provision and access to alternatives like LPG. This is not only because of the likely 
burden on the poor but due to its environmental advantages over biomass.   
 To address public hostilities to fuel subsidy reforms, governments must ensure that subsidy 
removal must be gradual and appropriately timed on the one hand and on the other, be 
certain that proceeds from the removal of the subsidy are reinjected back into the economy 
or are actually used for the benefit of the broad population.  
 
6.2.2 Suggestion for future Research   
While the study has investigated a range of issues on fuel subsidies from specific to 
general, additional efforts are required to generalise on some of the study conclusions. First, 
the evidence on the distribution of fuel subsidies focussed on Nigeria due to the household 
survey date required to apply the BIA methodology. It will be important to conduct similar 
investigations for other highly subsidising countries to generate new evidence and enhance 
further application of the method to the distribution of fuel subsidy benefits. Second, the 
evaluation of the socio-economic effects of subsidy removal focussed on gasoline in Nigeria 
due to data on countries’ input-output table and SAM. The analysis may be extended to other 
fuels particularly in many large subsidising countries that have been reducing or elimina ting 
fossil fuel subsidies in the last few years. The outcome from the Nigerian gasoline subsidy 
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experience can also be verified with the application of other advance general equilibr ium 
models.   
6.3 Contribution of the Thesis 
This investigations conducted in this thesis are unique in many ways.  
First, the specific analysis on Nigeria is distinctive and very motivating based on the 
application of the BIA approach. While studies have examined the distribution of fuel subsidy 
benefits in several countries, none has applied the Benefit Incidence Analysis (BIA) approach. 
This method have been used extensively by economists to analyse the benefit incidence of 
government subsidy on health, education and other social services and also to electricity and 
other sources of power in Colombia by the World Bank in 1994, this will be the first attempt 
to examine the distribution and incidence of petroleum subsidies with the BIA method. 
Second, despite the numerous and constant downward review of fuel subsidy by the 
Nigerian governments, available records indicate that no attempt has been made to evaluate the 
effects of a single attempt on both the people and the economy. Between 1978 and 2012, end 
user price of gasoline was adjusted 20 times on the ground of huge financial burden and the 
need to stimulate investment in the oil sector of the country. This is the first study on record to 
assess a reference point of subsidy removal and saving reinjection in Nigeria and provides 
detailed economic impact on economic sectors, agents and the macro economy at large.  
Third and final, despite the rich literature on fuel demand, this is the first attempt to apply 
the CCEMG estimation technique to study fuel consumption generally and for OPEC in 
particular. While the possible impact of fuel subsidy have been examine for many of the OPEC 
countries individually, going by available records, this will also be the first study to document 
evidence on the effects of OPEC fuel subsidies on fuel consumption, emission and welfare.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendices 4A Deriving the Leontief Equation 
The simple mathematical relationships of the I–O model can be expressed as 
𝓆𝑖 =  𝑧𝑖1 + 𝑧𝑖2 + ⋯ +  𝑧𝑖𝑗 + ⋯ +  𝑧𝑖𝑛 + 𝑓𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝑓𝑖     ………A.1 
Where (𝑞𝑖) and (𝑓𝑖) are the output of sector 𝑖 and final demand for sector 𝑖’s products while 
(𝑧𝑖𝑗 ) is the intermediate sales by sector 𝑖  to all sector 𝑗  including itself – all in monetary 
values124.  
It follows therefore that an economy with n sectors will have similar n-equations classifying 
the sales of output of each sector as: 
𝓆1 = 𝑧11 + 𝑧12 + ⋯ +  𝑧1𝑗 + ⋯ +  𝑧1𝑛 + 𝑓1 
⋮  
𝓆𝑖 =  𝑧𝑖1 + 𝑧𝑖2 + ⋯ +  𝑧𝑖𝑗  + ⋯ + 𝑧𝑖𝑛 + 𝑓𝑖  
⋮ 
𝓆𝑛 = 𝑧𝑛1 + 𝑧𝑛2 + ⋯ + 𝑧𝑛𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝑧𝑛𝑛 + 𝑓𝑛      ……………A.2 
 
Applying matrix notations, the systems of equations in (A.2) can be shortened as (A.4) where: 
𝓆 = (
𝑥1
⋮
𝑥𝑛
) ; 𝑍 = (
𝑧11 ⋯ 𝑧1𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑧𝑛1 ⋯ 𝑧𝑛𝑛
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓 = (
𝑓1
⋮
𝑓𝑛
)      ...…………A.3 
𝓆 =  𝑍𝑖 + 𝑓         …………...A.4 
The associated technical coefficient, defined as the ratio of input to output turn out to be: 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =  
𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑞𝑗
 =
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓  𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡  𝑖  𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑜𝑓  𝑗
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  𝑗 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑
    …………...A.5 
Though, it is logical that additional production will require more inputs, the Leontief 
production function fundamentally differs from the classical and other production functions  in 
that its technical coefficient (𝑎𝑖𝑗 ) is regarded as quantifying fixed relationship between a 
sector’s output and its inputs as depicted in simple geometry in figure 3 below125. Since 𝑎𝑖𝑗 𝑞𝑗 =
 𝑧𝑖𝑗 from (A.5), the Leontief model invariably becomes
126 𝑞𝑗 =  
𝑧1𝑗
𝑎1𝑗
=  
𝑧2𝑗
𝑎2𝑗
= ⋯ =  
𝑧𝑛𝑗
𝑎𝑛𝑗
. It is 
obvious from figure 3 that once the ratio of inputs 1 to 2 combination is known (say,  𝑧2𝑗 𝑧1𝑗⁄ ), 
                                                                 
124 Note that the volume of final demands (𝐹𝑖 ) is net of competitive imports for product (𝑖) 
125 The notion that the set of technical coefficients are fixed has two implications. First, inputs are used in fixed 
proportions by sectors and the second is that the Leontief Í-Ò model discounts economies of scale in production 
and assumes constant returns to scale.   
126 Usually, the Í-Ò model will specify the production function 𝑞𝑗as min (
𝑧1𝑗
𝑎1𝑗
,
𝑧2𝑗
𝑎2𝑗
, … ,
𝑧𝑛𝑗
𝑎𝑛𝑗
) where min (a, b, c) 
implies the smallest of the numbers a, b and c. The main reason is that when a specific input (i) is not used in the 
production of (j), (𝑎𝑖𝑗 ) will be equal zero and (
𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑖𝑗
) becomes infinitely large   
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(𝑞𝑗) can only be increased by added quantities of ‘both’ and NOT ‘either’ of input 1 and 2 as 
they are used in fixed proportion. 
Substituting equation (A.5) in (A.2), we obtain (A.6): 
𝓆1 = 𝑎11𝑞1 + 𝑎12 𝑞2 + ⋯ + 𝑎1𝑖𝑞1 + ⋯ + 𝑎1𝑛𝑞𝑛 + 𝑓1 
⋮ 
𝓆𝑖 =  𝑎1𝑖 𝑞1 + 𝑎𝑖2𝑞2 + ⋯ +  𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑞i + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑞𝑛 + 𝑓i  
⋮ 
𝓆𝑛 = 𝑎𝑛1 𝑞1 + 𝑎𝑛2𝑞2 + ⋯ +  𝑎𝑛𝑖 𝑞i + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑞𝑛 + 𝑓n      ……………A.6 
Since 𝑓1, … , 𝑓n  are known values and the coefficients 𝑎𝑖𝑗  are also known, the unknown 
𝑞1,… , 𝑞𝑛 can be found by making all 𝑞 terms the subjects in their respective equation and 
representing them compactly in matrix form. This will yield the Leontief Matrix as: 
𝓆 =  𝒜𝓆 + 𝔣           ……………A.7 
𝓆(𝐼 − 𝒜) = 𝔣          ..…………..A.8 
The existence of a unique solution to equation (A.8) depends on whether or not (𝐼 − 𝒜) is 
singular i.e. the existence or otherwise of the inverse (𝐼 − 𝒜)−1.  Once |𝐼 − 𝒜| ≠ 0, then 
(𝐼 − 𝒜)−1 = [(1 |𝐼 − 𝒜|⁄ ){𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝐼 − 𝒜)}] and the unique solution to (A.8) can be obtained by 
applying standard matrix algebra as:  
𝓆 = (𝐼 − 𝒜)−1𝑓 = 𝑳𝑓          ……………A.9 
Equation (A.9) is a summary whose details can be written as: 
𝓆1 = 𝑙11𝑓1 + 𝑙12𝑓2 + ⋯ +  𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑓j + ⋯ + 𝑙1𝑛𝑓𝑛 
⋮ 
𝓆𝑖 =  𝑙𝑖1𝑓1 + 𝑙𝑖2𝑓2 + ⋯ +  𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑓j + ⋯ + 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑛  
⋮ 
𝓆𝑛 = 𝑙𝑛1𝑓1 + 𝑙𝑛2𝑓2 + ⋯ + 𝑙𝑛𝑗𝑓j + ⋯ + 𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑛     ……………A.10 
The detail equations provided in (A.10) shows clearly that each of the gross outputs depends 
on the value of each of the final demand. For instance, it is obvious that 𝑑𝓆𝑖 𝑑𝑓𝑗 =⁄  𝑙𝑖𝑗 by 
applying partial derivatives in calculus 
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Appendices 4B: The Simple SAM Framework127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
127 the SAM is a modified version of Round (2003) by the authors in line with the structure of the Nigerian SAM 
used in this study 
Activities Commodities Labour Capital Household Government
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Activities 1
Domestic supply 
(gross output 
less export)
Export Gross input
Commodities 2
Total 
intermediate 
input
Private 
consumption
Government 
consumption
Inventory and 
investment
Total 
Absorption
Labour 3
Wages and 
Salaries
Total Wage 
income
Capital 4
Operating 
surplus + 
Consumption of 
Fixed capital
Total  capital 
income
Household 5
Wages and 
salaries 
Operating 
surplus + 
depreciation 
Total h/hold 
Expenditure 
Governmentt 6
Indirect tax 
–subsidies 
Direct tax 
Total Govt. 
expenditure 
7
Private savings 
(Total Factor 
Income - direct 
tax - Private 
consumption)
Government 
savings (net tax- 
government 
consumption 
–reserves) 
Total 
investment
8
Total Imports 
(competitive 
and non-
competitive)
Reserves 
(Export - total 
imports) 
Foreign 
exchange 
Gross output Total Absorption
Total wage 
income
Total capital 
income
Total h/hold 
income
Total 
government 
income
Total Savings
Foreign 
exchange
Capital account
Rest of world
EXPENDITURES 
Production
Factors
Institutions
Rest of world
Total Expenditure
Total Receipts
Production Factors Institutions Capital 
account
R
E
C
E
I
P
T
S
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Appendices 5A: Individual Countries’ Unit Root Test Statistics 
  ADF KPSS PP 
C
r
it
ic
a
l 
V
a
lu
e
s 
 Intercept Intercept & 
Trend 
Intercept Intercept & 
Trend 
Intercept Intercept & 
Trend 
Levels -2.957 -3.553 0.463 0.146 -2.954 -3.553 
First Difference -2.957 -3.558 0.463 0.146 -2.957 -3.558 
ALGERIA 
GC Levels -1.5513 -0.7224 0.2273** 0.1167** -1.5074 -1.5267 
First Difference -2.2748 -2.5119 0.2137** 0.2064 -5.6315** -5.6701** 
GP Levels -2.1693 -2.0254 0.5982 0.1434** -2.1031 -2.3149 
First Difference -4.5879** -4.4918** 0.2327** 0.0462** -4.5850** -4.4904** 
DIC Levels 1.3094 -0.2366 0.5757 0.1773 4.1426 0.9037 
First Difference -4.3347** -4.8365** 0.3228** 0.1109** -3.4801** -5.0636** 
DP Levels -2.1913 -2.8397 0.6334** 0.0740** -2.2463 -3.0828 
First Difference -5.1905** -5.0760** 0.1777** 0.1279** -6.5270** -6.2629** 
KC Levels -2.7133* -2.5789 0.2179** 0.1621 -2.9877** -2.3562 
First Difference -5.2118** -5.2923** 0.3716** 0.5000 -5.5514** -7.1619** 
KP Levels -1.4211 -2.5087 0.6441** 0.0941** -1.3216 -2.3530 
First Difference -5.1714** -5.0885** 0.1698** 0.1641 -5.8223** -5.7224** 
FOC Levels -2.0323 -1.8273 0.5153 0.1733 -2.0162 -1.7180 
First Difference -4.8310** -4.8486** 0.2061** 0.1696 -4.7589** -5.4545** 
FOP Levels -1.6588 -2.0894 0.2615** 0.1470 -1.7732 -2.1941 
First Difference -4.9841 -5.0291 0.1582** 0.0608** -4.9828 -5.0318 
PCI Levels -0.5088 -0.6057 0.3567** 0.1604 -0.2598 -0.9928 
First Difference -3.0164** -3.1999 0.2725** 0.1006** -3.0818** -3.1688 
IRAN 
GC Levels -0.5616 -3.0207 0.6344 0.0934** -0.6477 -1.8331 
First Difference -4.3822** -4.2807** 0.1128** 0.1136** -4.4465** -4.3816** 
GP Levels -2.5406 -2.7411 0.3012** 0.1139** -2.6084 -2.7924 
First Difference -5.4551** -5.3839** 0.1795** 0.1796 -6.5633** -6.9733** 
DIC Levels -0.9390 -2.7404 0.6796 0.0987** -0.9646 -2.7366 
First Difference -6.9956** -6.9552** 0.0895** 0.0774** -6.9931** -6.9502** 
DP Levels -4.4787** -4.4274** 0.0932** 0.0809** -4.4147** -4.3533** 
First Difference -7.7381** -7.6118** 0.5000 0.5000 -20.5473** -21.2212** 
KC Levels -1.5313 -1.6816 0.2098** 0.1999 -1.6002 -1.4760 
First Difference -6.0470** -6.8192** 0.3433** 0.5000 -6.0442** -8.5920** 
KP Levels -3.9996** -3.9435** 0.1034** 0.0834** -4.0085** -3.9525 
First Difference -7.5961** -7.4690** 0.3542** 0.3803 -12.5682** -12.3932** 
FOC Levels -1.8182 -3.1363 0.7188 0.1023** -1.7567 -3.1363 
First Difference -6.5869** -6.5383** 0.1228** 0.0819** -6.9147** -7.0975** 
FOP Levels -2.0937 -2.4814 0.2988** 0.1370** -2.1950 -2.5329 
 First Difference -5.5605** -5.4441** 0.2799** 0.3161 -6.1785** -7.0644** 
PCI Levels -0.5087 -0.6057 0.3566** 0.1605 -0.2598 -0.9927 
First Difference -3.0164** -3.1999 0.2725** 0.1006** -3.0817** -3.1688 
KUWAIT 
GC Levels 0.2254 -2.3623 0.6447 0.1641 1.18690 -1.9125 
First Difference -5.3989** -5.6695** 0.2830** 0.2605 -5.2485** -8.3595** 
GP Levels -1.7279 -2.2209  0.7231 0.1012** -1.7209 -2.3293 
First Difference -4.7774** -4.8616** 0.1415** 0.1002** -4.7774** -4.9117** 
DIC Levels -2.1494 -2.1075 0.1627** 0.1607 -2.1034 -2.0586 
First Difference -6.3009** -8.5548** 0.1028** 0.0932** -6.4359** -6.4427** 
DP Levels -3.4688** -3.6104** 0.7133 0.0806** -3.4276** -3.6083** 
First Difference -4.2674** -4.6090** 0.3089** 0.1034** -4.2771** -4.6961** 
KC Levels 2.6598 2.1147 0.3662** 0.1492 9.4681 5.5152 
First Difference 0.5198 0.1236 0.3436** 0.1323** 0.5198 0.1236 
KP Levels -3.2593** -2.5183 0.6944 0.0988** -3.1001** -2.5250 
First Difference -3.7129** -4.2588** 0.2691** 0.1016** -3.8504** -4.4254** 
FOC Levels -0.7992 -1.8836 0.5599 0.1353** -0.7580 -1.9199 
First Difference -5.7197** -5.5914** 0.1322** 0.1267** -5.7193** -5.5849** 
FOP Levels -2.0119 -0.9908 0.5825 0.1476 -1.4091 -2.2843 
First Difference -2.0572 -0.8395 0.0941** 0.0905** -5.1936** -5.0959** 
151 
 
PCI Levels -2.4574 -3.1019 0.3649** 0.0830** -3.8669* -2.6906 
First Difference -5.0054** -4.6561** 0.1788** 0.1252** -9.3786** -9.6382** 
LIBYA 
GC Levels 2.9315 -.03049 0.6618 0.2005 5.4652 -0.4157 
First Difference -1.5748 -3.7015** 0.4125** 0.2724 -6.2822** -13.2265** 
GP Levels -1.1740 -2.7684 0.4612** 0.1343** -0.6077 -2.1716 
First Difference -3.7951** -3.8371** 0.1937** 0.0976** -3.6244** -3.6592** 
DIC Levels -1.1579 -2.7811 0.5797 0.1079** -0.7372 -2.1455* 
First Difference -6.041** -5.8813** 0.2002** 0.2138 -5.4780** -5.4165** 
DP Levels -1.4933 -1.7816 0.2138** 0.1331** -1.6649 -1.9161 
First Difference -4.4057** -4.4008** 0.1587** 0.0901** -4.4246** -4.3689** 
KC Levels -0.7629 -1.4705 0.6902 0.1199** -1.4421 -4.1877** 
First Difference -7.2889** -7.1079** 0.2114** 0.1177** -10.3991** -9.2886** 
KP Levels -0.8813 -1.9754 0.4281** 0.1540 -1.0559 -2.0390 
First Difference -4.5269** -4.6022** 0.2033** 0.0908** -4.5270** -4.6205** 
FOC Levels -2.7826 -1.4895 0.4422** 0.1916 -2.6958 -2.1461 
First Difference -8.4301** -8.8857** 0.3786** 0.2841 -8.6116** -12.1408** 
FOP Levels -0.7481 -1.7773 0.5952 0.1018** -0.7456 -1.8274 
First Difference -5.6071** -5.5128** 0.1191** 0.1191** -5.6071** -5.5127** 
PCI Levels -5.1708** -4.5336** 0.2976** 0.1517** -5.4122** -4.7455** 
First Difference -6.4436** -6.5217** 0.3923** 0.1148** -6.4980** -6.6309** 
NIGERIA 
GC Levels 1.1925 -1.1821 0.7459 0.1699 1.9337 -1.1349 
First Difference -3.5688** -3.9058** 0.3331** 0.0932** -3.5286** -3.2465** 
GP Levels -1.1843 -3.7029** 0.4319** 0.1011** -1.4693 -2.1585 
First Difference -4.4465** -4.4417** 0.1164** 0.0546** -4.4465** -4.4613** 
DIC Levels -2.4224 -2.5809 0.2518** 0.1125** -2.4892 -2.6631 
First Difference -4.9386** -4.7565** 0.0942** 0.0923** -4.6594** -4.4334** 
DP Levels 0.1646 -1.7933 0.6291 0.1589 0.1646 -1.7933** 
First Difference -4.5973** -4.7678** 0.2313** 0.0412** -4.5973** -4.7136** 
KC Levels -2.5393 -3.3617 0.5423 0.1208** -2.5393 -3.3617 
First Difference -8.0009** -4.4267** 0.2284** 0.2163 -9.8479** -10.4073** 
KP Levels -2.1693 -1.8262 0.5390 0.1497 -2.1592 -2.9581 
First Difference -4.9538** -5.0455** 0.2294** 0.2291 -8.5863** -8.0005** 
FOC Levels -1.8910 -3.6852** 0.5889 0.0965** -1.8739 -3.6852** 
First Difference -6.8884** -6.7708** 0.4127** 0.3377 -8.3517** -8.2510** 
FOP Levels -0.0973 -1.4690 0.5333 0.1160** 0.0969 -1.4705 
First Difference -6.2515** -6.6296** 0.2699** 0.0885** -6.2389** -6.6937** 
PCI Levels 0.3533 -2.4458 0.4507** 0.2026 -0.1534 -2.4322 
First Difference -4.8098** -5.7419** 0.6578** 0.0837** -4.8164** -5.8389** 
QATAR 
GC Levels 3.3282 0.7147 0.7015 0.1922  1.8322 -0.4565 
First Difference -63051** -5.9443** 0.4898 0.0452** -6.3169** -7.6876** 
GP Levels 1.5828 -1.3489 0.7589 0.0901** -1.2515 -2.4649 
First Difference -1.0217 -2.6785 0.1115** 0.1086** -4.8349** -4.7728** 
DIC Levels -0.4056 -1.8312 0.5772 0.1784 0.2268 -1.3230 
First Difference -3.4860** -3.5979** 0.2802** 0.0870** -3.4860** -3.5578** 
DP Levels -1.6434 -2.7934 0.6873 0.0749** -1.5019 -2.6857 
First Difference -4.4217** -4.3496** 0.1211** 0.1186** -3.6819** -3.4331** 
KC Levels -1.1246 -0.3794 0.3131** 0.1287** 0.4578 -0.3794 
First Difference -0.0086 0.2975 0.3265** 0.1320** -0.0086 3.0623 
KP Levels -2.7010* -2.9638 0.4157** 0.1566 -8.9294** -6.7074** 
First Difference -3.8468** -4.0862** 0.3492** 0.1104** -3.6757** -4.0792** 
PCI Levels -0.5025 -2.6453 0.4979 0.1864 -0.0246 -1.9922 
First Difference -3.0447** -3.3151* 0.3518** 0.1207** -3.1105** -3.3593* 
SAUDI ARABIA 
GC Levels 0.3878 -0.6398 0.6208 0.1637 -0.1408 -1.2335 
First Difference -4.5256** -4.7751** 0.1628** 0.0939** -4.5505** -4.7751** 
GP Levels -1.7325 -1.6114 0.1573** 0.1392** -1.8741 -16843 
First Difference -5.4786** -5.5011** 0.1385** 0.1446** -5.4798** -6.0833** 
DIC Levels 2.2072 0.1759 0.7467 0.1876 2.8971 0.4766 
First Difference -4.5124** -5.2608** 0.4909 0.1432** -4.4503** -5.3502** 
DP Levels -1.5511 -1.3606 0.4864 0.1429 -1.5511 -1.4024 
First Difference -5.5271** -5.5635** 0.1568** 0.0831** 5.5271** -5.5630** 
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KC Levels -6.2620** -1.4008 0.3960** 0.1706** -1.9877 -1.5434 
First Difference -3.4116** -4.6394** 0.2195** 0.0635** -4.5115** -4.6394** 
KP Levels -2.1139 -2.2216 0.2883** 0.1114** -2.1831 -2.2216 
First Difference -5.6463** -5.5753** 0.0949** 0.0985** -5.8313** -5.7850** 
FOC Levels -2.3686 -1.8943 0.6463 0.1739 -2.3121 -2.1129 
First Difference -4.4361** -4.4208** 0.2936** 0..0978 -4.4579** -4.3939** 
FOP Levels -6.6383** -2.1394 0.3838** 0.1184** -1.3255 -2.1246 
First Difference -4.4695 -4.6926** 0.1923** 0.0812** -4.4695** -4.7161** 
PCI Levels -2.8150* -3.2884* 0.1823** 0.1825 -2.7096 -3.3022 
First Difference -2.7912* -4.2376** 0.5269 0.1131** -2.6701* -4.4204** 
UAE 
GC Levels -2.2723 -2.0976 0.1288** 0.0925** -2.6137 -2.4812 
First Difference -6.9390** -6.9255** 0.0966** 0.0556** -6.9390** -6.9255** 
GP Levels -2.1116 -1.1629 0.3312** 0.1475 -1.3255 -1.1629 
First Difference -3.1154** -3.0711 0.1216** 0.0826** -3.3349** -3.2260** 
DIC Levels -0.6336 -3.2317 0.6540 0.0697** 0.3518 -4.0765** 
First Difference -5.1362** -4.8950** 0.1765** 0.1053** -5.1849** -4.9212** 
DP Levels -1.6739 -1.8599 0.2125** 0.1751 -1.6003 -1.6874 
First Difference -5.7243** -5.7517** 0.2866** 0.5000 -5.9502** -9.6064** 
KC Levels -1.2090 -1.7740 0.2045** 0.1705 -1.6063 -1.7746 
First Difference -2.9876** -3.2392* 0.3179** 0.1074** -3.0168** -3.2387* 
KP Levels -1.7912 -1.7831 0.1634** 0.1593 -1.4770 -1.3037 
First Difference -4.0002** -3.9380** 0.1936** 0.0717** -3.9876** -3.9164** 
FOC Levels -0.8142 -1.4486 0.2700** 0.1743 -1.1696 -1.5141 
First Difference -4.4997** -4.8942** 0.2769** 0.0952** -4.5986** -4.8939** 
FOP Levels -5.6813** -3.1167 0.7050 0.1938 -18.8777 9.6257** 
 First Difference -1.6210 -3.5684** 0.6313 0.1799 -4.5567** -5.9416** 
PCI Levels -2.6540 -3.2675 0.6386 0.1045** -2.3473 -2.5254 
First Difference -3.6494** -3.7765** 0.2153** 0.1437** -3.6618*** -3.8421** 
VENEZUELA 
GC Levels 1.4776  -3.5468* 0.6638 0.2032 1.1052 -3.4176 
First Difference -9.2250** -9.6472** 0.3935** 0.3962 -10.520** -29.553** 
GP Levels -1.2401 -2.4359  0.4432** 0.0960** -1.5192 -2.6299 
First Difference -4.9577** -4.9794** 0.1130** 0.0627** -4.9662** -4.9990** 
DIC Levels  2.9991 -0.3536 0.5767 0.2067 3.1839 -0.2346 
First Difference -6.8927** -6.4731** 0.7383 0.5000 -6.8524** -18.443** 
DP Levels -1.3323 -1.6033 0.2124** 0.1551 -1.5429 -1.7008 
First Difference -4.3452** -4.3569** 0.1549** 0.0825** -4.1995** -4.2743** 
KC Levels -1.5285 1.4753 0.5718 0.1573 -1.5434 -2.0048 
First Difference -2.3569 -2.8779 0.4612** 0.1715* -2.4127 -2.9381 
KP Levels -2.2700 -2.2813 0.1398** 0.1377** -2.2498 -2.2347 
First Difference -6.6582** -6.6555** 0.1273** 0.0759** -6.7756** -7.0503** 
FOC Levels -1.7809 -2.4352 0.2629** 0.1792 -1.8844 -1.9564 
First Difference -3.8518** -3.6513** 0.1004** 0.1006** -3.8599** -3.6513** 
FOP Levels -2.2345 -2.4423 0.2009** 0.1393** -2.3346 -2.4766 
First Difference -6.8609** -6.8697** 0.1101** 0.0460** -6.8422** -6.9478** 
PCI Levels -1.8670 -2.1546 0.1671** 0.1374** -1.8670 -2.2238 
First Difference -4.4260** -4.5411** 0.2435** 0.0912** -4.3113** -4.8848** 
 
 
